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I N  M I D D L E  I N C O M E  C O U N T R I E S
Einar Braathen, Julian May, Marianne S. Ulriksen 
and Gemma Wright
Declining global poverty?
According to recent World Bank estimates, there ‘has been marked 
progress on reducing poverty over the past decades. The world attained 
the first Millennium Development Goal target – to cut the 1990 poverty 
rate in half by 2015 – five years ahead of schedule, in 2010.’1 Thus, the 
World Bank estimates that while 1.9 billion people lived on less than 
$1.25 a day in 1990, in 2011 this number had dropped to just over 
one billion. In relative terms, there has been a drop from 43 per cent 
of people in the developing world living at or below $1.25 in 1990 to 
17 per cent in 2011.
World Bank poverty estimates have been criticized on a number of 
fronts. Pogge and Sengupta argue that the decline in poverty conceals 
the fact that the threshold for being poor has been defined ever more 
narrowly and that, in any case, to define poverty in terms of daily 
expenditure levels of $1.25 is ‘absurdly low’ (Pogge and Sengupta 
2015: 578). Edward and Sumner (2014) also caution against too much 
optimism. There may have been some progress in addressing extreme 
poverty, but if poverty is instead measured as living on less than $10 a 
day (which is still a highly insecure position to be in) they suggest that 
as many as 70 per cent of the global population are income poor. The 
World Bank concedes that ‘progress has been slower at higher poverty 
lines’. Sticking to a still very low income level of $2 a day, the Bank 
reports that ‘In all, 2.2 billion people lived on less than US$2 a day in 
2011, [which] is only a slight decline from 2.59 billion in 1981.’2
Moreover, there is a growing consensus that income poverty is 
not a sufficient reflection of being poor. Instead, multidimensional 
definitions of poverty are more appropriate as they reflect other aspects 
important to well-being such as nutrition, housing, adequate sanitation 
and clean water, education, health and empowerment (Sen 1999). As 
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Lang and Lingnau argue, even if extreme income poverty has decreased 
somewhat, this ‘is unlikely to mean the end of the many overlapping 
deprivations faced by poor people like malnutrition, poor sanitation, 
lack of electricity or ramshackle schools’ (2015: 406). 
There has also been a shift in global poverty. Today, most of the 
world’s extreme poor, measured by both income and multidimensional 
poverty measures, live in Middle Income Countries (MICs) (Sumner 
2013). When taking into account the persistence of global deprivation 
and the changing geopolitics of poverty, the policy challenges of our 
time are formidable – not least in MICs that harbour the majority of 
poor people. This book therefore provides a timely contribution to the 
analysis of poverty in MICs. 
MICs: the changing geopolitics of poverty
The nature of global poverty has changed dramatically in its 
distribution across countries and within countries. Today, two-thirds 
of the poor are living in MICs, while in 2005 most poor people lived 
in Low Income Countries (LICs), with only a quarter living in MICs. 
The explanation for this huge change in the geopolitics of poverty is 
at a first sight quite intuitive. Over the past decade, twenty-six poor 
countries with a large poor population (including giants like India, 
China, Nigeria and Indonesia) have graduated into the MIC category 
owing to changes in their economic classification as measured by 
international agencies (Kanbur and Sumner 2012). However, changes 
in global poverty also reflect the fact that ‘income poverty, today more 
than ever, is a problem of income distribution’ (Lang and Lingnau 
2015: 404). Income inequality has increased in almost every region of 
the world and three-quarters of the world’s population live in countries 
where inequality has increased. Rises in inequality have been particularly 
severe in the parts of the world where the poor live (ibid.).
It is characteristic of MICs that the major, and a rapidly growing, 
share of the population is residing in urban areas. Poverty trends reflect 
a move among those who are poor from rural to urban areas, as well 
as a widening gap between urban and rural communities. More than 
half of the global population lives in cities, which is expected to rise 
to two-thirds of the population by 2050. Over half of urban dwellers 
are expected to live on less than PPP (purchasing power parity) $2 
per day (Ferré et al. 2012). In this context, it seems likely that the 
living conditions and amenities will significantly differ from a situation 
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in which poverty is concentrated in marginalized rural communities. 
Several chapters in this book analyse the distinctiveness of MIC poverty 
in urban and rural settings (see Chapters 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11).
The changing nature of poverty
Two forms of poverty – absolute versus relative poverty – are 
a constant theme in this book, reflecting a debate that started three 
decades ago between Peter Townsend (e.g. 1987, 1993) and Amartya 
Sen (e.g. 1982, 1999), among others, and has continued since. As is 
recalled by Gordon and Nandy in this volume, the choice of definition 
matters since it implies both an explanation of poverty and options for 
policy that reduces poverty.
Absolute poverty (being below a certain threshold of basic needs) 
has received most attention in the context of developing countries. 
Absolute poverty is commonly understood to be morally unacceptable 
and unjust in that it reflects a situation where severe deprivation 
perseveres in a world otherwise characterized by abundance. It is also 
possible to demonstrate that absolute poverty is economically inefficient 
and costly. People who are poor may have economically viable projects 
and be highly rational decision-makers. However, if the resources they 
command are insufficient to translate these projects into sustainable 
activities that can survive stochastic and covariate shocks, economic 
opportunities can be squandered and their resources degraded (Carter 
and Barratt 2006). An asset-based poverty line is thus conceivable, and 
attempts to estimate this suggest that such a line is also above most of 
the international poverty lines.
Although absolute poverty measures give some indication of the 
extent of deprivation, we suggest that relative poverty is a more useful 
concept in the context of MIC poverty. In the first chapter, Gordon 
and Nandy draw on Townsend (1979) and remind us that relative 
poverty refers to lacking ‘the resources to obtain the types of diet, 
participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities 
which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in 
the society to which they belong’. They argue that whereas absolute 
poverty measures have dominated traditional thinking on poverty 
reduction in LICs, the concept of relative poverty is more elucidatory 
of the poverty situation in MICs, where poverty coexists with extreme 
wealth and where there are increasing disparities in well-being across 
the population. Relative poverty, where the number of poor people 
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is calculated in relation to the well-being of the non-poor in a given 
country (Lister 2004), is closely related to inequality. While a certain 
level of inequality is acceptable and can encourage entrepreneurship, 
high levels of inequality have high social costs (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010). Even the conservative International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
a recent publication acknowledges that inequality hampers growth and 
poverty reduction and that ‘[e]quality, like fairness, is an important 
value in most societies’ (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015: 5) and suggests 
that redistributive spending by governments can contribute to greater 
equality. Given that the large majority of poor people live in MICs, 
there is room for (some) domestic redistribution from the relatively 
better off to those living in poverty.
High Income Countries (HICs) commonly use the OECD approach 
to measure relative poverty, which defines the poor as those with an 
income that is half or less of the median per capita income. Another 
option is to use the type of poverty lines adopted by South Africa, which 
uses the cost of a minimum energy food basket and adds a non-food 
component (see Chapter 7 by Braathen et al. in this volume). Finally, 
Gordon and Nandy discuss the consensual approach as a third approach 
to establishing the extent of relative poverty (see Chapter 1).
Whichever approach is used, the underlying issue is that relative 
poverty is much harder to eradicate than absolute poverty. What is 
deemed an acceptable lifestyle is continuously evolving; for example, the 
recent digital revolution has seen the purchase of airtime prioritized over 
food (Carmody 2012). In addition, even if absolute poverty is reduced 
and potentially eradicated, development itself brings about dynamics 
that will undermine the sustainability of this reduction in poverty. As 
incomes rise, so will the demand for water, sanitation and energy, the 
consumption of animal proteins and so forth. Poverty reduction thus 
deals with a political problem in which there is no finite set of solutions, in 
which solutions are impermanent and create more problems. However, 
if we do not take account of relative poverty, then we will be unable to 
grasp, maybe even misunderstand, the changes that are taking place in 
MICs and their implications for policies aimed at addressing poverty.
Addressing poverty in MICs (i): politics
The fact that the majority of poor people do not live in the poorest 
countries but in countries with the means to address poverty has been 
described by Andy Sumner as the ‘poverty paradox’. Consequently, 
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according to Sumner, poverty reduction on a global level has less to 
do with the transfer of international aid and is instead an issue of 
domestic distribution, and hence domestic politics (Sumner 2013). 
We would maintain that poverty in LICs continues to be a significant 
problem and that international transfers and domestic redistribution 
are only part of the solutions to tackling poverty. Nevertheless, the 
traditional thoughts, strategies and actions on poverty have mainly 
concentrated on the circumstances and realities of poor people living 
in LICs in which there is little to redistribute and in which govern-
ment resources and capacity are limited. In MICs, on the other hand, 
poverty reflects domestic inequalities, which suggests that poverty 
can be addressed through domestic policy solutions. Thus, we need 
to (re)think the nature of poverty, poverty measurement, anti-poverty 
strategies and redistributive policies – as well as the role of politics in 
shaping (re)distributive policies. This book contributes to advancing 
our knowledge on these issues.
What is common to all the chapters is a strong focus on the role of 
politics in causing and addressing poverty in MICs. Political actors 
have specific interests and pursuits, and they negotiate, bargain and 
interact with each other in shaping public policies and well-being. 
We do not confine politics to what takes place in the (formal) politi-
cal system centring on political parties. Instead, any actor operating 
within specific power relations that structure public policy-making is a 
‘political’ actor, and our key focus in terms of politics is the distributive 
outcomes of policy-making – ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lass-
well 1950 [1936]).The ‘disadvantaged, ‘poor’ or ‘subaltern’ groups 
may in this book appear as mere recipients – whether as ‘beneficiaries’ 
or ‘maleficiaries’ – of public policies. However, they equally play an 
important role as political actors. 
Thus, although highly technocratic and depoliticized approaches 
usually dominate public debates on poverty reduction, Karriem reminds 
us in this volume, by quoting Green and Hulme (2005: 876), that 
‘[Inequality and] poverty reduction do […] not simply require “good” 
policy: it requires creating the capacity of poorer people to influence, 
and hold accountable, those who make policies.’ Karriem points out 
that state policies or ‘politics from above’ is not enough to create 
sustainable poverty reduction. Instead ‘social movement “politics from 
below” can pressure the state to implement policies […] when it lacks 
the political will do to so’ (see Chapter 9).
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Political force is critical in the process of reducing poverty. 
Nevertheless, many MICs are imperfect democracies and social, 
cultural and political norms entail that many poor groups fail to gain 
firm political representation (Hickey and Bracking 2005). Political 
elites are thus a particularly powerful group that in many contexts 
steer policy developments in directions advantageous to them, as 
pointed out by Oloruntoba (see Chapter 6). In countries with high 
levels of inequality, it may be particularly difficult to pursue substantial 
redistribution. As Ulriksen suggests in Chapter 5: ‘The wealthiest 
constitutes a small but powerful group with little incentives to reduce 
their earnings for purposes of redistribution, while constituencies 
supportive of redistribution and more equal earnings generally are 
weaker and less well organized.’ The interplay of different domestic 
political actors is thus an important factor in understanding poverty 
in MICs.
Addressing poverty in MICs (ii): redistributive policies
It is a central thesis in this volume that, as MICs have some 
institutional capacity and domestic wealth, and as poverty is also a 
reflection of national inequality, domestic public policies are central in 
addressing poverty and deprivation. Public policies include an array of 
different areas (housing, land, infrastructure, health, education, water, 
taxation, social protection, etc.) and need not be redistributive; in fact, 
public policies may as well be regressive or merely support the status 
quo. 
One specific, and largely redistributive, public policy in MICs, 
which has received a lot of scholarly attention in the past decade, is 
social protection: the provision of cash or in-kind transfers to the poor 
and vulnerable (e.g. Barrientos 2013; Bender et al. 2013). Although we 
recognize the central role of social protection in addressing the needs 
of the poor in MICs, we wish instead to pay greater attention to the 
wider range of public policy options available to governments in MICs 
as well as the compounding impact of concurrent public policies and 
overall development plans. Consequently, the chapters cover specific 
policy areas such as health, housing, land, urban upgrading and food 
programmes as well as broader developmental models and public 
policy frameworks. The overall picture that the chapters provide is 
rather mixed. Some policy interventions are able to address poverty and 
inequality, but more often than not policies do not have their intended 
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impact and/or coexist with policy frameworks (and contextual realities) 
that are counterproductive. As argued throughout the chapters, this 
is largely because of strong political interests and struggles at both 
national and local levels.
Overview of the volume
The persistence of pervasive poverty in MICs is thus the central 
theme of this volume and is tackled from different perspectives.The 
chapters focus on how politics through public policy affects poverty 
and inequality and they show how the ‘politics of poverty reduction’ 
(or lack thereof) plays out at the global, national and local levels.
The chapters span three continents (Latin America, Africa and Asia), 
various scales (global, national and local) as well as the urban and the 
rural. Hence, as mentioned, Chapter 1 deals with the methodological 
issues of measuring poverty. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 centre on the larger 
global discourses on poverty from the perspectives of different MICs. 
Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the context of poverty and inequality within 
specific MIC nation-states, whereas Chapters 7 to 11 take a closer look 
at specific challenges at either urban or rural levels.
The majority of the chapters have been developed on the basis of papers 
presented at an international workshop, ‘Poverty and Politics in Middle 
Income Countries’, held in Cape Town from 22 to 24 November 2012. 
It was organized by the Comparative Research Programme on Poverty 
(CROP) and the Institute for Social Development, University of the 
Western Cape, South Africa. The workshop established an agreement 
between the participants that the MICs see a reduction in extreme 
poverty but increased inequality, and that politics and public policies 
need to be brought into the analysis to explain these developments. 
Moreover, the workshop raised questions which the chapters address 
to varying extents or in different ways: Is poverty reduction in MICs 
distinctive? What has been the overall policy framework for reducing 
poverty and inequality in such countries? Which political actors, or 
realignments, have been most active in influencing policy choices?
David Gordon and Shailen Nandy (Chapter 1) show how 
definitions of poverty based on the concept of relative deprivation 
can be operationalized to produce policy-relevant and comparable 
measures of poverty in Low, Middle and High Income Countries. 
It is important to have a globally consistent measure of poverty as 
the experience of poverty can then be compared across countries at 
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different economic levels as well as within a group of countries, such as 
MICs. The authors discuss the theoretical and conceptual background 
for the use of ‘consensual’ approaches to measuring poverty, and show 
how the views of populations can be included in poverty definition 
and measurement. Using household survey data from Benin (an LIC), 
Mexico (an upper-MIC) and the UK (an HIC), they show how poverty 
estimates can be made using measures which reflect internationally 
agreed definitions of poverty. They also show how, in each country 
selected, there is a high degree of consensus about the necessaries of 
life, and that such consensus identifies and establishes social norms 
which apply to everyone, from which no one should be excluded owing 
to a lack of resources.
Understanding what it means to be poor and finding ways to measure 
poverty are the critical starting points of any analysis of poverty in MICs 
– whether at the global, national or local level.The next three chapters 
deal with ‘global’ issues from the perspective of a major country in 
Latin America, Africa and Asia, respectively.
Camilo Pérez-Bustillo (Chapter 2) explores issues related to the 
intertwined legacies of poverty and racism. He presents Mexico as 
a key MIC case, where conflicting discourses regarding the future 
development model play out in violent ways, and where counter-
hegemonic approaches to issues of human rights and social justice 
emerged. He discusses the regional and global implications of these 
struggles, and shows the leading role of the Mexican political rulers 
in establishing several new ‘free trade’ blocs and keeping alive the 
neoliberal model of globalization, which is counterproductive to 
sustainable poverty reduction. The classification of a country as an 
‘MIC’ potentially has ideological implications, because it highlights 
visions of becoming ‘middle-class’ consumer societies despite the fact 
that severe deprivation, inequalities and human rights abuses continue 
to exist. It furthermore makes certain polities ostensible models for the 
implementation of policies capable of exerting broader influence on a 
regional and global scale. The chapter emphasizes the need for a critical 
reassessment of efforts to achieve fundamental social transformations 
in such contexts.
Tor Halvorsen (Chapter 3) continues Pérez-Bustillo’s discussion 
of the choices MICs have to make regarding their development 
model. Halvorsen departs from the fact that South Africa has become 
an associate member of the OECD, the Organisation for Economic 
braathen et  al .  | 9
Co-operation and Development, where the USA and the EU countries 
have played the leading roles. Concurrently, South Africa became the 
‘S’ in BRICS (also including Brazil, Russia, India, China). Whether 
South Africa will become a full member of OECD or rather will 
direct its international energies towards BRICS will depend on its 
internal political struggles. Central to these struggles are a number of 
development plans, containing a broad debate about South Africa as a 
potential ‘democratic developmental state’, securing poverty reduction, 
work for all, and environmental-friendly and inclusive growth. 
Halvorsen argues that South Africa seems to follow a dual strategy of 
using development models from both the OECD and BRICS. However, 
if South Africa wants to become a democratic developmental state, 
none of the development models contained in the BRICS cooperation 
or the OECD (or even a combination of these) will be the solution. 
Rather, South Africa needs to elaborate an alternative that emphasizes 
democracy and welfare for all rather than ‘development’. 
Amrit K. Virk (Chapter 4) brings the welfare state discussion to the 
MICs, thereby emphasizing the role of public policies in shaping well-
being. As universal health coverage (UHC) has become a prominent 
policy concern for MICs, many of them have established innovative 
health programmes in order to expand coverage and improve healthcare 
access. Contributing to the emerging global discourse on universal 
health coverage, this chapter explores the recent drive for UHC in 
emerging economies and the feasibility and effectiveness of current 
approaches. In particular, Virk looks at recent policy developments 
in India related to universal health coverage and its national health 
insurance programme for low-paid workers, the Rashtriya Swasthya 
Bima Yojana (RSBY). By identifying the underlying political and 
economic basis of recent healthcare reforms in the country, the chapter 
focuses on the role of politics in shaping health policy, and it provides 
added insights into the drivers and determinants of expanding and 
universalizing health coverage in other MIC contexts. 
Although the above three chapters focus on global discourses of 
poverty, they also emphasize the role of domestic politics within specific 
MICs. The next two chapters take this issue farther by exploring how 
domestic political actors, particular political and economic elites, can 
enable as well as obstruct efforts to address poverty and inequality.
Marianne S. Ulriksen (Chapter 5) holds that extreme inequality is 
undesirable as it is related to many social and economic ills. Moreover, 
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owing partly to high inequality levels, many MICs struggle with 
pervasive problems of poverty. This chapter centres on public policies 
that may address inequality – employment creation, wage-setting, 
taxes and transfers – and discusses why some policies are politically 
more attractive than others. Comparing the highly unequal MICs of 
Botswana and South Africa, it becomes evident that redistributive 
policies of taxes and transfer have some income-levelling impacts, 
although their ability to address extreme wage inequality is limited. 
Some policies, such as social transfers and minimum wage-setting, can 
create political responsiveness, particularly when lower-income groups 
are mobilized. However, other policies that could also address inequality 
– the difficult task of creating employment and the sensitive issue of 
addressing extremely high wages at the elite level – tend to receive only 
sporadic, incoherent political attention. Thus, Ulriksen shows how 
politics can disrupt attempts to address substantial redistribution in 
MICs.
Samuel O. Oloruntoba (Chapter 6) contends that political will is 
central to achieving poverty reduction at a substantial level. Although 
MICs have recorded high rates of economic growth, such growth 
was and still is anchored on the logic of the market, which advocates 
the retreat of the state and the discounting of social provisioning in 
education, health, pensions and welfare. For example, despite high 
economic growth in Nigeria, poverty and inequality are still very 
high, which Oloruntoba argues is due essentially to the ‘politics of 
disempowerment’, with various poverty reduction programmes having 
been merely tokenistic, serving as avenues for personal enrichment of 
the political class and their cronies. Following a brief comparison with 
Venezuela (another MIC with an economy reliant on oil revenue), he 
suggests that MICs must have the capacity to formulate policies which 
can enhance the ability of the poor to have title to their land, stimulate 
job creation and enact social welfare programmes that build human 
capability and preserve dignity.
Moving from the national to local urban and rural contexts across 
Latin America, Africa and Asia, the last five chapters provide different 
perspectives on the challenges of developing and implementing 
adequate public policies to address the needs of specific poor and 
vulnerable groups. As is the general theme of this volume, they also 
highlight how different political actors and interests affect these policy 
processes.
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Einar Braathen, David Jordhus-Lier, Berit Aasen and Catherine 
Sutherland (Chapter 7) argue that large cities in MICs can play a 
significant role in poverty reduction and social development. A growing 
majority of the world population, including the poorest segments, lives 
in cities. Large cities have become dominant in national landscapes 
as engines of economic development, and as spaces for struggle over 
social development and environmental change. The authors contend 
that housing precariousness, or the lack of adequate housing, is a 
good vehicle for understanding urban poverty and inequality. Housing 
precariousness is manifested in its most extreme form in urban 
substandard settlements (‘slums’). After providing an overview of 
urban poverty and inequality in Brazil and South Africa, as well as in 
the three cities that form the focus, the chapter reviews the shifts in 
urban and housing policies in each country and city. While a similar 
emphasis on informal settlements upgrading is identified, the processes 
behind the policy shifts are different, with old policies bouncing back 
and new policies implemented unevenly. Local politics is a strong 
factor in shaping these policy processes.
Martín Boy (Chapter 8) depicts how the urban landscape of Buenos 
Aires has changed since the 1990s and the deep economic and social 
crisis in 2001/02. In the daytime, the city centre is busy with people 
working in the area. At night, the ‘Adults who Live on the Streets’ (ALS) 
find a secure zone in the parts of the city centre where shelter and some 
social services are offered. In that context, public policies were created 
to attend to the needs of the ALS. However, Boy also shows how the 
state (city government) and the private sector (real estate market) have 
negatively influenced the position of poor, vulnerable and excluded 
groups, such as the homeless. Impoverishment and exclusion in the 
city were originally forged through private and public initiatives that 
forced poorer and low-income groups out of the city. Furthermore, 
although subsequently a number of social policies have been put in 
place, these policies often create temporary solutions and segmentation 
rather than addressing the structural problems of homelessness. This 
chapter thus provides a powerful picture of specific challenges in MIC 
urban areas.
Abdulrazak Karriem (Chapter 9) considers the Brazilian Landless 
Movement’s (MST) struggles for land and rural development. 
Karriem illustrates that through occupying unproductive land, the 
MST pressured successive governments into redistributing 7 million 
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hectares of agricultural land and providing infrastructural support, 
which have contributed to improvingthe livelihoods of small farmers. 
Many analysts focus their research either on MST struggles for land 
or struggles to build livelihoods on the land to comprehend progress 
in MST members’ livelihoods and access to land; however, Karriem 
argues that to better understand access to land and improvements in 
members’ livelihoods, we need to understand struggles for land and on 
the land as interconnected. He further argues that the MST’s grassroots 
politics encourage an organizational praxis that helps members develop 
a critical consciousness of the structural causes of their poverty and thus 
to act collectively to challenge their landlessness and marginalization in 
the development process. This chapter therefore provides insights into 
the political struggles in rural areas that directly affect the well-being 
and livelihoods of groups that are often particularly vulnerable in many 
MICs.
Sony Pellissery (Chapter 10) takes the land issue from Brazil to 
India. Pellissery argues that widespread poverty in India can be directly 
attributed to the contradiction of equality in the spaces of formal 
democracy and inequality in the social sphere. An examination of the 
sources of inequality reveals how Hindu social philosophy legitimized 
land alienation of the socially disadvantaged sections of India, namely 
lower castes and the indigenous population. Half-hearted land reform 
in independent India as well as economic planning that was biased 
towards the population on the higher rungs of the social hierarchy were 
consistent with the Hindu ideology of graded inequality. In recent times, 
India’s climb to middle-income status and its aspiration to emerge as 
an economic superpower has led to a fast depletion of natural resources 
through extraction-based development models. Such models deny 
the opportunity to depend on land for livelihood purposes. Thus, in 
the context of huge land inequality and a feudal mode of production, 
equality and liberty are far from realized for the socially disadvantaged 
groups, which are instead caught in a vicious cycle of asset deprivation, 
socio-economic marginalization through discrimination and limited 
political resources.
Rajakishor Mahana’s chapter (Chapter 11) is an important 
contribution to understanding why development interventions (e.g. 
public policy) sometimes fail owing to local political processes. 
Building on the insights of James Ferguson’s ‘anti-politics machine’, 
and Joel Migdal’s ‘state-in-society approach’, the chapter portrays 
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how development interventions do not work as intended by exploring 
the politics of hunger deaths in Kashipur, Odisha (India). Mahana 
shows how the failure of development interventions to address 
hunger deaths in Kashipur was not because of drought in the area or 
because institutional support mechanisms were inadequate. Rather, 
local politics obstructed the interventions, because of the power play 
between local elites who controlled the food as well as apathy of the 
state in addressing the root causes of hunger deaths. The government 
merely defined and recorded the deaths as ‘food poison deaths’ rather 
than ‘hunger deaths’. The author further argues that development 
interventions, one after another, continue to sustain the production of 
‘underdevelopment’ of various kinds. Thus, as highlighted by several 
of the preceding chapters too, although public policies may have good 
intentions they often fail to address deeper-set structural problems.
Concluding remarks
In LICs, national governments – largely encouraged by their 
resourceful international partners – have often focused on developing 
national plans, poverty reduction strategies and setting developmental 
goals in the effort to address poverty. International donors have tended 
to see these documents as ‘consensual’ strategies that bypass domestic 
politics (Faust 2010). Although policy-making and the distribution 
of resources remain highly political also in LICs, the role of external 
actors is much less profound in MICs. Instead, powerful and well-off 
domestic political elites tend to have strong impacts on policy-making 
and development, although their influence at times is counterweighted 
by social movements and local political interests.
Thus, this volume highlights how the interplay between different 
domestic political actors is an important factor in understanding 
poverty reduction efforts in MICs. The contributions also emphasize 
how poverty is best understood in relative terms and as connected 
to domestic inequality. Given that MICs have some level of capacity 
and economic wealth, domestic public policies are important tools 
in addressing poverty and inequality, and the chapters explore how 
different types of public policy are developed to address the needs 
of poor and vulnerable groups. Although some policy interventions 
do address poverty and inequality, many policies do not have their 
intended impact and/or coexist with other policy frameworks and 
political realities that are counterproductive to these efforts. More 
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profoundly, it is often difficult to address deeper structural problems 
and to create the kind of transformation that may reduce social, 
economic and political inequalities across and within nations.
Notes
1 www.worldbank.org/en/topic/




Barrientos, A. (2013) Social Assistance in 
Developing Countries, Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Bender, K., M. Kaltenborn and C. 
Pfleiderer (eds) (2013) Social 
Protection in Developing Countries: 
Reforming Systems, Routledge 
Explorations in Development 
Studies 2, Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge.
Carmody, P. (2012) ‘The 
informationalization of poverty in 
Africa? Mobile phones and economic 
structure’, Information Technologies & 
International Development, 8(3): 1–17.
Carter, M. R. and C. B. Barrett (2006) 
‘The economics of poverty traps and 
persistent poverty: an asset-based 
approach’, Journal of Development 
Studies, 42(2): 178–99.
Dabla-Norris, E., K. Kochhar, N. 
Suphaphiphat, F. Ricka and E. Tsounta 
(2015) ‘Causes and consequences 
of income inequality: a global 
perspective’, IMF Staff Discussion 
Note SDN 15/13, International 
Monetary Fund.
Edward, P. and A. Sumner (2014) 
‘Estimating the scale and geography 
of global poverty now and in the 
future: how much difference do 
method and assumptions make?’, 
World Development, 58: 67–82.
Faust, J. (2010) ‘Policy experiments, 
democratic ownership and 
development assistance’, 
Development Policy Review, 28(5): 
515–34.
Ferré, C., F. H. Ferreira and P. Lanjouw 
(2012) ‘Is there a metropolitan bias? 
The relationship between poverty 
and city size in a selection of 
developing countries’, World Bank 
Economic Review, lhs007.
Green, M. and D. Hulme (2005) ‘From 
correlates and characteristics to 
causes: thinking about poverty from 
a chronic poverty perspective’, World 
Development, 33(6): 867–79.
Hickey, S. and S. Bracking (2005) 
‘Exploring the politics of chronic 
poverty: from representation 
to a politics of justice?’, World 
Development, 33(6): 851–65.
Kanbur, R. and A. Sumner (2012) 
‘Poor countries or poor people? 
Development assistance and the new 
geography of global poverty’, Journal 
of International Development, 24(6): 
686–95.
Lang, V. and H. Lingnau (2015) ‘Defining 
and measuring poverty and inequality 
post-2015: poverty and inequality 
post-2015’, Journal of International 
Development, 27(3): 399–414.
Lasswell, H. D. (1950 [1936]) Politics: Who 
gets what, when, how, New York: P. 
Smith.
Lister, R. (2004) Poverty (Key Concepts), 
Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity 
Press.
braathen et  al .  | 15
Pogge, T. and M. Sengupta (2015) ‘The 
Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) as drafted: nice idea, poor 
execution’, Washington International 
Law Journal, 24(3): 571–87.
Sen, A. (1982) Poverty and Famines: An 
Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, 
Oxford and New York: Clarendon 
Press.
— (1999) Development as Freedom, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sumner, A. (2013) ‘Poverty, politics and 
aid: is a reframing of global poverty 
approaching?’, Third World Quarterly, 
34(3): 357–77.
Townsend, P. (1979) Poverty in the 
United Kingdom, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.
— (1987) ‘Deprivation’, Journal of Social 
Policy, 16(2): 125–46.
— (1993) The International Analysis of 
Poverty, Milton Keynes: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf.
Wilkinson, R. and K. Pickett (2010) The 
Spirit Level: Why Equality Is Better for 
Everyone, London: Penguin.
1  |  P O L I C Y - R E L E V A N T  M E A S U R E M E N T 
O F  P O V E R T Y  I N  L O W ,  M I D D L E  A N D 
H I G H  I N C O M E  C O U N T R I E S 1
David Gordon and Shailen Nandy
Introduction
The governments of all countries in the world have repeatedly made 
commitments to eradicate poverty during the twenty-first century. For 
example, at the 1995 World Social Summit, the leaders of 117 countries 
agreed on The Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action, which 
emphasized that the eradication of poverty ‘was an ethical, social, 
political and economic imperative of humankind’ (UN 1995). Countries 
subsequently committed themselves to implementing both national and 
international policies to substantially reduce overall poverty and eradicate 
absolute poverty during the twenty-first century (UN DESA 2005). 
In September 2000, the governments of 189 countries adopted 
the United Nations Millennium Declaration resolving to ‘spare no 
effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and 
dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty’ (UN 2000). In December 
2007, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the Second 
United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (2008–2017) 
and reiterated ‘that eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge 
facing the world today’ (UN 2008).
Thus, poverty reduction is a key concern across countries. An 
essential task in achieving this goal is first to understand the extent 
of poverty – that is, to define and measure it. Accurate and precise 
measurement is needed in all countries (Low, Middle and High Income) 
to determine whether or not anti-poverty policies are effectively and 
efficiently eradicating poverty and deprivation. It will be very difficult, 
impossible even, to determine whether poverty has been eradicated 
globally if different definitions and measures of poverty are used in 
different counties. This chapter discusses some potential methods 
for the robust and rigorous measurement of poverty in all countries 
irrespective of their level of economic development. 
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It is not possible to produce valid and reliable measures of anything 
(for example, speed, mass, evolution or poverty) without a theory 
and a definition. The next section provides a conceptual framework 
for measuring poverty in all countries, irrespective of their level of 
development. This is followed by examples of how similar methods 
can be used to meaningfully assess poverty in Low, Middle and High 
Income Countries.
Conceptual framework It is still fashionable among some economists 
to repeat the old claim that: ‘For deciding who is poor, prayers are 
more relevant than calculation, because poverty, like beauty, lies in 
the eye of the beholder. […] Poverty is a value judgement; it is not 
something that one can verify or demonstrate’ (Orshansky 1969: 37).
Orshansky defended the choices she made when developing the US 
poverty line by arguing, somewhat illogically, that ‘if it is not possible 
to state unequivocally “how much is enough”, it should be possible to 
assert with confidence how much, on average, is too little’ (Orshansky 
1965: 17). However, poverty is a social fact and all cultures have a 
concept of poverty (Gordon and Spicker 1999), which is a difficult 
finding to explain if poverty is solely in the ‘eye of the beholder’. In 
Low Income Countries (LICs), poverty is often a murderous social fact 
which results in the deaths of millions of children (Black et al. 2003, 
2010). As the World Health Organization points out, ‘The world’s 
biggest killer and greatest cause of ill health and suffering across the 
globe is listed almost at the end of the International Classification of 
Diseases. It is given code Z59.5 – extreme poverty’ (WHO 1995: 1).
Poverty does not kill children as frequently in Middle and High 
Income Countries, although, as mentioned in the Introduction, Middle 
Income Countries (MICs) still harbour a large number of extremely 
poor people. Even in High Income Countries (HICs) with functioning 
social security systems and welfare states, poverty still results in 
premature death.
Table 1.1 illustrates how life expectancy, even in an HIC like the 
UK, can vary to the extent that some people are worse off than the 
average person in some MICs. The table shows that life expectancy 
at birth for men in the Carlton area of Glasgow (in the UK) is only 
54 years, which is lower than the average life expectancy for men in 
MICs like India, the Philippines and Mexico. However, only a few 
kilometres walk north-east of Carlton, in the wealthier area of Lenzie, 
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life expectancy for men is 82 years – higher than the average male 
life expectancy in any country in the world. In a short walk across a 
city in one of the richest countries in the world, one travels from one 
area to another where boys have a twenty-eight-year difference in life 
expectancy. The underlying cause of this difference is poverty, not 
differences in health-related behaviours (Galobardes et al. 2004, 2008; 
Davey Smith 2007; Commission on Social Determinants of Health 
2008; Spencer 2008; Thomas et al. 2010). These deaths are cruel and 
measurable social facts; they are not in the ‘eye of the beholder’ and 
neither is their underlying cause – poverty.
Fortunately, since the work of Orshansky in the 1960s, significant 
theoretical advances have been made in poverty research. In particular, 
the research of Peter Townsend resulted in a paradigm shift in poverty 
measurement methodology (Walker et al. 2010). The first paragraph 
in his seminal work Poverty in the United Kingdom is arguably one of the 
most important ever written about poverty. It is now so well known 
that many researchers and students of social policy can recite it from 
memory:
Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only 
in terms of the concept of relative deprivation […] The term 
TABLE 1.1 Male life expectancy in Glasgow and selected countries
Place Life expectancy at birth 










Glasgow (Lenzie North), Scotland, UK 82
Source: Adapted from Commission on Social Determinants of Health (2008)
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is understood objectively rather than subjectively. Individuals, 
families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty 
when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate 
in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which 
are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the 
society to which they belong. (Townsend 1979: 31)
Townsend argued that absolute poverty did not exist as a meaningful 
concept distinct from relative poverty. Poverty in all countries and 
cultures was the same phenomenon and what was termed ‘absolute’ 
poverty was in reality just more severe/extreme/deeper poverty. The 
difference between being ‘relatively’ poor and ‘absolutely’ poor was 
simply the difference between the ‘poor’ and the ‘poorest’. 
Townsend’s relative deprivation approach is a sociological theory, 
which emphasizes the importance of both social participation and the 
dynamic nature of poverty, i.e.:
poverty is a dynamic, not a static concept … Our general theory, 
then, should be that individuals and families whose resources 
over time fall seriously short of the resources commanded by the 
average individual or family in the community in which they live 
… are in poverty. (Townsend 1962: 219)
According to Townsend, poverty can be defined as having an 
‘insufficient command of resources over time’ and the consequence of 
a lack of ‘resources’ is that a ‘poor’ person/household will eventually 
become deprived. Thus, poverty is the lack of resources and deprivation 
is the consequence/outcome of poverty.
Townsend (1979) defined resources as cash income (e.g. wages, 
self-employment profits, etc.), capital assets (e.g. imputed rent, stocks 
and shares, etc.), value of employment benefits (e.g. subsidized meals, 
travel, computers, etc.), value of public services (free health, education, 
housing subsidies, etc.) and private income in-kind (e.g. home 
production of food, etc.). He showed that, in the United Kingdom, 
cash income as conventionally measured represented less than 60 per 
cent of household resources and was therefore not a highly reliable 
measure of command of resources over time (ibid.).
Even in ‘rich’ countries, with monetized economies and high-
quality survey data, the use of income as a measure of resources is 
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problematic. In LICs/MICs, where there is a considerable amount 
of home production of food and some barter of goods and services, 
conventional measures of income from cross-sectional (i.e. one point 
in time) social surveys are likely to be inadequate proxy measures of 
‘command over resources’. Expenditure data from social surveys is 
often of lower quality than income data (owing to short expenditure 
diary-keeping periods and non-response among some household 
members) and attempts to measure ‘consumption’ are even less 
reliable. Also, there is no agreed international definition or method 
for measuring ‘consumption’, and even the seemingly simple task of 
converting food expenditure data into measures of food consumption 
and dietary adequacy is fraught with difficulty and requires literally 
thousands of ‘heroic’ assumptions (Deeming 2010, 2011).
Townsend also argued that deprivation, like poverty, is a relative 
concept:
Deprivation may be defined as a state of observable and 
demonstrable disadvantage relative to the local community or the 
wider society or nation to which an individual, family or group 
belongs. The idea has come to be applied to conditions (that is, 
physical, emotional or social states or circumstances) rather than 
resources and to specific and not only general circumstances, 
and therefore can be distinguished from the concept of poverty. 
(Townsend 1987: 5)
The two concepts, of poverty and deprivation, are therefore tightly 
linked. The concept of deprivation covers the various conditions, 
independent of income, experienced by people who are poor, while 
the concept of poverty refers to the lack of income and other resources 
which makes those conditions inescapable or at least highly likely 
(ibid.).
In order to measure poverty and deprivation consistently and 
comparatively across all countries and cultures, it is necessary to 
measure exclusion from the normal social activities and lack of 
common possessions in each society resulting from inadequate 
command of sufficient resources over time. The accuracy and policy 
relevance of poverty measures can be greatly enhanced if the views of 
the population (and particularly the ‘poor’) can be incorporated into 
the measure of poverty. There are several methods for achieving this, 
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such as the use of focus group methods, incorporating nationally or 
internationally agreed standards into the measure (such as minimum 
standards of education, water quality, housing quality, etc. found in the 
constitutions of some countries – such as South Africa) and/or using 
the ‘consensual’ or ‘perceived deprivation’ approach to measuring 
poverty by investigating the public’s perceptions of minimum needs. 
The 1983 Breadline Britain study pioneered this method:
This study tackles the question ‘how poor is too poor?’ by 
identifying the minimum acceptable way of life for Britain in the 
1980s. Those who have no choice but to fall below this minimum 
level can be said to be ‘in poverty’. This concept is developed in 
terms of those who have an enforced lack of socially perceived 
necessities. This means that the ‘necessities’ of life are identified by 
public opinion and not by, on the one hand, the views of experts 
or, on the other hand, the norms of behaviour per se. (Mack and 
Lansley 1985)
Mack and Lansley defined ‘necessities’ as possessions and ‘activities’ 
as items that every family (or person) should be able to afford and that 
nobody should have to live without. An item regarded as necessary by 
at least 50 per cent of respondents was seen as a ‘socially perceived 
necessity’. Since the 1980s, this methodology has been successfully 
used to measure poverty in Europe and across the world in Low, Middle 
and High Income Countries – for example, Bangladesh (Mahbub 
Uddin Ahmed 2007), Vietnam (Davies and Smith 1998), Tanzania 
(Kaijage and Tibaijuka 1996), Zimbabwe (Mtapuri 2011) and South 
Africa (Noble et al. 2004; Wright 2008; Barnes 2009a, 2009b; Barnes 
and Wright 2012).
The consensual method for measuring poverty involves three 
steps. First, what the public perceives as social necessities must be 
established; secondly, those who suffer an enforced lack of the socially 
perceived necessities should be identified; and, thirdly, the levels of 
household income at which people run a greater risk of not being able 
to afford the socially defined necessities in a given national context 
should be determined, so identifying the poverty line or band (Gordon 
and Pantazis 1997; Gordon 2006).
This approach contrasts with that of many other poverty measures, 
including the most commonly used one, the World Bank’s International 
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Poverty Line (IPL), set roughly at a ‘dollar a day’, adjusted for purchasing 
power parity (World Bank 1990; Ravallion et al. 1991; World Bank 
2000; Ravallion et al. 2008). It is the indicator being used to reflect 
progress towards Target 1.A of the first Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG), to ‘halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than one dollar a day’,2 and garners far 
more attention than the two other targets of MDG1, namely ‘Target 
1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, 
including women and young people’ and ‘Target 1.C: Halve, between 
1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger’.
Sustained criticism of the ‘$1/day’ measure has highlighted serious 
problems of validity and reliability. However, a number of reports have 
been published in recent years using this indicator, which purport to 
show that the world is on track to meet MDG1 and that this is true 
even for sub-Saharan Africa. 
As also discussed in the Introduction, the $1/day measure has long 
been contested on theoretical, methodological and even moral grounds 
(Townsend 1993; Townsend and Gordon 2002; Vandemoortele 2002; 
Pogge 2004, 2005; Townsend et al. 2006), not least because it does 
not fully reflect the Bank’s own definition of poverty, set out in 1990, 
as ‘the inability to attain a minimal standard of living’ (World Bank 
1990: 26). Concerns about methodological shortcomings are harder to 
ignore. Pogge and Reddy have made detailed assessments of the World 
Bank’s poverty measure (Reddy and Pogge 2002; Pogge 2010), noting 
recently that the Bank’s revised ‘updated’ poverty line ($1.25 in 2005 
PPP) resulted in significant revisions to its own estimates, by nearly 50 
per cent (Chen and Ravallion 2008), while still remaining at too low a 
level to cover the cost of purchasing basic necessities (Reddy and Pogge 
2008). Reliance on purchasing power parities (PPPs), which require 
adjustments over time (and place), also renders the Bank’s measure 
problematic, and a key reason for the revision of the Bank’s global 
poverty estimates was that the costs of living in many countries had 
been underestimated, and thus the previous estimates had significantly 
underestimated the extent of world poverty.
Revisions to the international poverty line have been made possible 
by the greater availability of high-quality household survey data 
from more countries and by more accurate estimates of cost of living 
standards around the world. The 2008 update made estimates of the 
proportion and number of people living below a range of different 
gordon and nandy | 23
poverty lines (i.e. $1/day, $1.25/day, $1.45/day, $2/day, $2.50/day). 
While there were significant reductions in the proportion and number 
of people living under the lower thresholds, there were increases when 
estimates used the $2/day and $2.5/day thresholds. The selection of 
lower thresholds downplays the true extent of extreme poverty and the 
conditions it entails and also facilitates claims of progress towards the 
first MDG. Chen and Ravallion’s update noted that, with the IPL set 
at $1/day or $1.25, the world was well ahead (185 and 131 per cent, 
respectively) of schedule to meet the first MDG by 2015. Much less 
impressive achievement was noted if slightly higher IPLs were used, 
of $2/day and $2.50/day. In these instances, the world was 32 per 
cent behind schedule or regressing by 12 per cent, respectively (Pogge 
2008). Pogge also noted that, if the Bank’s international poverty 
line were applied to the USA, a person with a daily income of $1.37 
(~$500/year) would be rendered as non-poor (Pogge 2010) – evidence 
(if it was needed) of the measure’s lack of face-validity in MICs and 
HICs. 
The differences in the extent and depth of poverty in rich and poor 
countries are not just the result of households in rich countries having 
more money. People in HICs and, to some extent, in MICs also have 
access to an extensive range of capital goods, e.g. schools, hospitals, 
roads, electricity distribution, water supply infrastructure, sewerage 
systems, etc. In LICs, millions do not have access to schools, hospitals, 
safe water, etc., because these capital goods simply do not exist close to 
where they live. This is important because, by understating the monetary 
cost of capital goods in developing countries, the PPP conversion, an 
integral part of the $1/day poverty methodology, obscures the costs 
of providing adults and children with the services they need to escape 
from poverty.
Therefore, in order to adequately assess the extent and depth of 
poverty in Low, Middle and High Income Countries using a comparable 
measure, it is necessary to examine both the lack of income and also 
the amount of deprivation in each society (i.e. the lack of possessions, 
goods and services). A key assumption when comparing poverty across 
diverse societies is that there are certain universal human needs, i.e. the 
need for food, shelter, healthcare and social activities/obligations – such 
as giving presents, marking important life events such as deaths, birth, 
coming of age, and the ability to care for friends and relatives. We now 
show how this can be done for countries at any level of development. 
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Our examples are Benin (low income), Mexico (middle income) and 
the UK (high income).
Benin (LIC)
The 2006 Demographic & Health Survey (DHS) for Benin included 
a special poverty module, which aimed to ascertain respondents’ 
opinions about what items/activities they considered to be necessary 
for an adequate standard of living (INSAE 2007; Nandy and Pomati 
2014). Respondents were asked for their perceptions of necessities and 
also the degree to which they felt these needs were met. Questions were 
asked about food, clothing, housing, health/hygiene, transportation, 
education and leisure, work and relationships. 
The module was administered to adult members of households, 
with one representative per household; the unweighted sample 
size was 17,511. The population of Benin in 2005 was around 7.6 
million, with 44 per cent under fifteen years of age (UN DESA 2012). 
Given respondents were aged sixteen-plus, this suggests a remarkably 
good sampling fraction of around one in every 243 Beninese. The 
sample reflected the 40:60 urban–rural split and was representative 
at subnational level. Full details of the sample are available from the 
national DHS report.3 No details are available on how the list of items/
activities was derived (e.g. through focus group discussions, etc.) but 
those selected appear to have some degree of face validity, covering key 
domains for food, shelter, clothing, etc. 
Table 1.2 shows what proportion of respondents considered an item 
to be ‘essential’, ‘necessary’ or ‘not essential’. A majority of respondents 
believed most items on the list to be ‘essential’, i.e. that people should 
not have to go without because of cost. The list included an assortment 
of items, which reflect both material and social needs, and also 
demonstrated the aspirations of respondents to a ‘good’ standard of 
living. While around 30 per cent of households in the sample reported 
having electricity as their source of lighting, more than twice this 
proportion (77 per cent) believed that having access to electricity was 
essential. Similarly, for drinking water, despite 84 per cent of respondents 
thinking that access to drinking water was essential, only around one 
third of households had piped water into their dwellings/yards/plots. 
There was a high degree of consensus across demographic groups (e.g. 
age, sex, ethnicity, religion and place of residence) as to which items 
were essential and that everyone should to be able to afford.
TABLE 1.2 Perception of essential items in Benin, 2006 – ‘Do you regard as essential, 
necessary or not that the following items are part of the minimal/basic needs in order 
to have adequate life condition?’
Essential 
(%)






Access to drinking water 84 15 0 100
Care when sick 84 16 0 100
Steady work 82 18 1 100
Send children to school 79 20 1 100
Electricity 77 22 2 100
Three meals per day 74 24 2 100
House 71 24 5 100
Radio 71 28 1 100
Transportation 68 30 2 100
Self-care (soap, barber, etc.) 67 32 1 100
A good meal on Sundays and holidays 64 33 4 100
Personal care products 62 36 2 100
Tables and beds 62 36 2 100
Several sets of clothing 61 36 2 100
A spacious house 59 37 4 100
Television 59 38 4 100
Several sets of shoes 58 38 4 100
Meat or fish every day 57 36 7 100
Taxi ride when needed 56 42 2 100
Birth control 55 37 8 100
Cereals or food made from roots or 
tubers every day
51 37 12 100
Vacation 51 43 6 100
Bus ride when needed 45 46 9 100
Ability to buy presents when needed 44 51 5 100
Vegetables every day 43 40 17 100
Need to work day and night 17 24 60 100
Note: Response categories were: 1 Yes, essential, 2 Yes, rather necessary, 3 No; n = 17,511
Source: Weighted data, DHS, Benin, DHS
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Table 1.3 shows the proportion of respondents who were ‘not at all’ 
satisfied with the degree to which their households’ basic needs were 
met owing to a lack of money. Responding that their needs were not 
met at all suggests a degree of enforced lack of access to the socially 
prescribed needs identified in Table 1.2. So, for example, while 77 per 
cent of respondents thought having access to electricity was essential 
(Table 1.2), nearly half (46 per cent) of respondents were not at all 
satisfied with their households’ access to electricity (Table 1.3).
These nineteen items can be used to construct a deprivation of 
socially prescribed needs index, to reflect poverty and deprivation in 
Benin. There is clear face validity for the index, given that the items 
TABLE 1.3 Respondents’ needs satisfaction – ‘Are you satisfied with how the minimal 
needs of your household are met in the following domains?’
% responding ‘Not at all’ 
Electricity 46
Furniture in the house 36
Transport 31
Availability of drinking water 26
Availability of leisure 22
Care in case of sickness 19
Help to parents in need 17
Housing 16
Self-care products in the house 15




Meat or fish every day 10
A good meal on Sundays and holidays 7
Number of meals a day 7
Consumption of cereals and tubers every day 5
Consumption of vegetables every day 5
Relations with family and friends 5
Note: Response categories were: 1 Very satisfied, 2 Satisfied, 3 No, not really, 4 No, not 
at all
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cover living conditions, clothing, food and social activities such as 
helping parents in need and relations with family and friends. Scale 
reliability is also high, with a Chronbachs Alpha of 0.894 (Nunnally 
1981), which can be interpreted as the average correlation between the 
set of questions asked (i.e. items in the deprivation index) and all other 
sets of deprivation questions of equal length (Pantazis et al. 2006). 
A deprivation index can be considered valid if it exhibits statistically 
significant associations with a set of independent variables known to 
be correlated with poverty. For example, it would be expected, from 
Townsend’s theory of relative deprivation and Mack and Lansley’s 
concept of ‘consensual poverty’, that someone who is ‘deprived’ 
would also be more likely to consider her/himself to be subjectively 
poor (Bradshaw and Finch 2003). Figure 1.1 shows that those whose 
families go into debt or have to resort to using savings have a much 
higher deprivation score, as would be expected. Figure 1.2 shows that 
overcrowded households with five or more people per room (Nandy 
and Gordon 2009) also have high deprivation scores, and those not 
living in overcrowded conditions have low deprivation index scores. 
Both these figures show clear construct validity of the index.






































1.1 Mean deprivation score and 95 per cent confidence intervals by families’ 
financial situation, Benin, 2006
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These results show that such methods can be used to great effect 
in measuring poverty in LICs like Benin. The results demonstrate that 
any poverty measure needs to include the costs of social participation 
as well as the costs of meeting material needs. Most people in Benin 
(Table 1.2) considered it essential as part of their minimum basic needs 
to be cared for when sick, to have a ‘good’ meal on Sundays/holidays 
and to have a range of goods to protect themselves from shame, e.g. 
personal care products, several sets of clothing and shoes. Significant 
majorities also considered it essential to have transportation and 
consumer durables which provide information/entertainment, such as 
a radio or TV. These findings highlight again the inadequacy of the 
World Bank’s ‘dollar-a-day’ poverty line, which does not include any 
allowance for the social and participatory needs of the ‘poor’.
Mexico (MIC)
On 20 January 2004, the General Law of Social Development 
(LGDS) was ratified unanimously by the Mexican Chamber of 
Deputies and Senators. Its aim was to: ‘guarantee the full exercise of 
the social rights consecrated under the Political Constitution of the 



























1.2 Mean deprivation score and 95 per cent confidence intervals by number of 
people per room (overcrowding), Benin, 2006
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United States of Mexico, by ensuring that all citizens are provided with 
access to social development’.
Article 36 requires that poverty in Mexico must be measured 
multidimensionally and that the measure must include (at least) the 
following eight dimensions:
1. Per capita current income
2. Average gap between compulsory education and actual education at 
the household level (educational gap)
3. Access to health services 
4. Access to social security
5. Dwelling characteristics, space and quality
6. Access to basic dwelling-related services (water, sewerage, electricity, 
etc.)
7. Access to food
8. Level of social cohesion
Thus, Mexican law requires a multidimensional poverty indicator, 
which measures access (or lack of it) to constitutionally mandated 
social rights, e.g. access to free compulsory education. The Mexican 
Constitution was the first in the world to include a range of social 
rights, and these provisions have influenced the constitutions of many 
countries (including MICs such as India and South Africa).
The Mexican poverty measure follows in the Latin American 
tradition of combining income-based measurement of poverty with 
unmet basic needs (Becaria and Minujin 1988; Feres and Mancero 
2000; Gordon 2006), within a human rights framework, such that: ‘A 
person is considered to be multidimensional poor when the exercise of 
at least one of her social rights is not guaranteed and if she also has an 
income that is insufficient to buy the goods and services required to 
fully satisfy her needs’ (CONEVAL 2010: 28).
The threshold values used to identify whether a person was suffering 
from a deprivation of their social rights was set using the following 
criteria:
1. Apply legal norms, if they exist.
2. Apply specific criteria defined by experts of specialized public 
institutions working on the field of each deprivation indicator.
3. Apply criteria based on statistical analysis.
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4. The Executive Committee of CONEVAL shall determine the 
threshold, after taking into consideration the opinion of experts.
Figure 1.3 shows how this method can be applied to Mexico’s 107 
million people. The X-axis represents the non-fulfilment of people’s 
social and economic rights, through the use of a deprivation index, 
with scores running right to left, from 0 upwards. The Y-axis shows 
people’s level of economic well-being, with level of income used as 
a proxy indicator. The population can then be divided according to 
predetermined thresholds for both axes. In this instance, 44 per cent 
of the population (37 million people) were identified as living in 
multidimensional poverty, with deprivation scores above 1 and an 
income below the set threshold or poverty line. In contrast, around 18 
per cent of the population was neither income poor nor affected by any 
social deprivations. The figure also identifies those people vulnerable 
to poverty owing to high deprivation scores (but having incomes above 
the poverty line), and those whose incomes are below the poverty line, 
but who do not (yet) have deprivation index scores above 1. 
The Mexican methodology can be considered to be a variation on 
the ‘consensual’ method for measuring poverty as advocated in this 







































6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Total population 2008 (106,680,526)
1.3 Multidimensional poverty measure in Mexico. The ‘poor’ are those with 
both a low income and deprivation of one or more social rights (source: 
CONEVAL slides: World Bank presentation)
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deprivation owing to a lack of income/resources. Similarly, both methods 
try to incorporate the views of the population in the measurement of 
poverty. In the case of the ‘socially perceived necessities’ methodology, 
this is done by measuring the opinions of a representative sample of 
the population, whereas, in the case of the Mexican method, this is 
done using constitutional and legal norms which are considered to be 
an expression of the will of the Mexican people (Boltvinik et al. 2010; 
CONEVAL 2010).
UK (HIC)
The UK has a long history of anti-poverty policies and poverty 
measurement, with detailed legislation stretching back over four 
hundred years (since the Poor Law Acts of 1597 and 1601). Some 
historians have even argued that the Industrial Revolution was 
particularly successful in England and Wales owing to the existence 
of an effective poor relief system, which prevented starvation and 
thus facilitated the growth of a large urban workforce (Solar 1995; 
Szreter 2005). The modern UK welfare state has continued to have 
an intensive policy focus on poverty. For example, in 1999 the UK 
government committed itself to eradicating child poverty forever by 
2020, and this policy commitment was written into law in the 2010 
Child Poverty Act, which had broad cross-party support. The Act 
established four child poverty targets which need to be met by 2020/21 
(UK Government 2010).
1. Relative poverty: Fewer than 10 per cent of children living in 
relative low-income poverty by 2020. The purpose of this target 
is to measure whether the poorest families are keeping pace 
with the growth of incomes in the economy as a whole. Relative 
poverty is defined as living in a household with a net equivalized 
income (before housing costs) of below 60 per cent of the national 
median.
2. Material deprivation and low income: Fewer than 5 per cent of 
children living in combined material deprivation and low income. 
The purpose of this target is to provide a wider measure of children’s 
living standards. For this measure, low income is defined as less than 
70 per cent of median equivalized net household income. Children 
are materially deprived if they live in households that cannot afford 
a range of basic activities, such as school trips, or celebrations on 
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special occasions, or if they cannot afford basic material goods, such 
as fuel to keep their home warm, etc.
3. Absolute low income: Reduce the proportion of children who live 
in absolute low income to less than 5 per cent. The purpose of this 
target is to measure whether the poorest families are seeing their 
incomes rise in real terms. Absolute low income is defined as less 
than 60 per cent of median equivalized net household income in the 
base year (2010/11) after allowing for inflation (RPI).
4. Persistent poverty: Percentage of children living in relative poverty 
for three out of four years (target level to be set by the end of 2014 
as data are currently unavailable). Relative poverty is defined as 
living in a household with a net equivalized income (before housing 
costs) of below 60 per cent of the national median.
In addition, a severe child poverty measure has been defined as 
‘living in a household with an equivalised income below 50 per cent 
of median Before Housing Costs which also experience material 
deprivation’ (DWP 2011).
Twenty-one questions are used to measure material deprivation in 
the UK as part of the low income and material deprivation target. These 
questions are derived from the 1999 Poverty and Social Exclusion 
Survey and all of them are socially perceived necessities, i.e. more than 
half of a representative sample of the UK population believes that they 
are ‘necessities of life’ which everyone should be able to afford and 
no one should have to do without (Gordon et al. 2000; Pantazis et 
al. 2006). The deprivations are prevalence weighted and summed to 
produce a deprivation index.
Adult questions
 1. A holiday away from home for at least one week a year, while not 
staying with relatives at their home
 2. Have friends or family around for a drink or meal at least once a 
month 
 3. Two pairs of all-weather shoes for each adult 
 4. Able to keep accommodation warm enough in winter
 5. Enough money to keep your home in a decent state of decoration
 6. Household contents insurance
 7. Regular savings of £10 a month or more for rainy days or retirement
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 8. Replace any worn-out furniture
 9. Replace or repair major electrical goods such as a refrigerator or a 
washing machine, when broken
10. A small amount of money to spend each week on yourself, not on 
your family
11. Adult has a hobby or leisure activity
Child questions 
 1. A family holiday away from home for at least one week a year 
 2. Enough bedrooms for every child of ten or over to share their 
bedroom only with siblings of the same sex
 3. Leisure equipment such as sports equipment or a bicycle
 4. Celebrations on special occasions such as birthdays, Christmas or 
other religious festivals
 5. Swimming at least once a month
 6. Friends around for tea or a snack once a fortnight
 7. Child has a hobby or leisure activity
 8. Toddler group/nursery/playgroup at least once a week
 9. Go on school trips once a term for school-aged children
10. Outdoor space or facilities near by in which to play safely
These measures of deprivation are consistent with Townsend’s 
relative deprivation definition of poverty as exclusion from the normal 
activities and possessions of the society to which the child belongs. 
They are relative indicators of poverty that relate specifically to UK 
norms and lifestyles at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Comparable measures of poverty across different societies
The key question this chapter seeks to address is how poverty can 
be measured comparably across different societies with different social 
norms and levels of development. There have been many attempts to 
measure income and expenditure in comparable ways across societies 
and this chapter has discussed how income in national currencies can 
be compared using exchange rates and/or purchasing power parity 
deflators. Although converting national currencies onto a comparable 
scale is a non-trivial problem, the main issue is determining comparable 
income poverty thresholds in each country. If an ‘absolute’ income 
threshold is applied, such as the World Bank’s dollar-a-day measure, 
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then this produces essentially meaningless results about the amount of 
poverty in all HICs and many MICs. By contrast, if a ‘relative’ income 
threshold is used, such as 60 or 50 per cent of the equivalized national 
household median, then this produces unrealistic results in most LICs 
and MICs.
Townsend argued that an objective poverty line could be defined 
using the ‘deprivation standard (a standard of income below which 
people experience deprivation disproportionately to income)’ 
(Townsend 1979: 270). He argued that, if the income/resources of a 
household decline, then their levels of deprivation will increase. There 
will come a point where a small decrease in resources will result in a 
disproportionately large increase in deprivation, and this point (or kink) 
can be used to define the ‘poverty line’. Figure 1.4 shows Townsend’s 































1.4 Modal deprivation by logarithm of income as a percentage of 
supplementary benefit scale rates (source: Townsend (1979: 261))
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However, even though the deprivation standard method might be 
used to identify an income/resources poverty threshold in different 
countries, a key issue still remains. How can deprivation indices be 
compared in different countries when they often consist of different 
deprivation questions added together to produce scales of different 
lengths and sometimes using different weighting methods?
One possible solution is to use Item Response Theory (IRT) models 
to align deprivation scales in different countries. IRT, also known as 
Latent Trait Analysis, is a set of statistical models, which describe the 
relationship between a person’s response to questionnaire items and an 
unobserved latent trait such as knowledge of biology, level of happiness 
or amount of material deprivation. This is generally shown with item 
characteristic curves, which are modelled by the main parameters 
(severity and discrimination). IRT is often used for developing tests, 
scales and indices in educational assessment and for psychological 
testing. It has also been used for developing measures of poverty (e.g. 
Martini and Vanin 2013; Raileanu Szeles and Fusco 2013; Fusco and 
Dickes 2008; Jenkins and Cappellari 2007).
The IRT model assumes that ‘deprivation’ is an unobservable latent 
trait, which cannot be measured directly, like, say, height or weight, as 
it is a concept rather than a physical entity. However, it is assumed that 
this concept of ‘deprivation’ can be measured indirectly using social 
survey questions about respondents’ ability to afford certain consumer 
durables and to participate in social activities. 
The ‘severity’ of a deprivation item in an IRT model is defined by 
the likelihood that the person/household will lack/not be able to afford 
that item, thus it is desirable that a deprivation indicator should include 
items with a range of different ‘severity’ scores, i.e. some low-severity 
items, some medium-severity items and some high-severity items. 
In IRT models, the ‘discrimination’ of a deprivation item measures 
how well this item differentiates between the deprived and the not-
deprived, thus high ‘discrimination’ scores are desirable. The purpose 
of a deprivation index/scale is to measure how much of the latent trait 
‘deprivation’ a person/household suffers from.
We have applied a two-parameter IRT test to each of the deprivation 
items in the 2009 European Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) that were not excluded on the basis of the validity and 
reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) tests, including some of the ‘borderline’ 
housing items.
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Table 1.4 shows the two-parameter IRT results for eighteen 
deprivation items for combined data from the twenty-seven countries of 
the European Union (Guio et al., 2012). The column marked ‘severity’ 
can be interpreted as the likely severity of deprivation suffered by a 
person who lacks this item because he/she cannot afford it (‘enforced 
lack’). The severity scores in this table are measured in units of standard 
deviation from the average. The table shows that respondents who 
TABLE 1.4 IRT results for eighteen deprivation items, European Union, 2009
Deprivation item Severity Discrimination Correlation with 
MD (standardized 
loadings)
One week annual holiday away 
from home
0.3 1.6 0.83
Unexpected financial expenses 0.5 1.4 0.79
Replace worn-out furniture 0.6 1.4 0.79
Leisure activities 1.1 2.0 0.87
Spend a small amount of money 
each week on oneself
1.1 1.8 0.86
Drink/meal monthly 1.2 1.9 0.88
Some new clothes (not second-
hand)
1.3 2.1 0.89
Overcrowding 1.5 0.6 0.47
Meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian 
equivalent) every second day
1.6 1.4 0.79
Keep home adequately warm 1.7 1.1 0.72
A personal car 1.8 1.1 0.72
Avoiding arrears 1.8 0.9 0.62
Computer and internet access 
deprivation
2.1 1.2 0.74
A mobile phone 2.2 1.3 0.78
Two pairs of shoes 2.2 1.6 0.84
Leaky roof, damp, etc. 2.4 0.4 0.39
Shortage of space 2.7 0.4 0.36
Dwelling suffers from darkness 4.2 0.4 0.34
Source: EU-SILC 2009 cross-sectional data, users’ database, August 2011 (Guio et al. 
2012)
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cannot afford an annual holiday or cannot face unexpected expenses 
have the lowest deprivation severity score, while those who consider 
their dwelling too dark are likely to be much more severely deprived.
These kinds of models and results are often used in the field of 
education. For example, there is a more of less an infinite number of 
exam questions which could be asked to measure a person’s knowledge 
of mathematics, French, biology, etc. Different questions have to be 
used each year in exams (so that students cannot simply learn the 
answers to the previous year’s questions), so there is a problem of how 
to align the threshold scores for each exam grade so that the same 
standards are used to award an ‘A’ grade, etc., each year.
One solution to this problem is to use IRT models. As long as 
the deprivation measures in each country are reliable, valid and 
equivalent measures of the latent trait ‘deprivation’, then the ‘severity’ 
of the deprivation item can be compared in each country by aligning 
the different deprivation scales. The deprivation questions asked in 
LICs are likely to be measures of more severe deprivation than the 
questions asked in MICs or HICs; e.g., in Benin, respondents were 
asked whether they had ‘electricity’ whereas in the UK respondents are 
asked if they have enough money to keep their ‘home in a decent state 
of decoration’. However, as long as there are a set of items that are 
common to both the UK and Benin deprivation indices (e.g. shoes, a 
vacation/holiday, etc.) then these could be used as anchors with which 
to align the two indices. Therefore, deprivation indices with a different 
number or severity of items could be linked/aligned using responses to 
a common set of anchor items.
This idea is not new, as it was first attempted by researchers at the 
World Health Organization (WHO) who were working on trying to 
align asset/wealth indices across countries which participated in the 
World Health Surveys (WHS) (Ferguson et al. 2003: Murray et al. 
2003). Unfortunately, a change in the director general of WHO resulted 
in the disbandment of this project team before they could finish their 
work.4 Recently their work has been revived to produce experimental 
comparative wealth indexes (CWIs) for DHS surveys using a linear 
regression approach (Rutstein and Staveteig 2014). However, IRT 
models have the potential to allow the severity of deprivation to be 
compared in a more consistent and theory-based manner across 
societies and cultures. Where high-quality survey data are available 
for different countries which measure both income and deprivation 
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then the potential exists to produce valid, reliable and meaningful 
comparisons of poverty in Low, Middle and High Income Countries.
Conclusion
Poverty measures which incorporate the views of the population and 
which are comparable across countries are highly policy relevant as 
they can be used to compare and assess the effectiveness and efficiency 
of anti-poverty policies. While the goal of eradicating poverty during 
the twenty-first century is shared by all governments, the means to 
achieve this goal are highly contested. Policy-makers require high-
quality evidence to help determine the best set of anti-poverty policies, 
and valid, reliable and comparable measurement of poverty can help to 
provide this evidence.
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A N D  H U M A N  R I G H T S  I N  M E X I C O  A N D 
L A T I N  A M E R I C A
Camilo Pérez-Bustillo
As traditional communities disappear and ancient cultures are 
overwhelmed, billions of human beings are losing the sense of 
place and sense of self that give life meaning. The fundamental 
political conflict in the opening decades of the new century, we 
believe, will not be between nations or even between trading 
blocs but between the forces of globalization and the territorially 
based forces of local survival seeking to preserve and to redefine 
community. (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994: 22)
Introduction
Latin America, like the contemporary Arab world, and like South 
Africa in the immediate aftermath of apartheid, has been designated 
by many throughout the world as a reference point for widely shared 
hopes that fundamental social transformations in the direction of 
global justice are still possible. These hopes continue to broaden the 
horizons of the political imagination throughout the world despite the 
deepening multidimensional financial, economic, environmental and 
civilizational crises on a planetary scale which pose persistent threats 
to humanity’s overall survival. This chapter seeks to contribute to a 
critical reassessment and reconfiguration of such assumptions about 
the global system, ‘from the perspective of the victims’ (Dussel 2013; 
Sousa Santos 2010). It will explore potential bases for comparative 
analysis of issues related to the intertwined legacies of poverty and 
racism in Mexico, their relationship to the emergence of counter-
hegemonic approaches to issues of human rights elsewhere, and their 
global implications.
Mexico and South Africa are both classified by the World Bank 
as middle-income economies. This classification potentially has ideo-
logical implications because it highlights certain states as ostensible 
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models for the implementation of policies capable of exerting broader 
influence on a regional and global scale. This is reflected, for example, 
in Mexico’s selection as a poster child worthy of hosting the global 
launch of the 2013 UNDP Human Development Report, amid wide-
spread insistence among analysts affiliated with institutions in the 
USA such as Foreign Affairs (the journal of the Council on Foreign 
Relations) and the Woodrow Wilson Center, which play a key role in 
generating and reproducing hegemonic discourses and policies which 
seek to shape trends in the global South, concerning its ostensible 
success in attaining ‘middle-class’ status (see, e.g., O’Neil 2013; De 
la Calle and Rubio 2012). Similar approaches are echoed by analysts 
at the Center for American Progress and in coverage of Mexico during 
late 2012 and early 2013 in the Wall Street Journal, The Economist and 
the Financial Times; all of these coincide with an intensive public rela-
tions campaign by Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto (who took 
office in December 2012) to reposition the country’s image in key 
circles of international public opinion. 
This reflects not only the unwelcome baggage of his predecessor’s 
record, but the fact that his election marks the return to the presidency 
of the party that headed an authoritarian regime which ruled Mexico 
as a one-party state for over sixty years, and which, though it lost the 
presidency in 2000, in fact has never left power, in a manner arguably 
analogous to the status of key financial elites in South Africa pre- and 
post-apartheid, and their equivalents in most of post-colonial Africa. 
Serious human rights violations targeting Mexico’s poorest indigenous 
communities have intensified meanwhile (Human Rights Watch 2014; 
New York Times 2014), and sparked intensified protest movements 
within Mexico and concerns about the country’s deteriorating human 
rights landscape from key sectors within the international community, 
highlighting the possibility that Peña Nieto might be forced to resign, 
in a scenario similar to that in Tunisia and Egypt during the ‘Arab 
Spring’. 
Duelling examples in ideological terms in the Latin American 
context include Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina from the 
left and centre-left (more distant from orthodox neoliberal policies and 
alignment with the USA). From the right we find Mexico, Colombia, 
Chile and Peru (more faithful to neoliberal recipes and with closer 
strategic ties to the USA). Cases such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and 
Argentina (together with Nicaragua, El Salvador, Uruguay, Honduras 
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– prior to a military coup in 2009 – and Paraguay), to varying degrees, 
reflect what Enrique Dussel has described (2013) as a Latin American 
‘political spring’, reflecting a shift away from neoliberal authoritarianism 
towards more democratic or ‘populist’ options. In his view this overall 
thaw in the region’s politics includes both grassroots movements such 
as Mexico’s Zapatistas and other indigenous movements elsewhere 
in Latin America, and the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) in 
Brazil, whose emphasis is on building autonomous initiatives from 
below (regardless of which sector is in power at the national level), as 
well as those which have come to power through leaders such as Hugo 
Chávez (Venezuela), Lula (Brazil), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Rafael 
Correa (Ecuador) or the Kirchners (Argentina), and their successors. 
Dussel’s conceptualization of such a trend in Latin America thus 
pre-dates, but converges with, the widely reiterated characterization 
of democratic revolutions with varying degrees of success in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, which have been described as 
the Arab Spring, and which have served as referents in other contexts 
elsewhere.
In both sets of cases it is their relative economic strength as middle-
income economies compared to that of poorer states in their regions 
which provides the material basis for the ideological influence of key 
regional cases (such as Mexico and Brazil in Latin America or South 
Africa in the African context, or Egypt in that of the Arab world). But 
the internal polarizations of wealth reflected in high levels of inequality 
in cases such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile and South Africa 
undermine their potential as policy models, as explored in further 
detail below.
There are inherent tensions between state-centred and non-state-
centred processes of social transformation which cut across the 
examples cited above in Latin America, the Arab world and Africa. 
The emphasis on building social movements from below that are 
independent of state control in contexts such as the anti- or alter-
globalization movements which emerged during the protests at the 
WTO Summit in Seattle in 1999 has gradually become associated with 
what have been characterized in broader, more affirmative terms as 
movements for global justice (Tabb 2001; Fisher and Ponniah 2003), 
and their contemporary heirs among the indignados of Spain and Greece, 
Occupy Wall Street, etc., in the wake of the 2008 global financial and 
economic crisis and its continuing effects. Mexico’s Zapatistas have 
pérez-bustillo | 47
been recognized as key precursors of such movements because of their 
pioneering critique of the anti-democratic implications of neoliberal 
globalization and free trade, and their emphasis on the intertwined 
effects of such policies in terms of racism, poverty and inequality.
Epistemological and conceptual frameworks
This chapter will explore these issues from a perspective grounded 
in what Boaventura Sousa Santos (2008) has described as the ‘episte-
mologies of the South’, and in what Mexican/Argentine philosopher 
Enrique Dussel has described as the essence of the Ethics of Liberation 
(2013). This includes a principled emphasis on creating and maintain-
ing the economic, political, social and cultural conditions and struc-
tures necessary for the production, preservation and reproduction of 
human life, which legitimizes struggles and acts of resistance by the 
victims of systems and structures of domination and exploitation that 
make a dignified life impossible. It also seeks to provide a basis for 
these victims to become protagonists in struggles for their liberation 
from such effects, and thus from poverty and inequality itself (Dussel 
2008). As Sousa Santos and César Rodriguez Garavito have argued 
(2010), Dussel’s approach demands ‘a shift of perspective from which 
global processes are analyzed and evaluated’:
Post-colonial scholars have variously theorized this move as a 
shift to a view from the experience of the victims, in the terms 
proposed by Dussel (2013); a new perspective from the exterior 
of Western modernity, in the terms of Mignolo […]; or a view 
from the reality of the coloniality of power, in Quijano’s (2000). 
In our own terms, we conceive this change of perspective as one 
that shifts from the North to the South, where the South expresses 
not only a geographical location but also reflects all the forms of 
subordination (economic exploitation, gender, racial and ethnic 
oppression, and so on) associated with neoliberal globalization. 
The South, in short, denotes the forms of suffering caused by 
global capitalism. In this sense, the South is unevenly spread 
throughout the world, including the North and the West […]. 
In inquiring into globalization from the point of view of the lived 
experiences of the South, therefore, subaltern cosmopolitanism 
takes the perspective of what Dussel (2013) has aptly called ‘the 
community of the victims’.
48 | t wo
This chapter thus explores the extent to which counter-hegemonic 
approaches to the relationship between poverty eradication, racism 
and human rights in Latin America contribute to the development of 
alternative processes of social transformation, from below, in the global 
South. My emphasis here is on describing key elements of a conceptual 
approach to these issues which draws on cases such as Mexico and 
the Zapatistas for illustrative purposes, as part of a broader, ongoing 
project which seeks to explore convergences and contrasts between such 
issues in the Latin American and African contexts, from a comparative 
perspective. 
As Leonard Gentle (2011: 366–7) argues in his contribution 
regarding the relationship between poverty and social movements in a 
recent detailed overview (Maharaj et al. 2011) of issues regarding the 
political economy of poverty in South Africa:
Social movements rarely emerge around poverty per se, and 
social movements of the chronically poor, in a self-declared 
sense, are even rarer. Cleaver […] argues in large measure that 
the chronically poor are so asset-deprived that engaging in 
organisation, mobilisation or political action would demand time, 
social networks and material resources that they do not have, and 
incur risks they are unlikely to tolerate. Social movements do, 
however, emerge in response to social relationships and dynamics 
of capital accumulation that are implicated in the creation and 
reproduction of poverty.
What kinds of social movements am I referring to in the Latin 
American context? I rely here on Gentle’s synthesis, drawn in turn 
from Bebbington (2006: 2), noting that ‘many of the classic types of 
social movement in Latin America are of this nature’:
Indigenous movements, women’s movements, Afro-Latino 
movements, and landless people’s movements were all motivated 
and sustained by aspirations that derive from shared identities, and 
are directed against social relationships and structures that have 
adverse consequences for these identity groups: in these examples, 
relationships of racism, ethnic prejudice, patriarchy and land 
ownership.
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As Gentle suggests (2011: 368–9), there is an implicit relationship 
between experiences of this kind in Latin America and Africa, and the 
global justice movement. Gentle also argues that such movements can 
fall along a varied continuum in terms of their ultimate political demands 
and impacts. I seek to apply this framework here to contemporary social 
movements in Mexico.
Racism, poverty and inequality The inspiration for this chapter comes 
from Howard Winant’s book The World Is a Ghetto (2001 – a title itself 
drawn from the song of the same name by the rhythm and blues group 
War), which argued in essence that race and racism continue to be 
central to the configuration of the globalized systems of domination 
and processes of resistance characteristic of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries (ibid.: 311–12). From his perspective race and 
racism also continue to be key, often decisive factors in the production 
and distribution of contemporary world patterns of poverty, inequality 
and injustice (ibid.: 311–12). As Winant argued (ibid.: 312):
Although often seen in terms of global social stratification, in terms 
of environmental destruction, and in terms of gender inequalities 
(sweatshops and maquilas, for example, tend to exploit women at 
high levels), these injustices are rarely characterized as racial. Yet is 
it not clear that they flow continuously from patterns established in 
the now-departed colonial epoch?
Winant (ibid.: 289) notes elsewhere in the same book that ‘[t]he 
concept of race has given rise to the fundamental social structures 
we take for granted, just as our ancestors do’. In Latin America such 
structural vestiges have been described by Peruvian sociologist Aníbal 
Quijano (cited above) as representative expressions of the persistent 
material, social and cultural ‘coloniality’ which afflicts our region, 
which pose deeply ingrained obstacles to its full liberation from the 
domination of transnational interests centred in the USA and their 
local allies, who continue to reap immense profits derived from our 
subordination and impoverishment. 
The relative advances represented by centre-left regimes in Latin 
America analogous to those of the ANC in South Africa, which have 
emerged during the same historical period (since the 1990s), are 
also widely criticized for falling short of their original impetus and 
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expectations, and for contributing to the consolidation in the region of a 
‘neo-extractivist’ or ‘neo-developmentalist’ (Zibechi 2012) model, from 
the left, which Zibechi argues actually represents a retreat from deeper 
aspirations and possibilities of more fundamental transformations, 
from the bottom. Issues involving the demands of sectors in Latin 
America which are generally marginalized and excluded in part upon 
the basis of their racial, ethnic and/or cultural identity (e.g. indigenous 
peoples and those of African descent), and among whom structures 
and patterns of poverty and inequality are most heavily concentrated, 
tend to be highly correlated with those most affected by this model. 
From Zibechi’s perspective (ibid.), which reflects a much more 
widely articulated concern, both among many of the region’s most 
critical analysts and key social actors, all of this includes the emergence 
of a ‘dual’ or ‘neocolonial’ democracy which operates along two parallel 
tracks: the expansion of democratic rights for those sectors which align 
themselves with and benefit from this model, and their negation among 
the most excluded rural and urban sectors, through the imposition of 
national security policies and mega-development projects resulting in 
the continuing dispossession of indigenous territories and resources, 
and the commoditization and militarization of marginalized urban 
spaces (such as Brazil’s favelas). Much of this echoes the same kind 
of critique of the limits of the post-apartheid regime in South Africa 
reflected in the declaration adopted by the Durban Social Forum in 
the township of Mpumalanga on 28 August 2001 (Desai 2002), and 
by continuing struggles along these lines throughout the country in the 
decade since, including the 2012 Marikana massacre. Peter Alexander 
(2012) has analysed the Marikana incident and summarized current 
trends in service-delivery protests in the context of the South African 
national Police Ministry’s assessment of the increase in ‘crowd-
management incidents’ between April 2009 and March 2012: 
The main conclusion we draw from the latest police statistics is 
that the number of service delivery protests continues unabated. 
Government attempts to improve service delivery have not been 
sufficient to assuage the frustration and anger of poor people in 
South Africa. From press reports and our own research it is clear 
that while service delivery demands provide the principal focus for 
unrest incidents, many other issues are being raised, notably lack 
of jobs. As many commentators and activists now accept, service 
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delivery protests are part of a broader Rebellion of the Poor. This 
rebellion is massive. […] There is no basis for assuming that the 
rebellion will subside unless the government is far more effective in 
channelling resources towards the poor.
Zibechi and Alexander are definitely reflecting along convergent 
tracks, which suggest that grassroots social movements of the poor, 
on the one hand, and public security experts, on the other, in settings 
such as South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and elsewhere 
in both Africa and Latin America, are confronting related challenges 
having a globalized character, which is also evident in contexts such as 
China and India (which rival South Africa in the density, extent and 
depth of their protest movements). 
Globalization, dispossession and resistance Much of this echoes 
Winant’s insistence on both the importance and the structural limita-
tions of anti-racist advances on a global scale since the Second World 
War, which spurred a shift from what he describes as the ‘old world 
racial system’ (Winant 2001: 290) founded on Western colonial-
ism, to new configurations in the context of neoliberal globalization, 
free trade and the kind of neocolonialism driven by the Washington 
Consensus and its successors through the IMF, the World Bank and 
the WTO. In the Latin American context this includes increasingly 
sharp, direct confrontations between multiple forms of what David 
Harvey has described as ‘accumulation through dispossession’ (Harvey 
2003, 2006), primarily through the mining and exploitation of natural 
resources, and widespread resistance movements among indigenous 
peoples insistent upon the defence of their territories and of the envi-
ronmental, social and cultural rights of their communities. Harvey has 
directly applied (2006) his concept of ‘accumulation through dispos-
session’ to the context of Mexico.
Pervasive state violence in Mexico
The Mexican landscape, the principal case which I seek to 
explore in this chapter, is meanwhile characterized by the continuing 
militarization of Chiapas (site of the 1994 Zapatista rebellion 
discussed in greater detail below) and every other region in the 
country characterized by indigenous unrest, and the unleashing of a 
US-backed counter-insurgency process which has included reliance 
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upon paramilitary forces responsible for massacres such as that in 
Acteal (forty-five dead, thirty-six of them women and children, all 
indigenous peoples with origins in Tzotzil Mayan communities most 
affected by state-promoted counter-insurgency and paramilitarism) in 
December 1997, which was reminiscent of similar instances of state 
savagery in Guatemala, Peru and Colombia; and a further massacre 
of seventy-two migrants in transit from Honduras, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Ecuador and Brazil in August 2010 in the municipality 
of San Fernando in the northern border state of Tamaulipas, which 
has completed the circle of such tendencies, now reinforced in the 
context of the so-called drug war.
It was thus only relatively speaking a small step from this precipice 
to Mexico’s current free fall as the latest example of generalized state 
terror (or ‘Colombianization’) in the region, in the name of the ‘war 
against drugs’, with the encouragement of persistent mechanisms of 
US domination such as the Security and Prosperity Accord of North 
America (the national security complement to NAFTA), the Mérida 
Initiative (Mexico´s version of Plan Colombia, explicitly modelled after 
its predecessor) and Mexico’s leading role with its Central American 
neighbours to the south in the Meso-American Project (formerly Plan 
Puebla Panamá). All of this has produced over 100,000 dead and 
disappeared, mostly civilians, within the last six years, more than in, for 
example, Iraq, Afghanistan or Syria during the same period. Much of this 
violence has specifically included the criminalization of indigenous and 
other protest movements, including a series of targeted killings between 
2009 and 2014 of activists involved in resistance movements to mega-
development projects (mostly mining or hydroelectric, which together 
involve over 50 per cent of the country’s territory, mostly franchised to 
foreign investors) or in defence of forests and environmental rights in 
regions such as Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Chihuahua, 
Jalisco and Colima, among others.
Similar trends in Latin America The intensification of such struggles 
throughout the region reflects what Jerry Mander and Victoria Tauli-
Corpuz have described (2006) as a framework of ‘paradigm wars’ in 
terms of the meaning and impact of Western notions of development, 
within the crucible of intensifying conflicts between indigenous 
people’s movements and processes of neoliberal capitalist globalization. 
Uruguayan analyst Raúl Zibechi (2012) has described such processes in 
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terms of the imposition of a ‘neo-developmentalist’ or ‘neo-extractivist’ 
model of domination and exploitation. 
According to Zibechi the interests of these underlying forces have 
driven a reconfiguration of regional hegemonies in a new political 
project which combines a fundamental accommodation to the 
demands of transnational capital and its local allies in a post-neoliberal 
mode (Dávalos, cited by Zibechi 2012). Dávalos has described such 
governments as examples of the emergence of a new ‘disciplinary’ form 
of mass democracy in the region. Key characteristics of this model 
include: relatively progressive social policies within a statist framework 
legitimized by revolutionary discourses, and focused on a critical stance 
towards US domination in the region and on alliance-building within 
a South–South framework in terms of foreign policy, and internally an 
emphasis on the reduction of poverty and inequality. 
These overall tendencies are generally reflected in governments such 
as those of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (and Cuba, 
with its distinct particularities), which belong to the regional alliance 
known as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (whose Spanish 
initials are ALBA, which means ‘dawn’). ALBA was established 
in honour of Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), the key leader of Latin 
American independence from Spain during the period between 1815 
and 1830, who was born in what is now Venezuela and served as the 
first president of the states currently known as Colombia, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Panama; Bolívar is best known for his 
insistence on the need for Latin American unity to resist US hegemony 
in the region. ALBA’s ideological framework has been described as ‘21st 
century socialism’ by governments such as those of Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua (and those of Cuba and several small English-
speaking former British colonies in the Caribbean such as St Vincent 
and the Grenadines, St Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, and Dominica, 
which are also members of ALBA, and whose benefits include low-
cost access to Venezuelan oil; Haiti is an associate member). Bolívar 
plays an equivalent role in the regional pantheon in this context to 
that of key exponents of pan-Africanism and/or pan-Arabism such as 
Nkrumah, Nyerere, Nasser or Ben Bella; this parallel is reinforced by 
the extent to which Bolívar inspired other key leaders later, such as 
Cuba’s José Martí (the single most influential thinker in shaping the 
Cuban revolution) and Argentine/Cuban revolutionary Ernesto Che 
Guevara.
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Mexico and the Zapatistas as representative cases
Mexico is especially relevant, along with Colombia, Chile, Peru 
and Guatemala, as among the major exceptions to this overall post-
neoliberal trend. All these countries are closely aligned with the USA 
and its regional and global interests (including all of the paraphernalia 
of the so-called wars against terrorism and drugs). They participate in 
US-promoted regional frameworks (OAS, Summit of the Americas), 
free trade pacts (NAFTA, CAFTA, FTAA, Alliance of the Pacific), 
security agreements, etc.
The Mexican state in new international alignments Mexico provides 
a relevant frame of reference here because of its size, complexity and 
racial/ethnic diversity, and because it is broadly representative of MICs 
within the global South more generally, including in its combination 
of supposed success in applying market-friendly policies together with 
persistent poverty and inequality, and purported anti-poverty initiatives 
which have been widely replicated elsewhere, such as conditional cash 
transfer programmes (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). A key guiding 
thread in Mexico and similar cases is the extent to which poverty and 
inequality in Latin America continue to be highly concentrated among, 
and correlated with discrimination against, racial/ethnic groups such as 
indigenous peoples and communities of African descent (World Bank 
2012; Winant 2001). 
My emphasis here on the racial/ethnic stratification of poverty and 
inequality in Latin America in turn forms the basis for suggesting 
elements of a comparative approach connecting such experiences 
with equivalent patterns of stratification and differentiation in Africa 
and their roots in the continent’s place in the global economy, within 
the context of its evolving relationship with dominant economic and 
geopolitical interests centred in the USA, western Europe and China. 
This includes the marked degree in both Latin America and Africa 
(and more concretely in Mexico and the Mesoamerican region on 
the one hand, and South Africa and southern Africa on the other) to 
which processes of forced migration and displacement are driven by 
structurally imposed conditions of poverty and inequality which make 
a dignified life impossible in communities and countries of origin, 
which in turn produces increasing dependency on income derived from 
remittances (Ferreira et al. 2012). 
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Mexico and South Africa’s respective roles within their regions as 
leading middle-income economies include analogous roles as subor-
dinated middlemen (brokers) or intermediaries between globalized 
processes of domination anchored in the transnational geo-economic 
and geopolitical interests of the USA or its equivalents in western 
Europe, and their less prosperous neighbours. In both cases the roles 
of Mexico and South Africa in NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) and SADC (Southern African Development Community) 
respectively are also related to broader regional configurations which 
include both overall regionalized mechanisms of integration such as the 
OAS and African Union (formerly OAU), and subregional processes 
such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States) 
and the EAC (East African Community) in Africa and Mercosur, 
ALBA, CAFTA (the Central American Free Trade Agreement, which 
includes all of the countries of that region except Nicaragua – which is a 
member of ALBA – plus the Dominican Republic, a Spanish-speaking 
nation in the Caribbean which shares the island of Hispaniola with 
Haiti) and Caricom (Caribbean Community, primarily made up of 
English-speaking states). 
NAFTA and CAFTA in the Latin American context are intertwined 
as complementary expressions of US aspirations for a restructured 
version of its traditional hegemonic pretensions in the region, which 
include long-standing but recently frustrated intentions to combine 
NAFTA and CAFTA and extend it into a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA, extending from Alaska to Argentina, as first 
articulated by Reagan in the early 1980s, which has been echoed in 
one form or another by every US president since then from Bush Sr 
to Obama, and which continues to be promoted through the so-called 
Summit of the Americas, whose sixth session was held most recently 
in Cartagena, Colombia, in April 2012). NAFTA and CAFTA are 
further complemented by bilateral free trade agreements between the 
USA and Chile, Colombia, Peru and Panama, as well as by the recently 
formed Pacific Alliance or Alliance of the Pacific, which includes the 
USA and Pacific Basin countries in Latin America such as Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru and Chile (and soon probably Panama).
It is not coincidental of course that all of these countries are those 
which are most closely aligned to the USA in terms of their political 
leanings and levels of security cooperation (and intervention) in the 
context of anti-drug and anti-terrorism policies of militarization and 
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paramilitarism. These policies often end up being implemented in the 
context of counter-insurgency against armed groups opposed to US 
policies; many of these in settings such as Mexico and Colombia target 
the poorest, most marginalized regions, often precisely those most 
heavily populated by excluded sectors such as indigenous peoples and 
communities of African descent, thus fully closing a series of concentric 
circles of domination and resistance. 
Analogies can also be drawn between Mexico’s geopolitical and geo-
economic role in Latin America, and that of South Africa in Africa, as 
regional policy models. In the Latin American context this includes 
implicit and sometimes explicit rivalries between Mexico and Brazil as 
regional leaders (in settings such as the UN, for example, competing 
for roles on the Security Council, and within the OAS, including its 
human rights system; both have among the most active diplomatic 
strategies in the region), and as convergent pioneers in the promotion 
of focalized anti-poverty programmes such as Oportunidades, Progresa 
and the Seguro Popular in Mexico and Bolsa Familia and Fome Zero in 
Brazil, all heavily promoted by the World Bank as regional and global 
models worthy of emulation. Both Mexico and Brazil (together with 
Colombia) are especially notable recently, as well, for the militarization 
of their anti-drug policies and public security paradigms in alignment 
with US priorities, incentives and financing. 
The Zapatista rebellion This implicit comparative framework can 
then be further ‘seasoned’ by the key role played by racial/ethnic 
inequities in the Mexican, Brazilian and South African landscapes, 
which are embedded in their convergent colonial legacies. There are 
also potential historical analogies which could be explored between 
Mexico and South Africa as to their respective, and still incomplete, 
processes of transition to democracy. The key year for both countries 
in this context is 1994 – most spectacularly for South Africa with 
its first free, non-racial elections in April and Mandela becoming 
president – which began with Mexico’s Zapatista rebellion. The 
multidimensional impact of the Zapatistas reflected their triple 
emphasis on: 1) a critique of neoliberalism expressed in NAFTA; 
2) a critique of the Mexican version of (anti-indigenous) racism, as 
reflected in the widespread poverty and inequality characteristic of 
the country’s indigenous peoples; and 3) the need to construct an 
authentic, multiracial and multicultural (or intercultural) democracy 
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including respect for indigenous linguistic and cultural rights and 
rights of autonomy and self-determination. 
Twenty years later, both Mexico and South Africa have fallen far 
short of the expectations awakened by the widespread, deeply rooted 
mobilizations which made 1994 possible in both contexts. It is widely 
acknowledged that Mexico’s Zapatista rebellion was the decisive spark 
which deeply shook the nation’s consciousness (in a way arguably similar 
to that of the Sharpesville and Soweto massacres in 1960 and 1976) and 
thereby set in motion the incipient process of democratization which 
finally culminated in the election for the first time of an opposition 
presidential candidate (ironically from the centre-right of the political 
spectrum) in the July 2000 elections.
But Mexico has never had a national truth commission, no trials 
for the crimes of the PRI regime; no real, enforceable recognition of 
indigenous rights; and its democracy is essentially an empty vessel (a 
‘low-intensity democracy’, as Sousa Santos has described such cases). 
The Zapatista rebellion continues peacefully today in the Highlands 
and jungles of Chiapas through the construction of community-based 
models of indigenous autonomy (including alternative systems of 
education, healthcare and justice independent of governmental funding 
and control), despite persistent harassment by government troops 
and paramilitary forces indoctrinated in US and Colombian counter-
insurgency, ‘national security’ and the anti-drug and anti-terrorist 
doctrine of ‘low-intensity’ warfare (pioneered first in El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras in the 1980s and later exported to Iraq 
and Afghanistan (see Grandin 2007). The emphasis of the Zapatista 
movement, EZLN, on building indigenous autonomy since 2001 
illustrates its key role as a forerunner of similar processes in varying 
contexts that include, elsewhere in Mexico, the Policia Comunitaria 
(autonomous community police in thirty indigenous municipalities in 
the country’s poorest region of Guerrero, Cherán and Atenco), and 
the APPO (Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca), the Minga 
and Guardia Indigena (Indigenous Guard) in Colombia, the Mapuches 
(indigenous peoples) in Chile, broad coalitions organizing against 
mining mega-projects in Peru, etc. 
New ambitions of the Mexican state Mexico’s cycle of a deeply 
flawed, incomplete transition to democracy was formally initiated in 
2000 but has recently come full circle as the party which was in power 
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from 1929 to 2000, the so-called Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), reclaimed the presidency in December 2012 after a vigorously 
disputed election plagued by widespread allegations of irregularities 
and inequities, including the role of media monopolies such as Televisa 
and Azteca, which heavily promoted the PRI candidate, Enrique Peña 
Nieto. Peña Nieto is well known for his repressive tactics of small-town 
counter-insurgency in his role as governor of the state surrounding 
the country’s capital. In May 2006 he led the operations against the 
Zapatista-supported communal landholders in San Salvador Atenco, 
who were resisting a planned airport mega-project.
My emphasis here is on Mexico as a case characterized by the 
convergent experiences of indigenous peoples and migrants as key 
referents within an overall framework centred on issues involving the 
rights of the poor within a single yet multidimensional landscape. 
Mexico is an ideal example from this perspective because issues related 
to both indigenous peoples and migration in the context of poverty 
are absolutely central to the country’s characteristics and identity, and 
because the Mexican state is one of the key promoters of UN initiatives 
regarding both indigenous rights and migrant rights (including its 
leadership in terms of all the key instruments focused on the rights of 
these sectors), but is at the same time one of the worst, most recurrent, 
generalized violators of their rights internally. In the case of migrants, 
the Mexican state is not only responsible for its actions or omissions 
in violation of the rights of its own citizens (over thirty million of 
Mexican origin living in the USA) driven to forced migration by its 
subordination to neoliberal imperatives imposed by the USA through 
free trade, supposed anti-terrorism and the so-called drug war. It is also 
responsible for systematic policies of state terror which implement US 
anti-immigrant and xenophobic policies on Mexican territory against 
migrants in transit from the rest of Latin America and the world headed 
north towards the USA. 
Mexico’s complexities include pronounced patterns of both increased 
wealth and increased poverty, combined with deepening inequalities 
correlated with racial/ethnic stratification plus social, political and 
cultural exclusion, discrimination and massive forced migration and 
displacement stemming from the current drug war imposed by US, 
policy which has cost the lives of over 100,000 civilians over the last 
six years. But Mexico at the same time was the most recent host of 
the G20’s summit at Los Cabos in June 2012, and the head of the 
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intensively globalizing OECD is former Mexican foreign affairs and 
finance minister José Angel Gurría, closely linked to the most corrupt 
and technocratic faction of the former ruling party which has just 
returned to power. 
Mexico’s supposed advances in reducing poverty and inequality 
have led analysts such as De la Calle and Rubio (2012) to highlight 
its purported transformation into a ‘middle-class’ society and 
country, promoting this view through highly influential channels in 
the USA such as the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars based in 
Washington, DC. This approach includes their strenuous efforts to 
diminish the relative weight, depth and importance of the persistent 
impoverishment of a majority of the country’s people, and is reflected 
in the deliberately provocative (yet awkwardly translated) subtitle of 
their book (‘Poor no more, developed not yet’). Meanwhile the costs 
of achieving Mexico’s supposed transition to ‘middle-class’ status (in 
addition to whitewashing its persistently high levels of poverty and 
inequality) include the European Union’s suspension of development 
financing to the country in 2014 (La Jornada 2012).
Empirical counter-evidence Data from October 2012 released by the 
Mexican government through the World Bank (2013) tell a different 
story. This includes an increase in overall household poverty rates 
from 42.7 to 51.3 per cent (a higher level than in 2004, for example, 
comprising some 52 million people) between 2006 and 2010, and from 
13.8 to 18.8 per cent in food insecurity (which is in Mexico equated 
to extreme poverty) (ibid.). A constant pattern throughout this period, 
despite ebbs and flows related to other factors, is that by 2010 85 per 
cent of the country’s indigenous peoples (between 10 and 15 per cent 
of its total population according to varying estimates) continued to live 
in poverty, mostly in the rural areas, with a majority living in extreme 
poverty (ibid.; UNDP 2010). Mexico thus exemplifies a broader pattern 
in Latin America characterized by the spatial concentration of poverty 
among groups such as indigenous peoples and those of African descent, 
which continue to be marginalized because of their racial and/or ethnic 
identities. In this way the Mexican case also highlights the extent to 
which Latin America’s persistent inequities reflect historical patterns 
which are reproduced as the result of the imposition of neoliberal free 
trade policies, with especially devastating effects among the region’s 
children.
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Meanwhile Mexico was in 2006, and continues in 2015, to be the 
country in Latin America with the highest number of undernourished 
children in Latin America (despite the fact that Brazil has a significantly 
larger total population) (México Social 2012: 47), while another recent 
study undertaken at Mexico’s Salvador Zubirán National Institute 
of Nutrition projects at least 10,000 deaths of Mexican children (La 
Jornada 2012), up from 8,450 in 2010 (México Social 2012: 4) from 
causes attributable to chronic malnutrition, or approximately twenty-
five children dead each day (ibid.: 52); a total which includes one 
out of every three deaths being associated with malnutrition, birth 
or contagious diseases registered in the 100 municipalities with the 
highest levels of marginalization (ibid.: 24); the accumulated toll of 
such avoidable deaths over the last three decades is estimated by the 
same study to reach some 1.3 million among children under the age 
of five; throughout the period referred to and all the way up to the 
present, the infant mortality rate among indigenous children has vastly 
exceeded that among non-indigenous children, particularly among 
those aged five or less; this includes a 16.2 infant mortality rate in the 
heavily indigenous state of Oaxaca, which is almost three times the 
national average of 5.5 (ibid.: 4). Overall 14.7 per cent of all children 
who were medically assessed by the country’s social security (IMSS) 
system in 2010 were diagnosed with some degree of malnutrition. All 
of this has led the Peña Nieto government to launch a new flagship 
programme to eradicate hunger in the country.
Another recent study regarding the ‘territorial dynamics’ of 
poverty and inequality in Latin America, issued in 2011 by the Latin 
American Centre for Rural Development (RIMISP), the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the UN’s International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), also stresses recent 
increases in both rural poverty and inequality in Mexico (RIMISP, 
IDRC and IFAD 2011). The report emphasizes the persistence in 
Mexico of ‘spatially-differentiated’ patterns of economic development 
(ibid.: 14), and how only Chile, among all of the members of the 
OECD, exceeds Mexico’s rate of income inequality. It also highlights 
how gaps ‘among Mexico’s municipalities and towns’, driven by 
differential rates of incorporation into the dominant modes of 
stratified globalization driven by NAFTA, ‘are comparable to the 
ones observed between the world’s richest and poorest nations’ 
(ibid.). This includes, for example, the fact that 67 per cent of the 
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population in Mexico’s poorest 125 municipalities is of indigenous 
origin (La Jornada 2012). 
The RIMISP/IDRC/IFAD report also highlights the extent to 
which focalized income transfer and subsidy programmes linked to 
Mexico’s so-called ‘Second Agrarian Reform’ process (initiated in 
1992), such as Oportunidades, Progresa and Procampo, have contributed 
to overall increases in poverty and inequality precisely because of their 
targeted approach and failure to account for pre-existing inequities 
embedded in Mexico’s territorial and regional configurations, which 
primarily affect the country’s indigenous peoples (RIMISP, IDRC 
and IFAD 2011: 9–13). As a result rural poverty, and its most 
extreme forms, continue to be most heavily concentrated among the 
country’s indigenous peoples, in regions such as Chiapas, Oaxaca 
and Guerrero, where the concentration of their population is highest. 
According to a 2010 UNDP report, this means in practice that all 257 
of the municipalities in the country with an indigenous population of 
over 55 per cent were classified as municipalities with concentrated 
rates of poverty affecting the vast majority of their populations; this 
includes several municipalities in the heavily indigenous Highlands 
(Montaña) region of Guerrero, which are not only the municipalities 
with the highest rates of poverty and lowest HDI in the country, but 
also the poorest in all of Latin America (UNDP 2010). The highest 
state rate of extreme poverty – 32.8 per cent – is meanwhile in the 
heavily indigenous state of Chiapas, followed by Guerrero at 28 per 
cent and Oaxaca with 26.6; together these three states are those with 
the highest concentration of the country’s indigenous population 
(México Social 2012: 4).
Concrete expressions of these overall structural patterns can 
be extracted from studies which disaggregate the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Human Development 
Indicators in terms of specific sectors (women, indigenous peoples, 
children, etc.) and regions, which lay the basis for comparing trends 
across regions. In Mexico – classified overall as a country of medium 
wealth with medium levels of HDI – correlations and convergences are 
detected between markedly lower HDIs in regions where indigenous 
peoples are concentrated, such as Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, 
where racism and ethnic/cultural discrimination emerge as key causal 
factors that reflect the genocidal implications of convergent modes of 
state and market violence.
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Indicators of this kind also make it possible to discern implicit 
correlations at deeper levels of analysis, reflected, for example, in the 
fact that the municipalities with the lowest levels of HDI in the Mexican 
state of Guerrero (the site of long-standing tourist destinations such 
as Acapulco and Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo) – and in all of Latin America 
– happen to have populations overwhelmingly of indigenous origin. 
They have the commensurately highest rates of infant and maternal 
mortality, low birth weight, stunted growth, hunger, fatal but eminently 
preventable childhood disease, etc. They are primarily located in the 
region known as La Montaña (The Highlands), which includes eight of 
the fifty municipalities in the country with the lowest levels of HDI, and 
have HDIs roughly equivalent to those of Gambia or Rwanda (which at 
0.390 and 0.385 respectively rank 154 and 155 out of 172, among the 
eighteen lowest-ranking countries in Africa, slightly above Sudan and 
Afghanistan). These are also the same communities of origin that expel 
the largest numbers and proportions of their residents into increasingly 
intertwined circuits of internal and external (international) migration 
– overwhelmingly to the northern, more prosperous regions of Mexico 
itself, and to the USA.
Conclusion
The counter-hegemonic paradigms of human rights which have 
emerged in Latin America throughout the last twenty years, like those 
of South Africa, imply a challenge ‘from below’ aligned with popular 
movements and struggles for liberation – both North and South – against 
contemporary forms of domination. These movements challenge 
capitalist and liberal hegemonic notions of rights which assume them to 
be necessarily embedded in exploitative market economies, traditional 
capitalist and liberal versions of the nation-state (expressed in what 
has been described as the Westphalian paradigm) and its constrained 
dimensions of democracy, participation and membership, which are 
enshrined in hegemonic versions of international law. Popular social 
movements such as the Zapatistas and those reflected in ‘service delivery 
protests’ in South Africa reflect and build upon counter-hegemonic 
notions of human rights centred on peoples, communities and persons. 
They help drive the imagining and construction of alternatives to state-
centred formulations which are focused upon nation-states as the most 
privileged subjects. These movements also tend to be characterized 
by an insistence upon the equality, integrality, interrelatedness 
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and interdependence of all rights (civil, political, economic, social, 
environmental, etc.). All of this is also present in South Africa’s rich, 
complex experiences of constitutional and legal transformation since 
1994, with all of their combined limits and potential. We have much to 
learn from each other and to reimagine together.
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Tor Halvorsen
Introduction
The year 2008 saw the emergence of three events relevant for South 
Africa (SA) and its future as a democratic developmental state. The 
first event, not unique to SA, of course, was the economic crisis. The 
second event is SA’s signing of an agreement with the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to be an 
‘enhanced engagement country’. The third is the formation of the 
BRIC alliance. When preparing for its constitution in 2009, SA was 
invited to participate. BRIC became BRICS from 2010, consisting of 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.1
How SA relates to the OECD and/or BRICS will influence how 
SA becomes what many see as a goal and an ideal: a ‘democratic 
developmental state’. The Human Science Research Council 
(HSRC) of SA hosted an international policy dialogue conference 
on ‘The potential for and challenges of constructing a democratic 
developmental State in South Africa’ in 2008 (4–6 June) (Edigheji 
2010). Parallel to this, a national mobilization for common goals was 
launched, and on 1 January 2009 the National Planning Commission 
started working, delivering its report eighteen months later. The report 
focuses on national unity, active citizens, more employment and 
reduced inequality, all these in relation to how the possible ‘democratic 
developmental state’ is expected to promote inclusive growth and help 
fight poverty.
The OECD and BRICS: old and new post-national economic actors
While the contact with the OECD is with an organization well known 
to SA (Marais 2011), BRICS is a turn towards regimes less familiar 
and less concerned about the democratic dimension. In competition 
with the OECD countries, BRICS, however, represents a South–
South alternative, legitimized by the position of the ‘developing world’ 
– developing MICs that are in opposition to the rich world. They are 
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seen to be driven by growth models different from the neoliberal one 
which is dominating within the OECD region – a neoliberalism that 
now, owing to the crisis, is questioned and under revision, but not 
challenged. The world is still dominated by Anglo-American neoliberal 
economic traditions, and candidates from these traditions inhabit the 
multilateral organizations, ranging from the World Bank (WB) via the 
International Monetary Fund to the OECD (Fourcade 2009). 
Such a domination by one economic paradigm may, however, 
be threatened by the partial success of BRICS in demanding better 
representation for countries from the global South in the governance 
of these economic multilaterals. The establishment of the BRICS 
Development Bank is also an implicit criticism of how these multilaterals 
work (particularly the WB). The BRICS think tank network is seen 
as an alternative both to knowledge from the West and the Western 
institutions (such as the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
agreements, TRIPS, of the World Trade Organization) that control 
the market for knowledge services. So far most university networks, 
student mobility programmes, research topics and systems of quality 
evaluation and excellence have been within the OECD world and with 
links to universities in these countries (which also try, as the OECD 
encourages, to recruit ‘the best brains’ from BRICS countries). This 
may be challenged by the BRICS network of education and research 
exchanges, which after the meetings in Durban in March 2013 is growing 
both as a networking initiative and in its ability to set the research 
agenda. New strategies for combating poverty may emerge out of the 
contradictions within the BRICS countries, contradictions to which the 
OECD growth model does not have any solutions (Adler and Webster 
2000). For SA, BRICS may be an alternative in terms of economic 
policy, knowledge and the formation of identities (from North–South 
to South–South). As we shall see, the OECD feels threatened by such 
an alternative and seeks to co-opt BRICS countries.
An alternative model and its vulnerability
This, however, puts SA in a potential mediating position, as 
the country now is courted by both these competing blocs. If the 
OECD promotes the neoliberal model, and BRICS is a more 
traditional authoritarian developmental state model, the democratic 
developmental state – as known within the Nordic community of small 
countries – may emerge as an SA alternative to both. Neoliberalism 
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bypasses democracies for the sake of the market; BRICS promotes the 
authoritarian type of state capitalism. 
The question, then, is whether SA can contribute to an alternative. 
Many SA academics (but not only them) think so, and are emphasizing 
that it will contribute to the building of such a state, even making the 
Nordic countries’ experiences a ‘model’ (Edigheji 2010). Emphasis is 
now less on the previously so much admired, but far less democratic, 
Asian Tigers, which are the reference countries for much of the BRICS 
‘developmental state’ talk. With the help of the political economy that 
underpins the democratic developmental state of the Nordic model – 
known for growth with equity, democracy and redistribution, a strong 
state and at the same time a vibrant civil society – the expectations 
are that poverty in SA will be combated, economic growth secured, 
social equality promoted. The hope is that a growing democratic 
influence from an alliance between working classes and middle classes 
will lead to a distribution of power in society, securing the weak and 
vulnerable their right and survival. However, the way SA is governed 
with influence from the post-national actors, such as the OECD and 
BRICS, is not reflected upon.
This reference to the Nordic model is an indication that SA needs 
to agree on a model different from both the statist BRICS and the 
technocratic OECD. What that model could be like – based on the 
arguments put forth after the HSRC conference in 2008 – will be 
discussed in the final section of this chapter as the utopian alternative. 
The embedded economy The kernel argument of political economy is 
that capitalism is shaped by how politics and economics are interrelated, 
and are over time developing preconditions for one another. The 
formal and institutional differentiation between politics and economics, 
characterizing modernity, is penetrated by numerous inter-institutional 
arrangements. The idea of the democratic developmental state 
presupposes the embedded economy approach: that the differentiation 
between politics and economics (so important to avoid corruption, for 
example) at the same time creates productive links in terms of mutual 
types of interpenetration, ideally promoting trust between the actors 
within both the state and the economy (Vale and Prinsloo 2014). 
A democratic developmental state regime seeks cooperation between 
state and economy for the purpose of reducing social inequality in line 
with democratic demands and democratic mobilization. A democratic 
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developmental state thus presupposes a regime shaped by a balance of 
class powers that can justify a strong role for the state as an agent of 
development in relation to, and within, the economy. This balance of 
class powers will again rely on and reproduce the democratic legitimacy 
of politics, usually secured by influential labour unions, an open and 
active press, vibrant civil society and social justice (Rueschemeyer 
et al. 1992).
In modern societies the main institutions involved in the power game 
are the state, the economy and democracy. These institutions need 
to be interrelated in a balanced way; therefore we need to emphasize 
the weak link, according to Evans (2005). In studies of power, formal 
democracy includes freedom of expression and human rights, political 
parties, voting rights and representation. But formal democracy does 
not guarantee a process of constant redistribution of power within 
society (Chipkin 2007). Building social relations strong enough to 
fight for greater influence on power, and an ability to use power to 
promote suppressed interests, presupposes a civil society and class 
alliances capable of confronting both the state (when being misused) 
and economic actors working through the silent powers of the market. 
Even constitutional democracies with a radical constitution such as 
that in SA may find that if democracy is not cherished daily it will 
not be able to resist the attacks from the other sources of power – e.g. 
from state-centred politics, the strategies of national and international 
capital (whether industrial or financial) or other anti-democratic social 
forces. 
The level of trust in a society is, however, usually seen as an indication 
of an interaction between state and economy under the scrutiny of 
democracy, and with a ‘state–economy–civil society interaction’ that 
leads to an enhanced democratic effect. Most important is a growth 
of trust in political institutions, which by most social scientists is seen 
as a precondition for a democratic developmental state (Streeck 2011, 
2013).
The question of external forces My question is how the model 
proposed by Evans (2005), ideally seeing development as a result of 
a positive spiral between state, economy and democracy, is influenced 
by external forces, a fourth variable not analysed by Evans or reflected 
on in the SA debate. External not in the conventional foreign policy 
sense, denoting a foreign power, but external in the sense of forces 
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which extend beyond the reach of the nation-state as a legal/spatial 
entity; forces which nevertheless are present in the social and political 
relations of the actors of the polity. Most policy areas have links to 
normative centres outside the nation-state environment, or have 
delegated parts of their sovereignty to multinational organizations. 
Thus both the OECD and BRICS get involved in the interaction 
between democracy, state and economy. OECD is formally advocating 
democracy as a value which must underpin this interaction, but, owing 
to its neoliberal and therefore anti-planning profile, the OECD is seen 
less as a promoter of the developmental state. BRICS countries may be 
models for developmental state idealists, but most of these countries 
seem to worry little about democracy and human rights. 
In practice, however, the OECD’s interactions with particular 
countries may undermine the democratic institutions. As the OECD 
is not only an organization that gives advice, but also an organization 
which influences the balance of social forces within a society, it can, 
despite its formal support of democracy, bypass the democratic process 
of decision-making within the nation-states, as is happening in SA. 
This takes place through external expert advice to internal bureaucrats 
or state representatives, leaving no room for deliberation. Again it is 
technocracy and not voice that counts, legitimized by the logic of the 
market, a logic controlled by actors who do not tolerate deliberations 
(Offe 1998). Some class interests find more support in OECD 
advice than others, and the type of knowledge valued by OECD may 
legitimize some interests and organizations at the expense of others. 
This is done by reference to so-called evidence-based advice, statistical 
standards, quality comparisons of sectors of society, the use of blaming 
and shaming to promote best practices and winners, thus at the same 
time creating losers. These are some of the soft methods of governance 
which an organization like OECD must rely on in addition to its 
appeal to trust in their experts and statistics. BRICS is now developing 
alternative tools for influence of the same kind.
The old and new OECD
The OECD can be seen as an organization with a particular 
mandate to regulate the relation between politics and economics 
within capitalism. The OECD, as a continuation of the organization 
that administered the Marshall Plan after the Second World War, 
grew out of a period with beliefs that the link between democracy and 
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economics could first of all be strengthened by the growth of capitalism. 
There should be a mutual affinity between democracy and capitalism, 
and to secure this the advice and knowledge production of the OECD 
was helpful, even necessary. The OECD therefore soon developed an 
interest in a number of areas important for the ‘embedded economy’, 
such as education and research, environmental policies and health 
issues, in addition to the regulation of the economy as governance. 
If the market dictates how capitalism can work, this dictate has to be 
softened by political means that reproduce the democratic foundation 
of societies. Even the OECD seemed to carry within its collective 
consciousness a memory of how the first democracies of Germany (the 
Weimar Republic), as well as democracy in a number of Latin American 
countries, were all destroyed by authoritarian forces. Also, the threat 
of the so-called socialist ‘alternative’ that had evolved in Europe as 
well as Latin America loomed over democratic capitalism’s road to 
development. Lately, how neoliberalism works against democracy has, 
however, become a burning issue (Streeck 2013: 148), also leading to 
new reflections on the future of capitalism within the OECD.
During the early 1980s, the OECD, along with its member countries, 
moved towards the neoliberal ideologies. The OECD ceased to be 
concerned about democracy and the institutional base for capitalist 
development. Instead it became an expert on implementing the dictates 
of the market. It became an organization dedicated to the spread of 
neoliberal economic reasoning to the public services and the public 
at large. It helped to erode the institutional basis for a differentiation 
between politics and capitalism. It buried the fear of how internal 
contradictions within capitalism might threaten its support within 
societies. 
The OECD seems to be an organization which is increasing its 
autonomy by emphasizing its think tank image, its role as evidence-based 
expert adviser and its ability to generate policy-oriented advice. Thus, 
the OECD, despite being formally a forum for national experts, gives 
these experts an aura of bureaucratic autonomy. The OECD reaches 
out to experts either in other think tanks, at universities or centres of 
applied research. About 1,500 full-time researchers have over the years 
been helped by about 40,000 academics chosen to participate in one 
or the other of the OECD’s publications (Gayon 2012). And they do 
so willingly, as the status of authoring an OECD report is growing. 
In addition, more than 1,200 of its employees support the mainly 
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economically trained and hard-working researchers, whose activities 
cover many fields. In the end, however, it is the ‘chief economist’ who 
holds the upper hand and gives the direction for the work of the other 
divisions. 
The OECD is a membership organization where countries, through 
their state bureaucracies, become closely involved in the work of the 
OECD as producers of policies. Much of the data that the OECD uses 
is provided by the civil servants and its research units. And as indicated 
above, numerous academics are used as guest writers. It is this coopera-
tion with the members that gives the OECD work its high legitimacy 
and value (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Carroll and Carroll 2011) and 
its base for independent authoritative policy formulation. The nation-
state representatives and those who do the work for the OECD locally 
find themselves coopted by this process and limited in their space for 
criticism of the final outcome. This outcome typically takes the shape of 
country reports at macro level or sector comparisons across nation-states 
to promote OECD-defined best practices or definitions of good quality. 
It is in this movement to and from and among the nation-states that the 
OECD bureaucracy and its collection of experts, more or less tempo-
rally employed, with the help of their networks of co-thinkers, develop 
its organizational identity. It is this identity, or combination of values 
and interests, that makes up the degree of autonomy of this organization 
(Trondal et al. 2010). In an historical-institutional approach, changes 
within such an organization must be seen in relation to the broader 
transformation of political powers and class structures – for example, the 
breakthrough of neoliberalism in the 1980s, the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the re-emergence of developmental state ideas, etc. 
Towards the neoliberalism light? The OECD has, with the help of 
its allies such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, 
become the lead organization for spreading the ‘innovation gospel’ 
(Foucault 1979; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Plehwe, in Halvorsen and 
Nyhagen 2011). Knowledge stands out as the key factor, together with 
access to financial capital. Knowledge, relevant for both human capital 
and the competition state, which measures its success through degrees 
of innovation, becomes the key fuel for the accumulation processes of 
the capitalism of the emerging economies. 
The economic crisis beginning in 2008 challenged the OECD’s 
kind of neoliberalism. This was a challenge from within owing to 
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criticism of the neoliberal economic hegemony as the crisis evolved. 
But there was also a challenge from outside, from BRICS and other 
countries less hit by the Western economic downturn. The growth of 
the new economies that could not have – nor wanted – full OECD 
membership became an external challenge owing to the alternative 
they represented as more successful growth economies. These are 
economies SA needed to link up with if it was to improve its situation. 
If the OECD model for development is to expand, it also has to 
expand its membership base towards the emerging economies. It can 
no longer be taken for granted that the OECD growth model is the 
dominating model for development. The democratic legitimization 
of capitalism again had to be put on the agenda and now questioned, 
both as a value for development and as a criteria for membership in 
OECD. 
The OECD answer to this situation was, first, to attempt to transform 
its identity from being an organization for developed democratic 
capitalist countries into being a ‘global player’; i.e. to generalize for all 
countries its developmental model. Secondly, as a consequence of this 
new-sought identity, the OECD felt compelled to start rethinking its 
political economy. 
The OECD recruiting SA and other BRICS countries? In 2008, South 
Africa signed an agreement with an OECD now in search of a new and 
more global identity. SA became an associate member. The signing 
was part of a process whereby OECD approached what were then the 
BRIC countries (Brazil, India, Russia, China) to establish a ‘waiting 
room’ for future cooperation, perhaps leading to membership. As 
already indicated, the OECD needed to broaden its mission globally 
and recruit countries that might adjust to its development model: 
democratic capitalism. So far Mexico and most recently Chile have 
become full members, thus opening up a new region (Latin America). 
As far as I can see, this recruitment is compromising criteria earlier 
used – about democratic governance, corruption, etc. – for sanctioning 
new membership. Chile and Mexico are the model cases of neoliberal 
reformed countries, as analysed in the cross-national comparison by 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002). If the economic development 
of the BRICS countries continues, some of them will be the next 
candidates, at least if they live up to some of the criteria of democratic 
capitalism. SA would be the gateway to Africa not only for BRICS but 
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also for the OECD, and it is probably a country that will maintain a 
democratic regime, making it eligible without too much ado. 
Woodward (2009) argues that the OECD is characterized by its 
ability to complement other organizations concerned with economic 
development. When the head of the OECD, Secretary General Angel 
Gurría, launched the accession initiative, he engineered a ‘handshake 
between the dominant countries of the twentieth century and those 
perched to dominate the twenty first’ (ibid.: 127). The associate 
member, SA, is officially called an Enhanced Engagement Country 
and is given the opportunity to make use of the qualified bureaucracy 
and expertise of the OECD. This is a way of influencing a country 
to fit the criteria stated by the OECD as necessary to become a full 
member. This arrangement, ‘enhanced engagement’, may be a way 
of keeping contact with the MICs that are too important to be turned 
away simply for lack of popular/democratic influence within the polity. 
The other countries enjoying such a status with the OECD are Brazil, 
China, India and Indonesia. Extreme cleavages between rich and poor 
in these countries, suppression of citizens, slave-like working relations 
and the degree of corruption show that democracy make a difference. 
The special agreement with these countries, despite the character of 
the polity of the regimes, allows consideration of full membership at 
a non-specified future time. SA, with its emphasis on the ‘democratic 
developmental state’, is probably closer to such membership, if it 
wishes, than other countries in the waiting room. 
However, it is now also a question of whether the much more 
politically problematic but economically rewarding BRICS network has 
become more important, even an alternative. The BRICS countries are 
overlapping with the enhanced engagement group (apart from Russia, 
which has been negotiating full membership without success, and 
Indonesia, which is not a BRICS country). They have one important 
trait in common: the growth of wealth among the few, and the growth 
of poverty among the many. Prospects for democracy, including where 
formal democratic institutions are in place, such as Brazil, presuppose 
a certain degree of equality between citizens and a degree of dispersion 
of powers, particularly among economic elites. SA is a typical BRICS 
country when it comes to cleavages, despite otherwise being the most 
different case. In this respect it is a country where democratic capitalism 
has meagre opportunities to develop. SA is, however, atypical in 
terms of the strength of the formal democratic structures owing to the 
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pre-1994 liberation processes and constitutional radicalism. As such, 
South Africa is a test case of how real democracy, defined as a process 
of redistribution of power in society, may or may not develop with the 
support of a democratic constitution. 
OECD: becoming the global player? The hand the OECD has reached 
out to the emerging economies since 2007 is part of an overall attempt 
to change identity: from rich countries’ club (and secretariat for G20, 
in which the BRICS countries also have a voice) to a global influence 
on the global economy. 
In his report to ministers in 2012, pictures of the OECD secretary 
general, Angel Gurría, are on almost every page, together with those of 
other political and economic male leaders. This symbolizes his leadership 
authority, with which in particular he directs the two reorientations 
mentioned above: the renewal of internal OECD political-economic 
thinking and the external orientation towards MICs, or ‘emerging 
economies’, to seek their cooperation within the new ‘globality’. 
With reference to the 50th Anniversary Vision Statement (OECD 
2011a), which outlines the need to make the OECD a global player, 
Gurría proposes to ‘intensify our work with our key partner countries 
and the next generation of emerging-market economies’ (p. 16). This 
intensification, must however, take the shape of integration:
We need to continue integrating key partners in our policy debate 
and work. This could be achieved on the basis of ‘Frameworks 
for Co-operation’ with individual partners, by further identifying 
priorities for collaboration, by strengthening data exchange and 
by including the partner countries in our databases, by having 
contact points in capitals, and at their embassies in Paris, and by 
developing secondment programmes, among other initiatives. 
(Ibid.: 17)
As for the reorientation of the economic thinking, an all-inclusive 
OECD working group called NAEC (New Approach to Economic 
Challenge) was established, to develop ‘A strategic OECD policy 
agenda for inclusive growth’. The economy, according to Gurría, has 
failed not only in preventing the economic crisis but also in reducing 
social cleavages. This kind of critique can no longer be of BRICS only, 
as cleavages are growing in all OECD countries where ‘a creative and 
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inclusive economy is lacking […] given the sharp increase in social 
inequality in most of our member countries’ (ibid.: 8). The political 
economy of the OECD world needs to be revised, to better connect 
politics with the economic analysis and thus to improve the policy 
advice of the OECD to its member states. But, despite the growing 
public critique of neoliberalism, the intention is not to build a new 
economic theory.
In this rethinking even the new ‘partner countries’ need to be 
involved. The BRICS/MICs are invited to shape the new direction of 
the OECD, as they are to be given influence from the start in the newly 
revised Development Strategy (ibid.: 17). 
SA, then, to make our case explicit, is invited to discuss the future 
development policies of the OECD. So far NAEC has launched its 
framework for reflection, asking for support and active participation 
from country ministerial representatives. NAEC’s terms of reference 
are the key ideas coming out of the celebration of OECD’s fifty years 
of existence. The main areas of focus are governance of the political 
economy, innovation and human capital development, all of this 
with an eye to green growth, i.e. the expectation that there can be a 
delinking between growth, on the one hand, and the use of energy that 
undermines the global environment, on the other.
SA choosing both the OECD and BRICS?
In a typical statement arguing for the importance of BRICS it is said: 
South Africa, of course, has promoted itself as an integral link to 
the African continent. It is our status as self-acclaimed gateway to 
the continent that has afforded us membership into BRICS and 
an opportunity to explore lucrative markets for our goods and 
services, and to implement the Industrial Policy Action Plan and 
the New Growth Path framework. There certainly is a wide scope 
for co-operation in various projects within the BRICS structures 
– membership in BRICS will promote trade and investment, 
enhance industrialisation and promote job creation. There is little 
doubt that South Africa benefits, and will continue to benefit, from 
clubbing together with the likes of the BRIC countries, but what 
is being contested is the potential of the South African economy 
and its political underpinnings to actually take advantage of these 
possibilities.2
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While much of the work in SA with BRICS is personalized through 
the minister of trade and industry, Rob Davies, the previous and long-
standing minister of finance, Trevor A. Manuel, has been the mediator 
and implementer of OECD/SA relations. The annexe of this statement 
lists activities linking SA and OECD which can be made much longer, 
as also described in the publication Active with Africa (OECD 2011b). 
Trevor A. Manuel has moved on to become minister of planning, 
but the Ministry of Finance continues as the nodal point of the OECD/
SA link. Yet Rob Davies was central in arranging the fifth meeting 
for the BRICS. In a letter posted on the BRICS website, he launches 
what he considers important elements in the BRICS rethinking of 
the development model (given the failures exposed by the economic 
crises).3 Both the OECD and BRICS are thus launching alternatives 
to the ongoing neoliberal orthodoxy. In this context it is interesting 
to note that Trevor S. Manuel, who has a reputation from his time 
as minister of finance of endorsing the ‘trickle-down effect’, may also 
be seen as a champion of more neoliberal policies generally (Dykes 
2004). His social policy, ideas of austerity and limited use of the state 
as a developmental state indicate that he saw the state as a potential 
drain on the economy rather than a force within the economic growth 
machinery (Green 2008).
In his role as minister of planning and member of the committee 
creating the National Development Plan – Vision for 2030, the main 
message is the balance between democracy, state and economy, 
generating trust. We also note that it focuses on the BRICS as the 
potential partner for the future. And more important still: the OECD 
is hardly mentioned.
SA’s motivations for the agreement with OECD seem to be 
bureaucratic learning, information-gathering and policy input. The 
OECD is seen to be a positive influence both on how the political 
economy is organized and what it contains, i.e. its substance. The 
OECD is thus functioning as a tool for development, owing first of 
all to the knowledge resources and knowledge-based solutions it gives 
access to. 
The OECD influence, however, varies. Its role in bureaucracy 
enhancement, knowledge mediation and policy formation is more 
important to some sectors of the polity, and some politicians see their 
interests better promoted by cooperation with and use of the OECD 
authority than others. The influence of the OECD must thus be 
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understood through its interaction within the polity of a nation-state/
national economy, as some actors more successfully than others use 
the OECD to promote internal political change. A likely hypothesis is 
that, for example, the minister of trade and industry (Dr Davis) will be 
less enthused by the OECD when formulating his industrial policies 
than Mr Manuel when formulating his ‘Plan for SA’ as chairman of the 
Planning Commission. 
Since 2008 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has 
been publishing its Industrial Polity Action Plan (IPAP). In the latest 
version of these plans,4 a policy different from mainstream OECD 
recommendations is indicated through the different suggestions for 
action: a strong role for the state; a need to regulate and transform the 
financial sector to make it industry-driven and also friendly to long-
term investments, reflecting a long-term perspective on the economy 
in general; regulation of private consumption so as to promote internal 
production (p. 22); a ‘regulated’ trade policy which makes an import 
substitution policy both possible and legal despite the commitments to 
WTO (p. 36). Similarities with the so-called state capitalism of some 
of the BRICS countries can be seen. Generally, the financialization of 
the economy which has been so dominant seems to be contradicted by 
a development policy whereby the state also takes part in the selection 
and promotion of a growth sectors. As a consequence, the state’s 
industrial policy has to transform the old regime’s alliance between 
mining and the energy sector, to make room for other actors in the 
market and to initiate a different energy policy supportive of this 
broader competition, leading in addition – intentionally – to a greening 
of the economy. A much more systematic use of state/private economy 
relations – for example, through procurements and in particular in 
the skill formation area – is also considered. The area of vocational 
education and training seems to need the leadership of a strong state 
to make sufficient public investments in education and skill formation, 
and to make these investments supportive of the needs of the labour 
market. Human capital does not grow out of market demands and 
individual choices, but needs to be developed through collective efforts 
with the help of the state. Justification for these policies is found in 
the practice of the other BRICS countries, their policies prior to the 
economic crisis, as well as during the crisis and after (to the degree the 
crisis is over). There are no references to the OECD in the document, 
nor is the organization mentioned in the minister’s introduction in the 
78 | three
DTI Annual Report (DTI 2012). Again it is BRICS cooperation that is 
emphasized.
In addition to the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Trade 
and Industry, SA has an Economic Development Department (EDD) 
– a puzzling observation in itself. With its document The New Growth 
Path: Framework (EDD 2011) this department has produced what 
seems to be the closest a country in social crisis can come to the New 
Deal of the USA or the crisis economic programmes of the Nordic 
countries during the trying years of the 1930s. There is a mutual 
affinity between the DTI strategies and those presented by the EDD, 
the latter, moreover, with a stronger emphasis on the constructive role 
of labour unions and their engagement in policies. The emphasis is 
on leadership and governance; on an active state and a strategy for 
creating more and better jobs. Contrary to much of the internal OECD 
rhetoric, the market is not necessarily an efficient way of organizing 
society. Rather, ‘The government has a critically important role to play 
in accelerating social and economic development including through 
effective regulation of markets’ (ibid.: 12).
Even for the National Planning Commission (2011), unemployment 
is a burning issue, as well as the high number of people who live on 
or below the poverty line. More than the previous policy documents, 
its National Development Plan highlights democracy and participation. 
Inequality of the kind SA exhibits cannot foster democracy. The new 
approach the planning document proposes for the coming years (until 
2030) is to revive the active citizen as opposed to the receiving citizen. 
The consequence of this is not only an active citizenry that is champion 
of its own future, but also a more inclusive society, where the weak and 
vulnerable are taken care of by the state. A democracy fostering citizens 
whose activities produce solidarity and a different and better integrated 
public space seems to be the main idea.
The question, however, is how the relation between democracy and 
the economy and economic growth (seen as a precondition for poverty 
alleviation) should be organized. The National Planning Commission 
(ibid.: 59) argues that it has drawn heavily on developmental theory 
(e.g. Evans 2010), emphasizing capabilities that enable people to lead 
their lives. National capabilities have the role of preparing for the 
competitiveness we all are part of by promoting human capital, in other 
words supporting institutions that make individuals capable of entering 
the competition society. Most readers will detect the influence of the 
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philosopher of law John Rawls and the economist Amartya Sen, as well 
as a number of more or less liberal economists who have promoted 
human capital theories as a guide for social development. 
Still, the National Development Plan gives its support to the New 
Growth Path: Framework strategies for job creation and economic 
growth. All these national policy documents have in common the 
emphasis on the need for stronger national unity. Hope is expressed 
for growing trust both in public institutions and between citizens.. 
To sum up, at the multilateral/multinational level we see a cleavage 
between the strategies of the OECD and BRICS along the same 
lines as that we find in the SA debate about development, both in 
terms of economic policies and in the understanding of democratic 
capitalism. 
The utopian alternative
The OECD wants to revise economic thinking. BRICS may 
represent an alternative to the neoliberal revisions. None of them, 
however, is in my view anchored in democratic processes. A poverty-
oriented policy, based on a democratic developmental state, needs 
a revision of both. A democratic developmental state presupposes 
democracy governing the economy, not the other way round, as now 
is the case in Europe (Streeck 2013). The many plans for SA indicate 
political support for democratic governance, as a priority before statist 
industrialism as well as neoliberal human capital mobilization, but so 
far this agreement has not led to a thorough debate about either BRICS 
or OECD influences. A human capital society is always on the move, 
with individuals advancing by improving their human capital through 
all forms of formal and informal learning processes. Making human 
capital advancements possible becomes, for neoliberal supporters, and 
for OECD economics, an alternative to costly and non-flexible welfare 
state solutions (see OECD 2009). The alternative is a society where 
people do not necessarily have to migrate in physical and social space 
to be valued, and where human voices count more than the voiceless 
individualized human capital. Collective solutions may be promoted by 
stable social relations and qualifications. Particularly if it is organized 
on the basis of universal rights, welfare will create solidarity and 
belonging, thus a feeling of being valued. This is a society which also 
nourishes trust, and reduces corruption, as the experiences with the 
Nordic model show. 
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Until the crisis of 2008, it was argued with force and conviction by 
the dominant economists (at the G20, for example) that the innovation 
paradigm was a paradigm for social change. Human capital was the key 
means. According to the orthodoxy by which a new ‘utopia’ now may 
emerge, the development of human capital improves the standing of 
the individual in the market. Individuals learn to use the market, at the 
same time as the working environment makes use of the qualifications 
it has demanded (Halvorsen and Vale 2012). In the labour market 
there is an incentive to constantly improve qualifications in accordance 
with the needs of the user. The so-called ‘monopolies of the labour 
unions’ (one of the main enemies of the neoliberals) destroy prices 
and prevent human capital from developing or people from entering 
the labour market to improve their human capital. But when given an 
opportunity to work, the market will increase rewards, secure innovative 
competences, and in the long run offer work for all according to the 
degree of human capital. The role of knowledge institutions is to 
contribute to the individual’s choices of education to improve his or 
her market position. 
To a large degree, the OECD has made this kind of reasoning its 
trademark; thus it is the political consequences of this theory that are 
now under scrutiny. The OECD does not seem to be able to see an 
alternative, or participate in the building of an alternative world view or 
utopia. A human capital strategy, however, builds on fear and spreads 
individualism, particularly as it is also seen as an alternative to the 
costly social security of welfare policies and an active public welfare 
mobilization. Solidarity is undermined, trust dwindles.
Again, to quote Offe (1998: 46):
The threat of marginalization through unemployment dominates 
these societies, and the resulting insecurities and anxieties generate 
a rational preference for social advancement and social security 
through individual rather than collective means. These feelings and 
perceptions in turn inculcate a life boat logic into social life, that 
reckons with the absence or unreliability of communal or state-
provided safety nets.
The social structure of the BRICS countries shows that this 
is an impossible strategy if poverty is to be alleviated, growth to be 
environmentally friendly and work accessible for all. If we look back 
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at the different programmes for development from the different 
ministries and planning commissions of SA, and take into account 
both the enthusiasm in the country for BRICS and the many points 
of interaction with the OECD, SA stands out as the most interesting 
experimental case when a new potentially democratic developmental 
state is to be organized. The question is how democratic this state will 
be, if we use as measures of democracy greater equality, redistribution 
and poverty eradication. The different plans for development in SA, 
discussed in this chapter, are more or less influenced by the OECD, 
while BRICS ideas only recently seem to be emerging. 
The debate in SA is thus on the move, and the links to the OECD 
and/or BRICS provide directions. The internal social struggles over 
power decide, however, which international connections will be 
nurtured, and to what degree SA will choose its own route in line 
with its ideals and goals. Perhaps, as argued among researchers on the 
democratic developmental state, the choice should be in line with the 
Nordic model rather than either the neoliberal or the state capitalist 
model?
Notes
1 ‘In 2011, the BRICS represented 40 
percent of the world’s population and 
nearly a quarter of the world’s economic 
output’ (Younis et al. 2013: 7).
2 Letter from Rob Davies with the title 
‘BRICS – championing a new paradigm for 
economic cooperation’, posted 7 February 
2013 on www.brics5.co.za.
3 Ibid.
4 DTI (2010); see in particular p. 20.
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I N  E M E R G I N G  E C O N O M I E S
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Introduction
Imperatives for healthcare reform and universal health coverage 
(UHC) There is now a growing consensus within the global health 
community and donor institutions more generally about universalizing 
health coverage in developing countries as health is increasingly seen 
not as a ‘drain on resources … [but] a driver of socioeconomic progress’ 
(Chan 2012). While health is historically recognized as a fundamental 
human right and hence important for all of a country’s residents and 
citizens (WHO 1948), additional factors drive the current policy 
attention on UHC. For one, growing awareness that poor health is 
rarely confined to individuals or regions but has wider repercussions 
for other groups and countries gives global society a stake in ensuring 
good health for everybody (Sachs 2012). A second influential factor, 
and perhaps of particular interest to developing countries, is the now 
well-recognized positive association between health improvements 
and economic advancement (Bloom and Canning 2000; Wagstaff 
2002). Whereas earlier, the positive effect of high economic growth 
on health and development outcomes was emphasized in global policy 
documents, they now increasingly promote good health and human 
development as prerequisites for nations advancing economically 
(DfID 2000; GTZ-ILO-WHO 2005). 
The need for global intervention in health is further established in 
the context of growing evidence on the vast health inequities that exist 
between rich and poor nations and among populations within these 
countries. To cite just a few examples: a shocking 99 per cent of all 
maternal deaths are reported to occur in developing countries (WHO 
2012a); well over 80 per cent of all children dying before their fifth 
birthday are likely to come from sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia 
(UNICEF 2012). Furthermore, about one billion people globally are 
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estimated to lack access to healthcare and 100 million are apparently 
pushed below the poverty line each year by paying directly for medical 
services (PMA Conference 2012). There are also numerous statistics 
that reveal striking disparities within regions, underlining the fact 
that the poorest in all countries are often the worst affected in terms 
of their access to services and physical and mental well-being (Reid 
2011; Waldron 2007). The data shows, for instance, that globally the 
wealthiest 20 per cent of women are up to twenty times more likely 
than the bottom quintile to have skilled birth attendance. Moreover, 
belonging to the poorest 20 per cent of the population doubles the 
risk of a child dying before the age of five as compared to one from 
among the richest households (WHO 2012a). Well-known problems 
such as their lack of resources, limited knowledge and distance from 
health facilities are often core contributing factors which prevent the 
poorest groups from accessing healthcare when they need it most 
(Bhattacharyya et al. 2010).
Why focus on the poor? In the context of universalizing health 
coverage, global advocates urge developing countries to focus on their 
most deprived populations, which are generally in worse health and 
with poorer access to healthcare services as compared to other groups. 
Studies show that indigent people usually have worse health outcomes 
than better-off groups and have significantly higher rates of malnutrition, 
child morbidity and infant and maternal mortality (Gwatkin et al. 
2007; Wagstaff 2002). They generally suffer inferior health because of 
poor diets and substandard work and living conditions. However, their 
situation is often made worse by their absolute lack of resources, which 
prevents them getting the medical attention they need (DfID 2000). 
This harms them not only physically but also financially because of 
their inability to work. In developing countries, poor people tend to be 
more severely affected as subsidized state-run services are low-quality 
and inadequate and the absence of formal financial protection means 
these groups have to pay for healthcare at point of use (Van Doorslaer 
et al. 2005). This situation could have especially brutal consequences 
for impoverished families, which may either cut back on other basic 
spending on food and clothing or else become indebted by borrowing 
money or selling personal assets (Peters et al. 2002; Van Doorslaer et 
al. 2005). In other words, poor people may become poorer as a result 
of getting medical treatment.
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These problems are not unknown to policy-makers in developing 
countries, who may indeed wish to improve services for the poor. 
However, there are evidently numerous economic and political 
challenges they face in effecting healthcare reforms. Arguably, a central 
factor is the limited fiscal capacity of governments in developing 
countries (World Bank 2012). Furthermore, across all contexts, there 
are often formidable vested interests standing in the way of redistributive 
reform which is perceived to harm their personal interests (Hacker 
2004; Wilsford 1994). By reconfiguring existing distributions of who 
funds (public or individual), who runs (state or markets) and who 
delivers healthcare (public or private providers), reforms often intend 
altering the position of more powerful groups in society. Hence, for 
example, middle-class taxpayers may be unwilling to contribute more 
taxes or subsidize services for the poor. They may also fear having their 
own benefits reduced, as occurred in Thailand where formal workers 
who were part of the Social Security Scheme (SSS) fought against its 
expansion to other groups (Hanvoravongchai 2013). In addition, there 
may be further opposition from commercial interests – a strong health 
insurance lobby which sees its income sources diminish as a result of 
restrictions on private insurance or private clinicians who fear losing 
out on earnings from informal sources if payment systems become 
more transparent (Carrin 2002). 
Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that many times 
health reform efforts have failed or been significantly scaled down as a 
result. In the past, powerful lobbies of health providers and professionals 
have successfully gained significant concessions on reforms, such as 
in the British NHS, where general surgeries were allowed to run as 
private businesses (National Archives 2013). Elsewhere, these groups 
negated reforms entirely, as happened with President Clinton’s plan 
of 1993, which aimed to provide universal healthcare to all Americans 
(Morone 1995). More recently, pharmaceutical reforms in South 
Korea in 2000 that intended to separate drug prescribing from drug 
dispensing faced strong opposition from doctors, who stood to lose an 
important source of revenue from the sale of medicines (Kwon 2003). 
Extensive lobbying and pressure tactics including strikes by doctors 
ensured significant changes in the reform and a large hike in medical 
charges for treatments. 
Reforming healthcare is clearly, therefore, a formidable task for 
policy-makers in developing countries. Despite this, or perhaps as 
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a result, a number of different and innovative methods of providing 
services to poorer populations are now being tried out in such regions. 
Defined as all individuals having access to good-quality healthcare 
without impoverishing medical costs (WHO 2005), UHC has both 
pragmatic and moral appeal for developing countries, given its positive 
association with economic progress and productivity. However, given 
stark resource limitations and huge numbers of impoverished people, 
a central question for governments in the global South is how to cost-
efficiently and effectively extend healthcare to historically underserved 
populations. As a relatively new area of research, individual country 
experiences of universalizing health coverage offer important insights 
into the evolution, political opportunities and challenges for extending 
healthcare to poor populations in emerging economies. Accordingly, 
this chapter focuses on policy developments in India, where an 
innovative health insurance programme for below-poverty-line families 
(Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, RSBY) was introduced in 2008 to 
supplement an underfunded and overstretched national health service. 
This analysis contributes to the emerging global discourse on UHC, 
exploring the drivers and determinants of particular policy approaches 
and an assessment of their workability and effectiveness in an MIC 
context. 
Beginning with an overview of healthcare systems in emerging 
economies, the following section examines their current preference for 
social health insurance (SHI) programmes, before moving on to assess 
the feasibility and effectiveness of the SHI approach. Turning to the case 
of India, the second section traces recent health policy developments 
in the country. In particular, it explores the political and economic 
underpinnings of healthcare reform in the country, thus shedding light 
on possible drivers, enabling factors and political barriers for scaling up 
and universalizing health coverage in emerging country contexts. 
Healthcare systems in emerging economies
A central problem for many developing health systems is the low 
levels of funds they receive despite having much larger populations 
and bearing a higher share of the global disease burden as compared 
to richer countries. For example, World Health Organization (WHO) 
statistics show that thirty-four OECD countries with less than a fifth 
of the world’s population accounted for over 80 per cent of global 
spending on health (WHO 2012b). Governments in low-income 
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countries spent an average of $23 per capita on healthcare in 2009 
(WHO 2012c), which is significantly below the $54 figure proposed by 
a recent WHO task force in order for low-income nations to provide 
a basic package of healthcare for all (Stenberg et al. 2010). Moreover, 
government health spending as a proportion of total health spending 
in low-income countries was about 38 per cent against the 62 per cent 
average for wealthier nations (WHO 2012c). Such disparities in health 
expenditure may be partly to do with the overall scarcity of resources 
in low-income countries, with yearly per capita incomes of less than 
$1,005 compared to more affluent regions like the UK or the United 
States with averages of about $36,000 and $50,000 respectively (World 
Bank 2012). Moreover, raising more resources locally through, for 
example, income taxes is often not easily accomplished in developing 
countries given their enormous informal and low-wage-earning sector 
(Gottret and Schieber 2006). 
Further, limited public funds for healthcare are also spent in 
inefficient and inequitable ways in many such nations. For example, 
developing countries usually spend more on paying staff salaries than 
on infrastructure and supplies in public hospitals. A recent study in 
South Africa also finds that provinces with the greatest disease burden 
often received far fewer public funds as compared to better-resourced 
areas with higher spending capacities (Stuckler et al. 2011). There is 
also evidence showing that governments in developing countries often 
prioritize expensive tertiary services even though there is a greater need 
for low-cost primary or preventive care (Gottret and Schieber 2006). 
Besides limited finances, health systems in developing countries also 
face huge scarcities of human resources and physical infrastructure 
(World Bank 2009; WHO 2006). The WHO estimates that there is 
one doctor per 5,000 people in low-income regions, which is in sharp 
contrast to wealthier nations, where a doctor serves about three hundred 
people (WHO 2012c). Whereas a hospital bed in Japan will normally 
service about seventy-seven people, in poorer countries like Ghana and 
Myanmar an average hospital bed caters to over a thousand patients. 
From patients’ perspective, under-resourced and overburdened 
public healthcare facilities often mean long waits to get treated or not 
getting needed drugs and essential services. Absenteeism among health 
workers, disrespectful and unresponsive attitudes towards patients, and 
demands for informal payments are well-documented problems within 
public sector services in developing and transitional countries (Ensor 
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2004; Lewis 2007). Grave shortcomings within public services typically 
induce patients to spend huge amounts of personal funds at relatively 
costlier private facilities. This also makes for a highly inequitable system 
where poorer populations cannot afford to pay for treatments and, 
when they do, the effects may be catastrophic, causing financial ruin 
and worsened poverty. For example, each year, 100,000 households in 
Kenya and about 290,000 people in South Africa are estimated to fall 
below the poverty line owing to out-of-pocket payments on healthcare 
(WHO 2010). 
Current trends in developing countries towards UHC
Against this background, a variety of government-sponsored health 
and health insurance programmes for the poor have emerged across 
large parts of the developing world. In fact, some MICs such as Brazil, 
Mexico and Thailand have achieved or are close to reaching near-
total population coverage through various state-led initiatives (Joint 
Learning Network 2013; Lagomarsino et al. 2012). Some analysts, 
however, argue that the labelling of many such schemes under the 
rubric of social health insurance (SHI) can be misleading since, unlike 
traditional insurance, these programmes for the poor are largely 
funded through public taxation (Kutzin 2012; McIntyre et al. 2010). 
Most developing countries are indeed experimenting with novel ways 
of financing and delivering health services alongside more common 
and conventional methods, such as funding through general taxation, 
user fees and insurance contributions or delivering services through 
traditional state-run public providers. For example, in conjunction with 
general revenue transfers and payroll taxes, 75 per cent of funding for 
Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) comes from a new 
VAT levy it introduced for the purpose (P4H 2013). Similarly, Gabon 
generated $25 million in 2009 to fund healthcare for its non-insured 
population through a levy on mobile phone companies (Stenberg et al. 
2010). Nations are also experimenting with decentralized institutional 
arrangements to manage new programmes, moving away from the 
traditional reliance on national health ministries to run all health 
initiatives. For example, some governments, such as those in Kenya 
and Cambodia, have set up independent funds managed by public 
primary health facilities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
to run healthcare programmes for their poorest and most vulnerable 
individuals (World Bank 2013). Countries are also trying out new 
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methods of demand-side financing of health services, essentially 
directing funds to healthcare providers based on the individual 
preferences of patients rather than through traditional budgeted 
transfers to public facilities. Common to many such initiatives is their 
inventive use of mixed sources of financing (general state revenues and 
payroll taxes) (ibid.). Individual country programmes hence present 
a rich array of different approaches and programme design to inform 
policy in other contexts like their own. 
Policy debates on SHI for developing countries
A growing literature on the merits and demerits of SHI and its 
feasibility in poor settings accompanies the huge interest it generates 
among policy-makers in developing countries. Yet, so far, there is 
mixed evidence on the effects of SHI systems in increasing the use of 
medical services or in reducing catastrophic spending by the insured. 
For example, a recent systematic review of social and community health 
insurance schemes in Africa and Asia finds little evidence linking SHI to 
improved service quality or social inclusion (Spaan et al. 2012). More 
positively, it reports that SHI may encourage greater healthcare use 
among members and protect them financially from high medical costs. 
In contrast, another review of state-led insurance schemes in China, 
Mexico, Colombia, Vietnam and the Philippines finds the evidence 
inconclusive on whether SHI improves utilization and reduces out-
of-pocket spending by patients (Acharya et al. 2013). Both sets of 
research, however, attribute ambiguous results on the impact of SHI 
to variable methodologies used by the studies they looked at. 
More funds for healthcare through SHI? An attractive argument for 
economies facing severe resource shortages alongside a growing demand 
for healthcare is that SHI in developing countries can help raise more 
funds for existing healthcare systems. The fact that people may be 
more willing to contribute to SHI since they get a clearly defined health 
benefit in return is thought to help elevate fund collections under SHI 
systems. Moreover, unlike tax-based financing, contributions under 
SHI regimes are explicitly secured for health, making health budgets 
less vulnerable to politically driven cuts (GTZ 2005). 
However, real-world scenarios in developing countries may end 
up reversing the positive effects above. Two of these are particularly 
important in the context of optimism about more resources for 
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healthcare through SHI. The first challenge relates to the structure of the 
labour market in developing countries. The fact that large proportions 
of workers in LICs and MICs are in informal employment1 makes it 
pertinent to consider how people without an identifiable employer or 
workplace will be accessed. Equally, as a large number of informal 
workers in developing countries are often unsalaried, low-income 
earners, they are perhaps unlikely to be able to contribute significantly 
into an SHI system. This was apparently the case with India’s Universal 
Health Insurance Scheme for poor households, in which, despite 
the considerable state subsidy on premiums, enrolments remained 
low (Ministry of Finance 2006). Secondly, arguments about SHI 
generating more resources for healthcare may hold no water if policy-
makers are tempted to cut back their own health spending, expecting 
SHI contributions to compensate (Wagstaff 2010). This occurred in 
Kazakhstan, where government health budgets were trimmed down 
following the establishment of SHI. Hence, SHI systems may be as 
vulnerable as general tax-based systems to unpredictable reductions in 
the overall resources for health services.
Effectiveness and quality of service delivery in SHI In many developing 
countries, national health services and the public bureaucracies 
running them are perceived to be inefficient and wasteful (Mills 
1997). Moreover, fixed budgets and assured salaries are often thought 
to encourage complacent attitudes among staff and give them little 
incentive to be efficient. In contrast, the fact that trained, quasi-
independent professionals manage funds under SHI is arguably a point 
in its favour. 
SHI structures are also considered more conducive to the introduc-
tion of market mechanisms and competition in healthcare delivery, 
thereby setting the right financial incentives for providers to be more 
effective (GTZ 2005). However, for this to work, first and foremost, 
there needs to be a sufficient supply of qualified medical profession-
als and facilities that are willing to be part of the SHI (Bhat and Saha 
2004). Secondly, ensuring that reimbursement rates and methods of 
claiming payments are attractive to medical providers is likely to be 
particularly challenging in contexts where they are accustomed to few 
regulatory checks on how they price and charge patients for their serv-
ices. Hence, under a regulated system of SHI, doctors may fear mon-
etary losses by losing their private sources of revenue. For example, in 
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the initial years of Vietnam’s SHI, providers were hostile and reluc-
tant to treat patients because they found that under the new regime 
users were no longer willing to pay them informal fees that normally 
supplemented their low salaries (Carrin 2002). In another scenario, 
doctors may worry about being overworked and underpaid by a system 
that encourages excessive demand from patients. A case in point is 
the Hospital Association of South Africa, which is strongly opposed to 
the proposed National Health Insurance on precisely such grounds. It 
argues that the system is unlikely to improve access or quality of care 
since there is presently a limited supply of doctors who will inevitably 
be induced to ration services through ‘waiting lists’ and ‘bidding wars’ 
(Hospital Association of South Africa 2010: 134). 
The second argument about SHI contributing to better-quality 
services is based on the logic that monetary contributions by members 
give them a stake in the system and stimulate patients to keep up 
pressure for good services. However, this theory may be undermined 
by the existence of separate insurance programmes for different 
population groups and when health services inequitably benefit 
relatively wealthier groups who pay higher contributions. For example, 
despite near-universal coverage in Colombia, there are vast inequities 
between the range and quality of services available to more affluent 
individuals covered by private insurance and those for indigent groups 
under the state-subsidized insurance regime (Tsai 2010). A similar 
situation exists in Thailand, where the health insurance scheme for 
civil servants offers far more generous benefits than the schemes for 
workers and poorer individuals (Hanvoravongchai 2013). Essentially, 
not only does this lead to a segmented and less efficient health system, 
but also ‘[b]enefits meant exclusively for the poor often end up being 
poor benefits’ (Sen 1992: 15). Hence, an effective SHI may require 
better coordination and integration with existing risk-pooling methods 
in a country (Hsiao and Shaw 2007).
Costs and sustainability of SHI systems in developing countries Ordi-
narily, insurance-based systems tend to have higher costs as compared 
to those funded from general taxes (Saltman et al. 2004). Costs may 
be higher mainly because SHI systems are complex and often need 
sophisticated methods and qualified technical staff to run them. Rou-
tine SHI activities such as enrolling members, collecting contributions, 
processing contracts and settling claims with medical providers all 
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involve considerable expenditure (Nicolle and Mathauer 2010). SHI 
often needs strong institutional structures, including functional banking 
and communication networks, healthcare facilities and legal services. 
A fundamental issue for developing countries is whether governments 
have enough resources to invest in such systems. Furthermore, it is 
debatable whether they have the administrative structures to effectively 
collect, pool and redistribute funds or whether they have the requisite 
capacity to develop risk-adjustment mechanisms compensating local 
insurers for different levels of ‘bad risks’. Moreover, even when coun-
tries have the requisite information systems and organizational capac-
ity, such as the USA, health insurance schemes nevertheless involve 
significant administrative costs (Enthoven and Fuchs 2006).
In order to keep costs under check, insurance-based systems will also 
require effective regulatory and monitoring mechanisms for insurers 
and medical professionals. In their absence, pluralistic providers may 
be left free to drive up the price of premiums and medical services. The 
current evidence from developing countries indicates that considerable 
efforts may be needed by them in this direction. For example, poor 
enforcement of laws, weak capacity to effect contracts and few checks 
on medical practices are commonly reported problems in many LICs 
and MICs (Bloom and Standing 2001; Peters and Muraleedharan 
2008). 
The cost-effectiveness of SHI also depends on its design and 
implementation structure. For example, costs may be significantly 
higher in an insurance-based system with multiple competing insurers. 
Such systems arguably lack the monopsony power of a national health 
service, where the state as the solitary purchaser of services is often in a 
stronger position to negotiate with providers and drive down treatment 
prices. 
Furthermore, there may be specific cost implications for govern-
ments in developing countries given their large numbers of indigent 
people who will be unable to afford contributions. In effect, if serv-
ices are to be equitable, formal workers may need to contribute more 
for the uninsured, as they do in Germany, paying 16 per cent payroll 
contributions (Wagstaff 2010). A more feasible and favoured alterna-
tive being tried out in countries including Vietnam, Ghana and the 
Philippines is for the state to partially or fully fund payments for the 
uninsured (Lagomarsino et al. 2012). State administrations will now 
have to consider the affordability of subsidizing contributions for the 
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huge number of people in the informal sector in developing countries 
(ILO 2012), especially when government tax revenues for funding are 
relatively small (Bird et al. 2008). 
Moreover, given the vast unmet need for medical treatment in many 
LICs, health insurance may lead to increased healthcare utilization. 
In turn, huge claims on insurance funds are likely to raise insurance 
premiums or user co-payments, which may be unaffordable and 
difficult to sustain. For example, in the context of rising insurance 
costs, questions are already being asked about whether the Indonesian 
government will continue to fully sponsor poor beneficiaries under its 
Jamkesmas health insurance scheme (Joint Learning Network 2013). 
Hence, while there are many positive attributes of SHI, ultimately 
it is the design of programmes that determines their effect on health 
outcomes in particular settings. 
The drive for universal health coverage in India (2000–13): 
achievements, opportunities and obstacles
The past decade has seen heightened political interest in India in 
the health sector and in extending health coverage to impoverished 
populations, especially those below the poverty line, who even according 
to official figures were estimated in 2010 to be a third of the entire 
population or 350 million people (Planning Commission 2013). This 
was undeniably a pressing need given the sorry state of the country’s 
healthcare system, with scarce infrastructure, poor quality, corruption 
and high levels of out-of-pocket spending by patients. In fact, personal 
spending on healthcare in India amounts to over three-quarters of total 
health expenditure, in contrast to developed countries like the UK, 
where it is less than 15 per cent (WHO 2012b). 
In 2003, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by 
the centre-right Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), launched a state-
subsidized contributory Universal Health Insurance Scheme (UHIS) 
for impoverished Indians, intending to ‘correct’ the lack of good 
healthcare for them by offering them financial protection and greater 
choice (Ministry of Finance 2003). Initially targeting 7 million people, 
the UHIS was a standard insurance policy in which members paid a 
graduated premium with an additional subsidy if they were below-the-
poverty-line (BPL). Subsequently, in 2004, the NDA also unveiled 
an ambitious Unorganized Sector Workers’ Social Security Scheme 
(USWSSS) targeting 370 million informal workers following on 
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from the recommendations of the National Commission for Labour, 
a state-appointed body charged with developing basic social security 
legislation for unorganized workers (MoLE 2002). At first pilot-tested 
in fifty districts in India, the programme was to be scaled up nationally 
if it did well. Like the UHIS, the USWSSS reimbursed the worker 
for hospital expenses of up to about $500. However, both the UHIS 
and the USWSSS had few potential recipients sign up: a key reason, 
according to a subsequent Health Ministry appraisal, was their lack of 
coverage for important services like maternity care, which target groups 
desired (NRHM 2005).
Since 2004, when an unexpected electoral victory brought the centre-
left United Progressive Alliance (UPA) into government, a tranche of 
healthcare reforms and state-run programmes have been introduced. 
Steered by its ‘welfarist’ proclamations, the UPA pushed forward an 
agenda of improved health services and welfare legislation for informal 
labour. High-level committees and working groups were established 
to look into universal and comprehensive health services (PHFI 2011) 
and better provision for low-income populations such as its working 
poor (NCEUS 2006). The UPA was also quick to launch two new 
programmes in 2005: the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) to 
strengthen public primary healthcare facilities in rural areas and the 
Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), a conditional cash transfer scheme for 
improving pregnant Indian women’s access to hospitals.
Correspondingly, in 2008, the UPA sponsored an ambitious national 
health insurance programme, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), 
targeting 60 million impoverished households. Drafted as part of the 
UPA’s social security legislation for low-paid informal workers (GoI 
2008), the RSBY aims to prevent catastrophic health spending by 
enabling access to hospital-based secondary care for recipient families 
(MoLE 2014). At this point, it is important to recognize that the dem-
onstrated political interest in health insurance over the last few years 
occurred against a backdrop of increasing labour informalization and 
insecurity in India following large-scale economic reforms over the 1990s. 
Official documents champion labour as ‘human capital’ and underscore 
the need for social security to help workers retain their efficiency and 
the country’s ‘international competitiveness’ (MoLE 2002: 6). Hence, 
programmes were specifically designed with a view to improving general 
productivity (by preventing further impoverishment) and targeted infor-
mal workers and ostensibly more expensive hospitalization expenses. 
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In its two terms in office, the previous UPA government had 
invested more funds in the RSBY, also extending it to new regions and 
population groups. Significantly, it also had for the first time a clear 
policy statement on universalizing healthcare for all Indians (PMO 
2012). While the centre-left UPA was instrumental in pressing ahead 
with health reforms in India, other factors too have contributed to 
the emergence of a national agenda on universal health coverage. As 
part of the BRICS2 group of emerging economies and an increasingly 
influential actor in international debates, India also seems to want to 
match up to developments in other countries aiming to universalize 
healthcare. Illustrating this ambition, a recent state-commissioned 
report on UHC declares that the country is now motivated ‘not only 
to act in conformity with a globally progressive commitment to health 
equity but also to become a leader of the movement by creating the 
best contemporary model of UHC’ (HLEG 2011: 2).
A striking development since the RSBY’s launch has been the 
subsequent and rapid growth in various state-led regional health 
insurance programmes for impoverished groups. Recently, schemes 
have been (re)launched in three southern states of Andhra Pradesh 
(AHCT 2007), Tamil Nadu (TNHSP 2009) and Karnataka (SAST 
2009). Some states, such as Himachal Pradesh and Delhi, have 
devised additional schemes to top up RSBY services with tertiary care 
benefits for members (La Forgia and Nagpal 2012). The role of these 
government-sponsored health insurance programmes in expanding 
health coverage in India has been quite remarkable. Since 2007 
and the introduction of various state-sponsored programmes, total 
health insurance coverage in the country has leapt from less than 10 
per cent to 25 per cent of all Indians now believed to be part of a 
public or voluntary health insurance plan (PHFI 2011). States like 
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu with large-scale health insurance 
programmes of their own have in fact much higher proportions of their 
populations insured as compared to other states only implementing the 
RSBY (Figure 4.1).
However, while improving general access to health insurance 
and hospitals (MoLE 2014), the RSBY is proving less successful in 
offering financial risk protection to patients (Devadasan et al. 2013; 
Selvaraj and Karan 2012). Such outcomes point back to fundamental 
shortcomings in the RSBY design: partial and selective coverage 
only for the ‘poorest’ (below-poverty-line) among the working 
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poor, and offering only hospital-based services to users rather than 
a comprehensive package including outpatient care as well. As a 
costlier form of care, hospital-based services are presumed to be 
more likely to cause catastrophic financial consequences for patients. 
However, this is clearly at odds with the evidence: most of the 60 
million Indians who become impoverished paying for healthcare 
do so paying for outpatient services – doctors’ consultation fee and 
medicines – and a smaller percentage because of costlier hospital-
based care (Shahrawat and Rao 2011). 
While clearly not born out of a desire to universalize health coverage, 
the RSBY has gradually become an important part of UHC dialogues 
in the country (PHFI 2011; La Forgia and Nagpal 2012). Recent 
policy documents, however, view UHC as a long-term goal, which 
may take more than a decade to accomplish (Planning Commission 
2013). While retaining the policy commitment to UHC, the newly 
elected, right-centred BJP government is reportedly interested in 
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universalizing health insurance in India and plans to extend the reach 
of the RSBY by offering it to non-poor populations in return for a 
premium paid by them (Dey 2014). For now, however, the RSBY is 
to continue reaching out to the entire BPL population in the country, 
offering them health insurance and health benefits, albeit partial and 
inadequate. 
There is currently a lot of uncertainty about the future course of the 
RSBY and that of universalizing health coverage in India. What is clear, 
however, is that in its existing form and as stand-alone programme, the 
RSBY can at best be a stopgap measure to address specific groups of 
poor people and particular forms of health risks among them. Moving 
in the direction of a comprehensive and integrated policy may help 
sustain the programme. More importantly, it is likely to improve the 
RSBY’s effectiveness in providing healthcare to a majority of India’s 
citizens.
Conclusion
Universalizing health coverage is high on the priority list of 
international health organizations and governments in developing 
countries. Increased political interest in expanding health coverage is 
translating into policy action as many new state-led health programmes 
are introduced across diverse countries including China, India, 
Indonesia and Ghana. Realistically, given limited budgets and swelling 
demand for healthcare, some level of rationing of services is inevitable. 
However, in prioritizing resources, policy decisions on funding 
primary-, secondary- or tertiary-level healthcare must be based on 
existing evidence on healthcare needs and spending behaviours within 
a population. At the same time, what is also important is for policy-
makers not to lose sight of the larger goal of universal health coverage 
– comprehensive services for all citizens. Current government-initiated 
programmes for those in extreme poverty are important and laudable 
efforts. Yet, ensuring that ‘programmes for the poor’ do not end up as 
‘poor programmes’, there is a need for integrated and inclusive policies 
that reach out to various others besides those in absolute poverty. 
Eventually, the policy choices made in opting for cost-effectiveness 
versus responding to human needs will determine the future course of 
UHC in a country. 
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Notes
1 In the past, SHI expansions were 
linked to economic growth and increases 
in the number of formal workers able 
to make contributions to the system. In 
contrast, recent global patterns indicate 
greater informalization of labour occurring 
worldwide and across many emerging 
nations (Chang 2001; Srivastava 2012).
2 An association of emerging and 
newly industrializing economies including 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa.
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Marianne S. Ulriksen
Introduction
It is tempting to say that there are two quite different paths to 
greater equality, one using taxes and benefits to redistribute 
income from the rich to the poor, and the other achieving narrower 
differences in gross market incomes before any redistribution. 
But the two strategies are not mutually exclusive or inconsistent 
with each other. In the pursuit of greater equality we should use 
both strategies: to rely on one without the other would be to fight 
inequality with one arm tied behind your back. (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2010: 247)
Botswana and South Africa are two MICs with persistent and extreme 
levels of income inequality. Measured in terms of the Gini coefficient, 
inequality sits at 61.0 in Botswana and 57.8 in South Africa, and neither 
country has been able to decrease inequality substantially (ILO 2010: 
188). Even though inequality is not the same as poverty, both countries 
also struggle with deprivation among large parts of the population.1
Extreme inequality is now recognized as being undesirable (Oxfam 
2013). High levels of inequality tend to go with a variety of socio-
economic ills: worse health indicators, poor educational performance, 
limited social mobility, deficiency in social cohesion, corruption, crime, 
conflict and poverty (Nel 2008; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Bangura 
2011). Even so, unlike poverty, inequality has been treated marginally 
in international development policy (Bangura 2011; Wade 2011).
Consequently, there is a real need to concentrate on specific policies 
that promote greater equity in society. This chapter focuses on public 
policies that affect gross market incomes (employment and wages) as 
well as redistribute incomes (taxes and transfers). How such policies 
affect income inequality is addressed both theoretically and empirically 
through analyses of Botswana and South Africa. While a range of 
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possible policy solutions may be available, it is emblematic that some 
policies receive much more political responsiveness than others. Hence, 
as policy-making is fundamentally political in nature, this chapter also 
includes a political analysis of the varieties of policy outcomes and the 
consequent impacts on income inequality.
Across MICs, and as evident throughout this book, inequality is a 
concern because, despite raising economic wealth, resources are not 
distributed equitably and poverty is a persistent problem (Sumner 
2012). In this chapter, I consider public policies that can address 
such inequalities, but I also recognize why some policy solutions are 
either largely ignored or promoted in ways that are inequitable. If the 
domestic political interests that steer policy-making can be appreciated, 
finding workable and sustainable ways of addressing extreme income 
inequality may be one step closer.
Politics, policies and inequality: setting the scene of the enquiry
There are multiple causes of high inequality levels and hence also 
multiple possible ways to address this issue. Public policies can target 
the deep roots of inequality – for instance, through interventions that 
aim at broadening asset ownership or addressing human capital through 
the provision of equitable and good-quality education and healthcare. 
However, such interventions are long-term processes in which the 
impact will become visible only in decades to follow (Goni et al. 2011: 
1559). In this chapter, the focus is rather on more immediate public 
policies and their impact on income inequality. Specifically one can 
divide these into a pre-tax/-transfer income scenario, where the extent 
of wage inequality may be addressed through employment creation 
and wage-levelling policies, and a post-tax/-transfer scenario, where 
policies of taxation and transfer may redistribute incomes (Wilkinson 
and Pickett 2010: 184).
Starting with the latter, it is increasingly recognized that 
redistribution through taxes and transfers is a legitimate option for 
reducing inequality and that MICs should be able to raise sufficient 
domestic revenue to carry out such redistribution (ODI 2004; Sumner 
2012). In a study comparing the high-inequality continent of Latin 
America to the more equal countries of Europe, Goni and colleagues 
(2011) find that substantial redistribution through taxes and transfers 
in Europe addresses market-related income inequality, whereas in Latin 
America the countries remain highly unequal because of inabilities to 
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promote progressive taxation and comprehensive social transfers (with 
data from the early 2000s). An additional important finding is that 
redistribution is mainly achieved through transfers rather than taxes; a 
point also supported by other scholars who argue that while particularly 
proportional income taxation draws government revenue from top and 
middle income earners, income levels at the bottom largely depend 
on how this revenue is spent (Steinmo 1993; Barrientos 2008). In 
fact, sufficient revenue to ensure substantial social spending has larger 
redistributive effects than steeply progressive taxes (Steinmo 1993).
In terms of market-related income discrepancies (the pre-tax/-
transfer scenario), research on inequality in developing countries points 
out that the ‘differential between skilled and non-skilled labour is a 
crucial determinant of income inequality’ (Nel 2008: 23). Economic 
transformation in many developing countries puts a premium on 
skilled labour while the countries fail to increase the skills levels among 
the population. Consequently the ratio of unskilled workers to skilled 
labour is high, such that oversupply of unskilled labour pushes their 
wages down while high demand for skilled labour puts a premium 
on their market value (ibid.: 23, 48). In a study of Latin American 
countries, it is argued that, besides more progressive social spending in 
recent years, a determining factor in reducing inequality levels was that 
the supply of educated workers caught up with the demand, thereby 
levelling wage levels (Birdsall et al. 2011). 
Recent decades of globalization and free market policies have 
arguably exacerbated gross income inequality. The combined forces 
of increased economic openness and market liberalization tend to put 
low-income groups in weaker positions (owing to threats that jobs can 
be moved elsewhere) while allowing more freedom and opportunities to 
high-income groups with capital to spare (Nel 2008; Wade 2011; Stiglitz 
2012). Whether market liberalization reforms have been necessary 
for developing countries or not is disputed and will not be discussed 
here. However, it is clear that since the 1980s – a period dominated by 
neoliberal economic models and increasing global market interactions 
– informality and precariousness of employment have intensified, wage 
inequalities have been rising, the share of national income going to 
wages rather than to profits has dropped, and inequality has increased 
in the majority of countries around the world (UNRISD 2010; Bangura 
2011; Lee and Sobeck 2012; World Bank 2012).
Employment and wage differentials may be addressed in numerous 
ulriksen | 107
ways. However, ‘while some macroeconomic indicators get enormous 
attention, others, such as the level of employment, the level of wages, 
and disparities in pay, are virtually ignored’ (Stiglitz 2002: 24). This 
is a puzzling oversight if one is concerned with promoting equality. 
As Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz argues (though focusing on the 
USA), ‘much of the inequality that exists today is a result of government 
policy, both what the government does and what it does not’ (Stiglitz 
2012: 28).
I concentrate in this chapter on government policy and its possible 
impact on inequality. Such policies include taxation and transfers, but 
also, perhaps more controversially, labour market policies that address 
employment and wage regulation, such as minimum wages and wage 
compression. Policy-making is inherently political and in order to 
understand why some potentially inequality-reducing policies are 
promoted in Botswana and South Africa – and others not – we need to 
pay attention to the politics of policy-making, something that has been 
largely ignored in the study of inequality in developing countries (Nel 
2008: 15).
The power resource approach is commonly seen as a useful 
framework in political studies for understanding how and why certain 
policies are promoted (Korpi 1983). Principally, the organization 
and mobilization of special interests – typically trade unions on the 
one side and the capital sector on the other – and their bargaining 
relationship determine the extent of certain benefits. Thus, if trade 
unions are strong they are likely to push for increases in salaries as well 
as social benefits, whereas the capital sector will push for a reduction 
in such costs and be successful if trade unions are weak (Bangura 
2011; Stiglitz 2012).
Hence, the promotion of policies depends on the organization of 
‘special interests’ and their collective action (Olson 1971). Policies 
are more likely to develop when catering for a clearly defined group 
of beneficiaries that has incentives to act as the benefits to be gained 
exceed the costs of mobilizing (ibid.; Garay 2007). It is also possible that 
the introduction of new policies subsequently generates constituencies 
of support and promotes collective action; for instance, social grants 
may help beneficiaries to construct collective identities and help them 
organize, particularly if their benefits are likely to be cut (Pierson 1994; 
Garay 2007).
The concept of collective action also helps us to understand why 
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certain policy areas receive more attention than others, because ‘[o]nly 
when groups are small, or when they are fortunate enough to have 
an independent source of selective incentives, will they organise or 
act to achieve their objectives’ (Olson 1971: 167). Thus, large and 
latent groups often exert no political pressure even if they hold some 
vital common interests. For such large groups there are only marginal 
benefits to mobilizing compared to the potential costs, and so they are 
unlikely to organize themselves. For instance, consumers would like 
lower prices and taxpayers lower taxes, but both groups are so large 
and diffuse that they seldom form a consistent organized representation 
(ibid.). Another group that is typically poorly organized and therefore 
unable to assert political pressure, despite obvious common interests, 
is ‘labour-market outsiders’ – informal workers and the unemployed 
(Garay 2007).
With the above discussion in mind, hypotheses that explain how 
politics affect the policies central to this chapter can be generated. With 
respect to the pre-tax/-transfer scenario we would expect minimum 
wages to be pushed upwards only if there are strong trade unions that 
can put pressure on the capitalist sector and the government. Wages at 
the top end, however, are likely to increase regardless as high income 
earners are powerful groups (and often in high demand in skills-
constrained contexts) while those bearing the costs – the consumers and 
taxpayers – are poorly organized. Employment creation, though critical 
for the reduction of inequality (Stiglitz 2012: xii), is unfortunately 
the type of policy area likely to receive erratic political attention: the 
potential beneficiaries, labour market outsiders, are generally unable 
to exert much political pressure, capital interests are likely to increase 
employment only if they have an incentive to do so, and governments, 
even if willing, lack straightforward tools to tackle this difficult and 
persistent problem.
In the post-tax/-transfer scenario, social transfers are likely to be 
promoted if there are strong low-income groups pushing for this. 
Although the poor rarely constitute a mobilized group of special 
interests, they may exert an indirect influence if perceived to be of 
electoral importance for politicians. Once social policies are in place, 
the direct beneficiaries of such policies may form collective identities 
and mobilize if the need arises. The expansion of taxation may occur 
as taxpayers, even if loath to pay, are unlikely to mobilize, particularly 
if new initiatives are less obvious, such as slight reforms or introduction 
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of indirect taxes like VAT. However, it is also possible that taxpayers 
will organize if they constitute a smaller group that pays clearly defined 
and obvious taxes.
In the following, Botswana and South Africa are compared 
with respect to key public policy areas impacting on inequality – 
employment and wage levelling, taxation, and social transfers – and it 
will be discussed how these may explain the high inequality levels in 
our two cases. In the penultimate section, I elucidate how politics as 
hypothesized above has impacted on policy development in the two 
countries, while I draw on the comparative analysis in the conclusion 
to provide lessons for other MICs.
Labour market policies: employment and wage levelling?
In an African context, Botswana and South Africa are both wealthy 
nations with status as MICs. There are notable differences between the 
two economies. South Africa is the largest and most diversified economy 
in Africa and has – unusual for a continent where the private sector is 
normally characterized by informality – a large segment of formal wage 
employment in the private sector (46 per cent of total employment) 
(Stampini et al. 2011). Yet South Africa also has tremendous structural 
challenges, particularly how to draw former disadvantaged and isolated 
areas into the formal economy.
Botswana, on the other hand, can best be described as a resource-
dependent economy that has failed to diversify beyond exports of 
minerals and beef. Basically, despite long-ranging and persistent 
attempts by the government to encourage economic diversification, 
most economic sectors, such as, for instance, manufacturing, remain 
underdeveloped and are unable to absorb sufficient employment. 
The often noted success of Botswana lies in a consistent, but labour-
extensive, economic growth and ability to not squander resource wealth 
but instead promote some extent of social development (Conteh 2010; 
Hillbom 2012; Taylor 2012).
Despite these differences, there are also some interesting similarities 
that can partly account for the high levels of inequality. Both countries 
report extremely high levels of unemployment for developing countries 
(Klasen and Woolard 2008: 3). Employment creation is a concern 
for both governments and is clearly a critical political issue, with 
large numbers of particularly young people being outside formal 
employment. Yet over recent decades both Botswana and South Africa 
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have followed an economic philosophy that focuses on economic growth 
and macroeconomic stability, with governments playing a facilitating 
and supporting role for the private sector. The main government policy 
to directly address employment has been public works programmes. 
These economic growth paths have not stimulated (unskilled) labour-
intensive production, as will be elaborated upon in the following (Gelb 
2004; Hillbom 2012).
Job creation has been disappointing. Not only are official 
unemployment rates high (Table 5.1); both countries also have large 
segments of the population that are inactive. According to the World 
Development Report 2013, almost a third of the working-age population 
in both countries are not participating in the labour force – that is, 
they are not working or officially unemployed (World Bank 2012: 
340–41). It can be difficult to calculate the productive activities of 
citizens, particularly when one tries to also include those working in 
the informal sector. Following the work by Stampini and colleagues 
(2011) one can distinguish between those in formal and permanent 
employment in both the public and private sectors and those that are in 
temporary and/or informal wage employment or engaged in non-wage 
activities (self-employment or unpaid family work). From this it can be 
seen (in Table 5.1) that half the employed working-age population in 
Botswana is in the latter group, whereas the same group accounts for 
38 per cent in South Africa.
It is important to make a distinction between those in formal and 
secure employment and those in informal, temporary and precarious 
employment situations. Those in the latter group do not get any 
social benefits from their productive activities. Furthermore, their 
salary levels are generally low and a far cry from the wages that top 
officials employed in private and public sectors take home (even when 
excluding various bonuses and benefits). Thus both countries have 
extreme wage inequality. As shown in Table 5.1, labour earnings at the 
90th percentile of the wage distribution as a proportion of the labour 
earnings at the 10th percentile stand at 28.3 per cent in Botswana and 
14 per cent in South Africa; this is very high in comparison to other 
MICs.2 The level of wage inequality in South Africa is more favourable 
than that of Botswana, but that may partly be due to the probable fact 
that calculations are based on official rates of minimum wages, and 
South Africa has much higher minimum wages than Botswana (Table 
5.1) – this is an interesting difference to which I shall return later.
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To elaborate on Botswana: the government has engaged in human 
capital development and encouraged economic diversification (though 
with limited success) without meddling too much with private sector 
interests. Minimum wages have been kept low in an attempt to encourage 
low-skill and employment-intensive production while no attempts have 
been made to constrain wages at the top level. Such wage differentials 
must clearly account for the large income differences – particularly 
as there is limited redistribution through taxes and transfers, as will 
be discussed later. If one divides households in Botswana into four 
expenditure classes (lowest group with expenditures below 1,500 
pula (P), and highest group with expenditures above P8,000), then 
the average income of households in the first group is P666, whereas 
it is P12,928 in the latter group – almost twenty times higher.3 It is 
clearly a challenge for Botswana to create labour-intensive production 
that caters for the large groups of unskilled or low-skilled labourers. At 
the same time, Botswana also faces the challenge of skills constraint, 
whereby companies requiring highly skilled staff are unable to identify 
sufficient employees; this situation then pushes up wages at the high 
end. Skills constraints are also evident in South Africa, though to a 
lesser extent than in Botswana (World Bank 2012).
TABLE 5.1 Employment and wage indicators in Botswana and South Africa
Indicators Botswana South Africa 
Unemployment ratea 17.6% 24.7%
Participation rateb 68.5% 68.2%
Inactive working-age populationc 31.5% 31.8%
Formal, permanent public and private wage 
employmentd
49.5% 61.6%
Informal/temporary private wage employment and non-
wage activitiese
50.5% 38.4%
Wage inequalityf 28.3 14
Minimum wageg 1.164 5.556
Notes: a Share of labour force that is unemployed (World Bank 2012: 340–41, 347); 
 b Percentage of working-age population that is in the labour force (ibid.); c Working-
age population minus participation rate, as percentage (ibid.); d As a percentage of 
employed working-age population (Stampini et al. 2011: 20); e As a percentage of 
employed working-age population (ibid.); f Labour earnings at the 90th percentile of the 
wage distribution as a percentage of labour earnings at the 10th percentile (World Bank 
2012: 364–5); g In US$ at 2005 prices, per year (ibid.: 368–9)
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South Africa has, compared to Botswana (and MICs4), a relatively 
high minimum wage, which is largely due to pressure from much better 
organized trade unions, which have been able to push up minimum 
wages (Nattrass and Seekings 2012). It is possible that the higher 
minimum wage accounts for the lower wage inequality in South 
Africa compared to Botswana. However, this figure may conceal a 
more dim reality. Recent research shows that many in South Africa 
do not comply with the minimum wage regulations, with 44 per cent 
of covered workers not being paid the wages they are due (Bhorat et 
al. 2012). This situation is exacerbated by the fact that attempts to 
enforce minimum wages in industries producing labour-intensive goods 
(such as the clothing industry) have forced many companies to close 
down (as they cannot keep up with competition from cheaper products 
produced in Asia). Hence, many jobs catering for the unskilled are lost 
(Nattrass and Seekings 2012).
Consequently, despite relatively high minimum wages, South 
Africa still has a large share of its workforce either in a situation 
of unemployment or working in low-wage employment, and the 
economic growth path in South Africa excludes many unskilled, 
unemployed and/or informally employed workers. The difference 
between working in the formal and informal sectors is stark, with 
the median monthly earnings of informal sector employees being 
only 43 per cent of the median monthly earnings of formal sector 
employees (Statssa 2010: xv). Furthermore, the monthly earnings of 
the top 5 per cent working in the formal sector (19,000 rand (R)) is 
forty-two times more than the monthly earnings of the bottom 5 per 
cent in the informal sector (R450) (ibid.). This illustrates the trend 
of market-related inequalities, where incomes in the bottom deciles 
have fallen markedly in real terms compared to those in the higher 
deciles (Leibbrandt et al. 2010).
Despite considerable differences between the Botswanan and South 
African economies, the similar challenges of employment creation and 
wage inequality are striking. There is clearly a need for more un- and low-
skilled jobs in both countries, while at the same time skills constraints 
are evident in high-skilled industries, which pushes up wages. Neither 
country appears to regulate wages at the top end. Botswana keeps a 
low minimum wage while South Africa has a relatively high minimum 
wage. In both cases, however, low pay and huge salary differences are 
evident.
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Taxation: proportional, but progressive?
Taxation can be an important tool in reducing inequality if it aims 
at reducing the incomes of top earners. However, the redistributive 
impacts also depend on how revenue from taxation is spent and 
whether sufficient funds for social spending are extrapolated. At the 
same time, taxation may also be regressive if taxes target high- and low-
income groups alike, as is the case with indirect taxes. Each country 
has a range of taxation policies that require citizens to pay for certain 
goods, incomes and profits; policies that are further complicated by 
a variety of tax exemption rules. In order to get a general picture of 
the possible redistributive effects of taxation I concentrate here on tax 
indicators mainly related to personal income taxation and VAT.
At first sight, the taxation systems in Botswana and South Africa 
appear quite progressive. Both systems have proportional income tax 
rates and exempt the poorer population from paying (Table 5.2). 
Thus, income earners at the low end pay no income tax, while the 
income tax rate increases with rising incomes. Whereas a maximum 
income tax rate of 25 per cent in Botswana is quite low, an income tax 
rate of 40 per cent in South Africa is relatively high in an international 
context (KPMG 2012). However, it should also be noted that in both 
TABLE 5.2 Taxation indicators in Botswana and South Africa
Indicators Botswana South Africa 
Proportional tax ratesa 0–25% 0–40%
Exemptionb P36,000 R60,000
Income tax payersc – 44%
Income tax/total revenued less than 16% 34%
Indirect tax/total revenuee 14% 26%
Notes: a Range of income tax rates; Botswana: Botswana Unified Revenue Service 
(BURS) website, www.burs.org.bw (tax calculator); South Africa: SARS (2009: 30); 
b Annual income under which one is exempt from paying income tax; Botswana: www.
burs.org.bw (tax calculator); South Africa: SARS (2009: 32); c Botswana: See Ulriksen 
(forthcoming); South Africa: Share of economically active population paying income 
tax (13.7 million of 31.2 million), SARS (2012: 28); d Botswana: Non-mineral income tax, 
BoB (2012: Table 7.2); South Africa: Revenue from personal income tax as a percentage 
of total government tax revenue, SARS (2012: 18); e Revenue from indirect tax (VAT) as 
a percentage of total revenue; VAT 12 per cent in Botswana and 14 per cent in South 
Africa; Botswana: BoB (2012: Table 7.2); South Africa: SARS (2012: 18)
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systems the taxpayer is taxed at 25 and 40 per cent respectively only 
on parts of their earned income; hence, in both countries, even if you 
earn a million a year in the local currency, you still do not pay a full 25 
or 40 per cent of your income in tax.5 Of course, high income earners 
are also taxed for capital and investment profits, but this should be 
counterweighted by tax exemptions on medical aid schemes, pensions 
and other savings that are disproportionately utilized by high to middle 
income earners.
Despite these similarities there are also some critical differences 
between the two countries. In Botswana income taxation plays a 
minimal role – both as a mechanism to lower incomes for high income 
earners and as a means to generate government revenue. Thus, income 
taxes (on both companies and individuals) constitute only around 16 
per cent of total government revenue as reported in the government 
statistics. This means that revenue from personal income taxes is even 
less. This is partly explained by the low income tax rates, as already 
discussed, and also the low number of taxpayers. It is difficult to 
find exact figures for income tax payers in Botswana, but based on 
information from the most recent Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey tax payments are basically non-existent for about three-quarters 
of households (Ulriksen forthcoming). VAT constitutes the most 
important indirect tax in Botswana and generates about 14 per cent of 
total government revenue (Table 5.2). The main tax revenue sources 
for the government are mineral extraction (45 per cent of total tax 
revenue) and payment from the Southern African Customs Union (24 
per cent) (BoB 2012).
Taxation of citizens is more extensive in South Africa. Personal 
income tax constitutes about 34 per cent of total government tax 
revenue (Table 5.2), which excludes corporate income tax (another 21 
per cent of government revenue) (SARS 2012: 18). At the same time, 
there has been a remarkable growth in the number of taxpayers over 
recent years: from 5.9 million taxpayers in 2009/10 to 13.7 million in 
2011/12 (ibid.: 28). Thus, about 44 per cent of the economically active 
population (age fifteen to sixty-four) in South Africa are income tax 
payers. In addition, about a quarter of total government tax revenue is 
derived from VAT, which is paid by all income groups.
To sum up, while Botswana and South Africa have similar personal 
income tax systems, the extent of taxation is considerably more 
substantial in South Africa, and it appears that taxation does have 
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some marginal redistributive effects in this country (ODI 2004: 7). 
Nevertheless, while taxation may cut incomes of high income earners, 
the incomes of low-income groups are more likely affected by the extent 
of social transfers, which is discussed in the next section.
Social transfers: pro-poor, but redistributive?
Social transfers may be considered to include both social security 
schemes (insurance) and social assistance (grants). Social security is 
usually provided through contributions by employer and employee and 
covers the employee in situations of inability to work, such as sickness, 
old age, maternity and injury. Social security is therefore an important 
mechanism in situations of income insecurity. Nevertheless, the 
redistributive impacts are less straightforward, particularly in contexts 
of high informality of employment, where only those in formal and 
better-paid employment are able to benefit from social security schemes. 
As indicated in Table 5.3, while South Africa has provided legally for 
most social security provisions, unlike Botswana, the actual coverage is 
relatively low in both countries as compared to other MICs.6
Social assistance policies that provide direct cash grants to the poor 
and vulnerable have clear income redistributive potentials as grants can 
TABLE 5.3 Social transfer indicators in Botswana and South Africa
Indicators Botswana South Africa 
Social security statutory provisiona very limited semi-comprehensive
Social security coverageb 9% 6.7%
Social assistance expenditurec 1.8% 15.7%
Social assistance coveraged less than 7% about 32%
Going without cashe 39% 22%
Notes: a Existence of social security statutory programmes (for sickness, maternity, old 
age, invalidity, survivors, family allowance, employment injury, unemployment), lowest 
score: very limited, highest score: comprehensive; ILO (2010: Table 15); b Share of labour 
force actively contributing to old-age pension scheme; World Bank (2012: 370–71); 
c Social assistance spending as a percentage of total government expenditure; 
Botswana, spending on food and social welfare, BoB (2012: Table 7.3); South Africa, 
spending on grants and welfare, National Treasury (2012); d Cash grant recipients as a 
percentage of population; Botswana: number of beneficiaries of destitute programme 
(40,865) and pension (91,446) out of a population of 2 million, in per cent, Mupedziswa 
and Ntseane (2013: 92–3); South Africa: about 16 million grant recipients of a population 
of 50 million, SASSA (2012); e Share of survey population saying they go without cash 
many times or always in a year; Dulani et al. (2013)
116 | f ive
raise the incomes at the bottom end. Our two cases differ considerably 
with respect to their social assistance frameworks. Botswana has a 
range of feeding schemes for children, pregnant women and other 
vulnerable groups, but only the universal old-age pension and the 
means-tested destitute programme can be considered direct cash grants 
(the destitute programme only partly so as it includes a food parcel). 
Social assistance is clearly not a priority of the government of Botswana 
with low coverage and very low levels of expenditure (Table 5.3). It is 
noteworthy that 39 per cent of the Botswanan population go without 
cash many times or always in a year – close to double the proportion 
in South Africa.
In South Africa, on the other hand, social assistance is prioritized. 
There are a range of means-tested social grants, of which the child 
support grant (in terms of numbers of grant recipients) and the old-
age pension (in terms of costs) are the most important. Almost 16 per 
cent of government expenditure goes to social assistance programmes, 
covering about a third of the population (Table 5.3). There is clear 
evidence that social grants have been central to reducing poverty in 
many households, particularly households including older people or 
children; however, at the bottom of the income distribution remain 
those without access to income from the labour market or from grant 
income (Leibbrandt et al. 2010).
Thus, South Africa has been able to address poverty reduction 
directly through social grants to a much larger extent than has Botswana. 
Nevertheless, combined with the substantial income increases for high 
income earners as discussed earlier, the impact of social transfers on 
aggregate inequality levels in South Africa has been limited (ibid.; 
Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen 2010).
Political pressure and collective action: explaining 
differences in policy outcomes
Botswana and South Africa have been unable to significantly 
confront high levels of income inequality. In terms of labour market 
and redistributive policies the countries reveal some interesting 
differences, including more extensive taxation and transfer coverage as 
well as higher minimum wages in South Africa compared to Botswana. 
Nevertheless, the countries also display critical similarities that point 
to potentially equality-promoting policies, which fail to get sufficient 
political attention or adequate direction. Such areas include inabilities 
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to address unemployment and wage compression (including wage 
constraint for high income earners). By drawing on the political science 
frameworks of the power resource approach and collective action it is 
possible to understand such varieties of policy outcomes.
A big difference in the political landscapes of Botswana and South 
Africa relates to the mobilization and organization of trade unions. 
Union membership in Botswana is much lower than in South Africa, 
and even if formal membership of unions has decreased slightly in 
South Africa (World Bank 2012: 368–9), it is commonly recognized 
that the unions are well organized and have substantial political clout. 
It is therefore unsurprising that minimum wages are much higher in 
South Africa than in Botswana.
By all accounts, South Africa has a more lively civil society than 
Botswana. The Botswanan government is generally seen as elitist 
and under limited pressure from low-income groups (Ulriksen forth-
coming). Characteristically, the government ‘does not encourage 
dependency’ (RoB 2012: 9) and sees little need to expand social 
transfers beyond a bare minimum. In South Africa, on the other 
hand, social grants are given as a right and it is possible that grant 
beneficiaries become an important political pressure group as cover-
age expands.
Taxation policies are harder to explain. According to the theory of 
collective action, taxpayers usually do not form a strong and mobilized 
group and therefore governments may be able to expand taxation 
relatively easy. In Botswana, personal taxation is limited, probably 
because mineral wealth incomes have not forced the government 
to expand income taxation. In South Africa personal income tax 
constitutes an important part of government revenue, and the 
government has been able to expand its pool of taxpayers. However, it 
is also clear in South Africa that taxpayers can mobilize – particularly 
when it concerns a clearly targeted tax policy such as the toll roads tax 
in Gauteng province, which has been hugely contested.
The impact of taxation and transfers on inequality levels has overall 
been limited. This is not so surprising in Botswana, where these 
potentially redistributive policies have received limited attention. In 
South Africa, there is some indication of the income-reducing effects of 
taxation for high income earners and positive impacts of social grants 
for poor and vulnerable groups. Thus, it has been reported that social 
grants reduce inequality from a Gini coefficient of 0.8 to 0.73, and 
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taxation further reduces the inequality level to 0.71 (Tregenna and 
Tsela 2012).7 It is also possible that the effect of taxation and transfers 
in South Africa has not yet been fully appreciated as these policies have 
expanded considerably in recent years. Nonetheless, such policies have 
not helped labour market outsiders, those unemployed or informally 
employed who, in both countries, suffer from limited incomes. In fact, 
while taxes and transfers may have some redistributive impact, the 
high levels of income inequality are largely attributed to access to wage 
income (Van der Berg 2014). 
Labour market outsiders constitute huge and dispersed groups that 
in both countries are unable to exert substantial – or, rather, purposeful 
– political pressure. Frustrated youth in South Africa may protest 
against poor service delivery (which is then a direct, clearly defined 
issue) and voice frustration with unemployment. But given the difficulty 
of employment creation (around which, compared to minimum wages, 
there is an array of possible policy solutions on which there is little 
agreement), it is clear why political pressure for employment creation 
in general is difficult to sustain. Unemployment and informal work are 
acknowledged as gigantic challenges by both governments, but so far 
these challenges remain and large parts of the working-age population 
live on minimal incomes.
Unlike labour market outsiders, high income earners are much 
more resourceful and powerful. It is therefore no surprise that incomes 
for the top percentiles have been increasing rapidly without receiving 
much attention in both countries. The rising incomes at the top can be 
attributed to skills constraint that pushes demand and thus wages for 
certain skills groups. However, top earners have arguably also been able 
to raise their incomes because those bearing the costs, the consumers 
and taxpayers, are large and latent groups. Without disputing the 
importance of free market mechanisms, it could be questioned whether 
skyrocketing incomes at the top are reasonable and whether wage-
compressing policies have a role to play.
Conclusion
Taxes and transfers have redistributive potential, and in contexts 
where low-income groups are able to mobilize political pressure, 
such redistributive policies may be promoted. Still, formal policies of 
taxation and transfers are largely unable to reach the labour market 
outsiders who are unemployed, work for low pay and/or make a 
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living in the informal economy. Furthermore, the question is whether 
expanding transfers and taxation will be sufficient in situations where 
the differentials of pre-tax/-transfer incomes are extreme.
Expansion of formal jobs – also for the lower skilled – may over time 
smooth wage differentials. However, we have seen that this has not 
yet been achieved in Botswana and South Africa – far from it. What 
is more, the trends across developing countries are disheartening. 
Not only are wage inequalities rising (Lee and Sobeck 2012), the 
informality of jobs is also increasing across the globe (World Bank 
2012), thereby exacerbating the risks of low pay and no formal social 
protection.
Hence, lack of employment opportunities and low pay seem to be 
clear obstacles to income inequality levelling. It has been argued that 
low minimum wages are an important mechanism to encourage the 
private sector to pursue employment-intensive production. However, 
this has not been enough to ensure employment and reduced 
inequality in Botswana. One may instead argue that raising minimum 
wages ensures decent pay. Nonetheless, in South Africa it appears 
that minimum wages benefit a formally employed working class while 
many work informally and/or for poor pay well below these averages. 
At the same time, it is probable that jobs have been lost owing to high 
wages. Thus, too high a minimum wage may be counterproductive, 
particularly in a situation where collective bargaining does not include 
the lowest paid and poorly organized (informal) workers.
Political force is critical in the process of reducing inequality. 
However, by its very nature, deep inequality does not create an 
environment conducive to substantial and sustained public pressure 
for wage compression and redistribution. The wealthiest constitute a 
small but powerful group with little incentive to reduce their earnings 
for purposes of redistribution, while constituencies supportive of 
redistribution and more equal earnings generally are weaker and less 
well organized. In a context of increasing informality, the potential 
organization of the working-age poor is even more difficult. A way 
forward could be to find strategies to formally recognize the many 
productive economic activities that take place informally and, 
concurrently, to identify innovative approaches that move social 
protection for the working-age population beyond the formal 
sectors.
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Notes
1 Population below nationally defined 
poverty line: Botswana 20.7 per cent 
(CSO 2011); South Africa 26.3 per cent 
(Statssa 2012).
2 Wage inequality: Argentina (5.5 
per cent), Brazil (6 per cent), Mauritius 
(6.7 per cent), Thailand (9.6 per cent) and 
India (10.7 per cent) (World Bank 2012: 
364–5).
3 Data derived from LABORSTA 
Labour Statistics Database, ILO, www.
laborsta.ilo.org.
4 Minimum wages in 2005, US$ per 
year: Argentina: 4.824, Brazil: 3.000, 
India: 264, Mauritius: 1.692, Thailand: 852 
(World Bank 2012: 368–9).
5 Author’s calculation based on 
Botswana Unified Revenue Service’s 
(BURS) tax calculator (www.burs.org.
bw) and South African Revenue Service’s 
(SARS) annual report (SARS 2009: 30).
6 Social security coverage as 
percentage of labour force: Argentina: 
47.0 per cent, Brazil: 59.3 per cent, India: 
10.3 per cent, Mauritius: 53.4 per cent, 
Thailand: 22.8 per cent (World Bank 2012: 
370–71).
7 The reported Gini coefficient 
here is different to the one reported 
above, which is due to differences 
in measurements and calculations 
(Tregenna and Tsela 2012). The main 
point, however, is not undermined: taxes 
and more so transfers have some income-
distributing effects, although inequality in 
South Africa remains high.
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Introduction
One of the distinctive characteristics of the neoliberal international 
economic order that has existed since the end of the Second World War 
is the promotion of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy has been 
held aloft as a philosophical touchstone for the promotion of economic 
growth and development. The central argument is that this form of 
democracy guarantees order and stability and that these are correlates 
of economic prosperity.
As the argument goes, the developed economies of North America 
and Europe are developed because democracy has taken root in these 
countries. Scholars such as Friedman (1962) believe that there is a 
strong connection between political stability and economic freedom. 
He argues that these two freedoms are mutually reinforcing and that 
an expansion of political rights through the adoption of democratic 
principles in governance will foster a higher rate of economic growth. 
Although there are variations to this generalization in terms of the 
form of democracy – for example, the case of Singapore, South Korea 
(under General Park) and China, which recorded impressive growth 
under authoritarian regimes – advocates of the positive correlation 
between democracy and economic growth prefer to adduce other 
factors for the economic growth of these countries. Such factors, it is 
claimed, are ‘helpful politics which include openness to competition, 
the use of international markets, a high level of literacy and school 
education, successful land reform and public provision of incentives 
for investment, exporting and industrialization’ (Sen 2001: 150).
Given the high debt burden of Third World countries and the 
associated macroeconomic problems in the 1980s, democracy was 
made part of the conditionalities for accessing aids and grants. Thus 
started the democratization process in many of the countries previously 
under authoritarian rule in what Samuel Huntington called a third 
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wave of democracy (Huntington 1992). Nigeria joined this trend 
and returned to democratic governance in 1999 after about thirteen 
years of unbroken military rule. Over this period, various poverty 
reduction programmes have been embarked upon both at the national 
and subnational levels. However, evidence and empirical results show 
that, rather than abating, the prevalence of poverty in the country has 
continued to rise (NBS 2011). Contrary to the theoretical formulation 
that characterized liberal democracy as a prerequisite for economic 
growth, liberal democracy in Nigeria has perpetuated disempowerment 
of the masses even as the elite live in opulence from wealth acquired 
through primitive accumulation. Rather than helping to build human 
capability, the various poverty reduction programmes have been at 
best tokenistic, serving only as avenues for personal enrichment of the 
political class and their cronies. This chapter contends that politics 
matter for poverty reduction, and that indeed the nature of the state 
and the structure and type of politics that is practised can affect the 
outcome of poverty reduction strategies in MICs.
Until the global economic crisis that followed the financial crises 
of 2007–09, earnings from fuel and commodity exports skyrocketed 
owing to high demand in the international markets for fuel, minerals 
and metals and other commodities. The result of this was that the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of Nigeria grew at an average of 6 per cent 
per annum between 2004 and 2010. This culminated in Nigeria being 
classified as a Medium Income Country by the World Bank in 2008 
(Sumner 2011). Despite this otherwise impressive growth, levels of 
poverty remain high, with about 61.5 per cent of the population living 
on than $2 per day (NBS 2011). The type of growth that is being 
experienced in the country is a jobless growth as the unemployment 
rate hovers above 23 per cent (ibid.).
Disempowerment in relation to democracy relates to the 
contradictions inherent in the practice of democracy whereby the 
electorate with whom sovereignty resides get poorer with a democratic 
government. Democratization of disempowerment was used by the 
late African political economist Claude Ake to express the systematic 
and conscious strategy of political elites in Africa to court the masses 
of people in the period leading up to an election but leaving them to 
continue their lives of daily struggle for survival and penury until the 
next election (Ake 1994). Under this condition, the electorates are 
disempowered because, as proposed by Sen (2001), they lack capability 
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in terms of political, social and economic freedom. They are poor, lack 
access to education, health and social security. In order to appear that 
they show some modicum of concern, the political elites in Nigeria 
design various cosmetic and ill-thought-out intervention programmes, 
such as allocating money and clothing materials to party members, as 
was done under the National Poverty Eradication Programme during 
the Olusegun Obasanjo administration from 1999 to 2007. As I shall 
show later, the national poverty eradication programme was national 
only in name as the few beneficiaries were members of the ruling 
People’s Democratic Party or members of the families of the political 
elites. 
The MIC examined in this chapter is Nigeria, although I will draw 
comparisons with Venezuela. While Nigeria is located in West Africa 
with an estimated population of 167 million, Venezuela is located 
in Latin America with a population of about 29 million. The two 
countries are oil-producing nations and were previously under military 
dictatorship but are now practising democracy. However, the results 
of the democratic experience in terms of a reduction in poverty and 
inequality have been markedly different. Venezuela has practised 
a leftist form of democracy that allows the state to intervene in the 
economy, thereby helping to reduce poverty and inequality. Nigeria’s 
version of democracy is liberal in form, with preference for the market as 
the agent for allocation of resources. Also, while the political leadership 
in Venezuela is guided by the ideology of providing maximum welfare 
for its citizens, the political leadership in Nigeria appears preoccupied 
with the idea of acquiring power, preservation of class interest and 
using access to power as a means of primitive accumulation. While 
Nigeria became an MIC in 2008 with a GDP per capita of US$1,376, 
Venezuela as a MIC has a GDP per capita income of $11,223 (World 
Bank 2011). The rate of external aid as a percentage of GDP also 
varies between the two countries, with Nigeria having a higher level. 
Both countries are oil dependent. However, while the management 
of Nigeria’s oil industry is riddled with gross inefficiency and massive 
corruption, Venezuela has successfully exerted effective control over 
the oil industry, thereby enhancing a positive multiplier effect on the 
economy. Development indicators such as life expectancy at birth, 
school enrolment, Gini coefficient, access to health facilities, payment 
of social security and so on also show that Venezuela is far ahead of 
Nigeria.
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The following section examines the prevailing theory that established 
a causal relationship between democracy and economic growth as well 
as the underlying philosophy of the primacy of economics upon which 
the international development agencies based their assumptions. 
Section three examines the peculiarity of Nigeria democracy, the 
political economy of the country, especially the centrality of oil, the 
contrast between Nigeria and Venezuela, and the lessons that can be 
learnt. Section four concludes with recommendations. 
Theory of democracy and economic growth
There has been a long debate over the link between democracy and 
economic growth. The argument that there is a positive correlation 
between democracy and economic growth follows the neoclassical 
growth model that sees less function for the government in economic 
affairs. Under this model the role of the state is limited to provision 
of incentives and maintenance of law and order geared towards 
security of property rights and protection of investment. In the place 
of the government the market is preferred as the effective agent for 
allocation of resources (Barro 1996). As Barro (ibid.: 2) argues, ‘if 
the government improves the climate for business activity – say, by 
reducing the burden, from regulation, corruption and taxation or by 
enhancing property rights – the growth rate increases for a while’. The 
importance of this submission is that government has a limited role to 
play in business. 
Dahl (1997: 35) contends that ‘the close empirical link between 
twentieth century democracy and the presence of an advanced market 
economy is beyond dispute’. His justification for this submission is 
the presence of many features that are conducive to economic growth, 
which democracy provides. These include: (i) a stable legal system, 
(ii) considerable decentralization of economic decisions, (iii) wide use 
of information, (iv) persuasion, (v) inducement, (vi) rewards rather 
than open coercion to influence the behaviour of economic actors, 
(vii) the creation of middle classes, (viii) access to fairly reliable 
information, and so on (ibid.: 35).
However, despite this submission, Dahl adopts a cautious tone in 
noting that ‘there is no reason to suppose that, as a by-product of socio-
economic modernization, a democratic political culture will somehow 
emerge automatically as a kind of political deus ex machina’ (ibid.: 25).
There is another school of thought which believes that even if 
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democracy fosters economic growth, the liberal form of democracy 
does not foster development. This view was well captured in Ake’s 
Democracy and Development in Africa. He contends that liberal democ-
racy is a correlate of the market that diverges from the classical idea 
of democracy (Ake 1994). Inasmuch as liberal democracy cares only 
for the interests of the propertied class, it cannot foster development 
for the masses of the people. Consequently, given the central position 
that acquisition of power occupies as a means of accumulation in post-
colonial Nigeria, what liberal democracy has been able to bring is 
nothing but democratization of disempowerment (ibid.).
One theory that has been widely used to describe the political 
economy of Nigeria’s democracy and governance is the public choice 
theory. Scholars like Krueger (1974) and Nelson (1990) argue that the 
involvement of the state in the economy constitutes an impediment to 
the development of a country’s economy. According to Olukoshi (2004: 
47), the consensus among this new school of public choice scholars was 
that ‘the post-colonial African state and its intervention in the economy 
were the fulcrum around which various rent-generating niches were 
created and tapped by the state-based or state-dependent elite to the 
detriment of rational policy-making and efficient resource allocation’. 
As the argument goes, rent-seeking pervades the public sphere through 
‘neo-patrimonial patron–client relationships, which linked different 
layers of officials and other elites to one another and to the rest of the 
society’ (ibid.: 47). However, both Olukoshi (ibid.) and Mkandawire 
(2015) have criticized this theory as being too simplistic and overtly 
general in addressing the challenges of development in Africa. They 
made a distinction between rent-seeking that is developmental and 
rent-seeking that is anti-developmental, noting that the former can 
actually be fed into a strategy of capital accummulation, while the latter 
will only feed into elite consumption. Be that as it may, it would appear 
that the manner in which the political elites abuse their positions for 
primitive accumulation in Nigeria feeds into the main argument of 
the public choice theory. Rather than use rent from oil to advance the 
common good, it has been largely used in the pursuit of personal and 
class interests. Although political representations tend to follow ethnic 
and kinship ties, it is only those who are really very close to political 
office holders who share part of the spoils of that office. The majority 
of the citizens are left to struggle for survival and hope in perpetuity for 
change in their existential conditions.
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Democracy, politics and poverty reduction in Nigeria
Nigeria is a federation that has thirty-six state structures, a Federal 
Capital Territory, 774 local government areas and a central government. 
It operates a bicameral legislature with a total number of 469 representa-
tives in lower and upper chambers. It is a rentier state whose existence 
is predicated on extraction and exploitation of both human and mate-
rial resources, first by colonialists and later by indigenous political elites. 
The country depends on oil for 95 per cent of its foreign exchange and 
85 per cent of its exports. Revenue from oil is shared among the three 
tiers of government, with the federal government taking the lion’s share 
of about 62 per cent. Although the country operates a federal system, 
the constitution bequeathed by the departing military both in 1979 and 
1999 ensured a centralized system of administration, which continues to 
make fiscal federalism an issue of constant intergovernmental and inter-
ethnic conflict in the country (Suberu 2001).
Since 1973, oil has taken centre stage in the political economy of 
the country to the extent that other sectors such as agriculture and 
manufacturing have been grossly neglected. As Obi (2002) argues, in 
Nigeria oil is politics and politics is oil. Petrodollars serve to lubricate 
the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1993), affording politicians the 
resources to live an expensive lifestyle, which is usually at the expense 
of the majority of the people, who live in abject poverty. 
When the country returned to democracy on 29 May 1999, there 
were hopes that with the election of then President Olusegun Obasanjo 
the country would witness economic growth and the high level of 
poverty and inequality in the country would be drastically reduced. 
As a political actor, the president assembled a team of technocrats as 
his economic advisers. This team, which had the then vice-president 
Atiku Abubakar as its chair, embarked on a programme of massive 
privatization of moribund state-owned enterprises. From 2003, the 
economic team formulated an economic blueprint named the National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). 
The reforms that the government embarked upon, especially on 
macroeconomic issues, led to impressive growth of about 7 per cent in 
gross domestic product (Okonjo-Iweala 2012). However, this high level 
of growth did not translate into a reduction in inequality or poverty. 
One of the main reasons for such a disconnect between economic 
growth and a corresponding reduction in poverty and inequality is 
that most of the reforms reflected full doses of neoliberal economic 
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policy prescriptions, which advocate cuts in social provisioning such 
as subsidies on health, education and petroleum products (Amuwo 
2008). As Seguino (2005: 2) argues, ‘liberalization policies, more 
generally, seem unable to generate social development in terms of 
steady increases in GDP or in terms of improved standards of health, 
education, and human security’.
Another reason is the high cost of governance and lack of 
accountability in the country. Nigeria’s brand of democracy is the most 
costly in the world. It is a presidential system that is modelled on the 
United States of America. The huge cost of governance in the country 
manifests from the period of selecting candidates for political offices at 
the party level through to the cost of maintaining political officials. To 
start with, politics is seen as an investment rather than a call to service. 
Consequently, aspirants to political office at all levels of government 
spend a fortune to get selected or elected. Those who cannot afford 
the money from personal accounts rely on godfathers who have 
accumulated ill-gotten wealth through previous political appointments 
or by acting as phony contractors to the government. These godfathers 
always sit back and expect their godsons to pay them back from the 
amount they also earn or steal from government treasuries (Ayoade 
2006; Gambo 2006). 
Payments and allowances to the 469 members of the national 
assembly, which comprises the Senate (upper chamber) and the House 
of Representatives (lower chamber), are centrally determined and paid 
by the Revenue Allocation and Fiscal Mobilization Commission. In 
2010, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria revealed that the 
national assembly alone absorbs about 25 per cent of the national 
budget overhead (Sanusi 2010). The executive is no better in terms 
of the regime of fiscal mismanagement and financial recklessness 
that characterizes Nigeria’s brand of democracy. From the president 
to the chairman of the local government, there is an undisclosed and 
unaccounted-for amount of money called the ‘security vote’ which they 
spend as they wish, mostly on personal issues. This runs into millions 
of dollars per annum.
The implications of the above for the trajectory of democracy, 
politics and governance and poverty reduction efforts in Nigeria are 
twofold. First, liberal democracy and its penchant for the primacy of 
economics over politics has failed dismally to ensure the conditions for 
an improved standard of living for the people. It engenders greed and 
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promotes primitive accumulation, especially among the political elites, 
who are preoccupied with class survival and dominance, rather than 
service to the people. As Hobson (2012: 447) argues, ‘neo-liberalism 
strongly emphasizes individual liberty, competition, and the self-
correcting nature of the market and prioritizes the economic realm over 
and above the political sphere’. This ‘low intensity democracy’ (Gills et 
al. 1993, cited in ibid.) foisted on the MICs rendered the state nearly 
incapacitated. The weakness of the state and its institutions makes it 
impossible to put an adequate check on the opulence and corruption 
of the political elites in Nigeria. 
Secondly, the democratic experience in Nigeria has accelerated 
disempowerment of the citizens rather than building capabilities. In 
this regard, the right of the citizens to criticize and protest, though 
guaranteed by the Constitution, has been largely circumscribed. As has 
happened several times, whether in the oil-rich Niger Delta or in Lagos, 
citizens’ protests have been brutally suppressed through the apparatus 
of the state. Political leaders react with scorn and indignation to the 
few citizens who have the means and ‘audacity’ to criticize the anti-
people policies of the government.
Poverty reduction in Nigeria
Since the return to democracy in 1999, the Nigerian government 
has adopted various poverty reduction strategies. Some of these are 
described below and evaluated in the light of the current situation. 
The first in the series was the establishment of the Poverty Alleviation 
Programme (PAP) in 2000. The National Poverty Eradication 
Programme (NAPEP) quickly followed this in 2001.
Under the Poverty Alleviation Programme, the president, at that 
time Chief Olusegun Obansanjo, set aside the sum of 10 billion naira 
(N) for the creation of 200,000 jobs. Participants on this programme 
were paid a stipend of N3,500 to engage in labour-intensive activities 
such as unblocking and cleaning drains, sweeping roads, filling and 
sealing cracks and potholes, installation and restoration of road signs, 
rehabilitation and maintenance of public buildings such as markets and 
hospital, and so forth (Ajakaiye 2002). Even though a few individuals 
derived benefits from the programme, it did not lead to a significant 
reduction in poverty. The programme was also riddled with corruption, 
nepotism and lack of transparency (ibid.: 15). The failure of the 
programme was also a reflection of the nature of politics and policy-
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making in Nigeria, in which end users of policies are neither consulted 
nor incorporated before policies are elaborated. 
The National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAP) that replaced 
the Poverty Alleviation Programme had four schemes: (i) the youth 
empowerment scheme (YES), (ii) the development of rural infrastruc-
ture scheme (RIDS), (iii) the social welfare services scheme (SOWESS) 
and (iv) the natural resource and conservation scheme. With regard 
to the objective of poverty reduction with respect to building human 
capability, the social welfare services scheme was the most relevant. 
This is because, as Ajakaiye (ibid.) submits, the programme deals 
with special education, primary healthcare services, establishment and 
maintenance of recreational centres, public awareness facilities, food 
security provision and so on. 
At the subnational level, state governments in the northern part of 
Nigeria also buy tricycles and motorcycles for many of the unemployed 
youths. The political elites see these gestures and tokens as political 
capital that they can leverage to secure votes during elections. While 
such gestures can address economic deprivation, as the beneficiaries 
derive daily income, they fall short of other dimensions of poverty 
reduction such as building human capability and access to justice and 
political rights. Despite the various poverty reduction programmes 
in the country, and the remarkable growth in the economy over the 
years, the following data shows that rather than abating, poverty has 
been increasing in the country. According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics, the major component used in the computation of the relative 
poverty measurement is household expenditure. This is shown in Table 
6.1, which illustrates the steady increase in the numbers that are poor.
TABLE 6.1 Relative poverty headcount from 1980 to 2010




Population in poverty 
(millions) 
1980 27.2 65 17.1
1985 46.3 75 34.7
1992 42.7 91.5 39.2
1996 65.6 102.3 67.1
2004 54.4 126.3 68.7
2010 69.0 163 112.47
Source: NBS (2011)
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There is a progressive increase in the incidence of poverty in the 
country from 1980, when it was just 27.2 per cent, to 2010, when it 
reached 69.0 per cent. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, 
the number of people in the country in absolute poverty is 99.248 
million (NBS 2011). Also, the director general of the National Bureau of 
Statistics, Dr Yemi Kale, was reported as saying that ‘In 2004, Nigeria’s 
relative poverty measurement stood at 54.4 per cent but increased to 
69 per cent or 112.518 million in 2010’ (Punch Newspapers 2012). 
The unemployment rate is currently at 24 per cent in the country. 
Unemployment is even more prevalent among the youth (NBS 2011). 
Table 6.2 shows the geographical structure of poverty in Nigeria.
TABLE 6.2 Geographical structure of poverty in Nigeria (percentage of population)
Zone Food poverty Absolute poverty Relative poverty Under 1$ 
per day 
North Central 38.9 59.5 67.5 59.7
North-East 51.5 69.0 76.3 69.1
North-West 51.8 70.0 77.7 70.4
South-East 41.0 58.7 67.0 59.2
South-South 35.5 55.9 63.8 56.1
South-West 25.4 49.8 59.1 50.1
Source: NBS (2011)
Table 6.2 is important in that it shows both the various dimensions 
of poverty, their rates and the geographical spread. It shows that the 
number of people living in relative poverty is higher in all the regions 
than the number of people who are trapped in food or absolute poverty. 
It also shows that the incidence of poverty is highest in the North-West, 
with 51.8, 70.0 and 77.7 per cent of the population trapped in food, 
absolute and relative poverty. The number of people living on less than 
$1 dollar per day is also highest at 70.1 per cent. The incidence of 
poverty is lowest in the South-West at 25.4, 49.8 and 59.1 per cent, for 
food, absolute and relative poverty respectively. The number of people 
living on less than $1 per day is also lowest at 50.1 per cent. 
In line with the tradition of the IMF of taking economic growth as 
the measure of the health of a country’s economy, this organization and 
the World Bank have consistently rated Nigeria as one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world (IMF 2011; World Bank 2011). 
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However, despite this, the reality on the ground suggests that poverty 
has indeed increased in the country.
The Goodluck Jonathan administration that came into power in 
2011 focused government policy on what he called a ‘Transformation 
Agenda’. Although job creation is one of the main planks of this 
agenda, lack of functional infrastructure such as adequate power 
supplies, good transportation networks and provision of cheap funds 
has made it difficult for industries to thrive in the country. The federal 
government has initiated huge financial intervention programmes in 
the textile, cotton, garments, ‘Nollywood’, cocoa, banking and other 
sectors as a means of creating jobs. Grants are also made available to 
young entrepreneurs under the ‘You Win’ programme of the federal 
government. These intervention programmes are particularly targeted 
at poor people, especially the urban poor and rural farmers. Yet the 
rate of unemployment is still very high as these programmes have little 
or no effect on the people, especially the poor.
An interesting fact about the politics of poverty reduction in Nigeria 
is that opposition parties control some states in the country, especially 
the Action Congress of Nigeria, which controls six out of the thirty-
six states in the country. To an extent, the states controlled by the 
opposition parties have exhibited some tendencies to develop policies 
that are geared towards a reduction in poverty and inequality. Many 
of these states have also embarked on programmes that help to create 
employment, especially for the youth. In Ekiti State in the south-
western part of the country, the governor has approved payment of 
N10,000, which is about $64, monthly in the form of social security 
to senior citizens of sixty-five years of age who have no one taking care 
of them. The government of Ondo State, also in the south-western 
part of the country (which is also controlled by an opposition party, 
the Labour Party), has, through payment of conditional cash transfers 
and improvement in health facilities, reduced household poverty and 
inequality at the state level. 
Although there have been reports about the growth of the middle 
class in Nigeria and other MICs, it is worth noting that the failure 
of the state to provide any form of social provisioning such as social 
security means that the income of an average member of the middle 
class in Nigeria is hardly ever sufficient to meet his or her basic needs. 
This is so for several reasons. First, the year-on-year inflation rate in the 
country is typically above 12 per cent. As the naira is extremely weak 
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against the dollar at an official rate of US$1 to N198.00, the purchasing 
power of the naira is very low. Secondly, interest rates are prohibitively 
high at an average of 19 per cent. Contrary to what obtained in other 
MICs such as South Africa, consumer credit opportunities in Nigeria 
are very limited. Bank lending to the manufacturing sector and at the 
household level is very thin, with the latter at less than 10 per cent of 
total household expenditure. Thirdly, an average middle-class citizen 
in Nigeria has at least three dependants, either parents, uncles, cousins 
or friends, who look to him for survival. The failure of the state to 
design an effective programme for poverty alleviation in the country 
has forced many citizens to seek succour from community associations 
and religious organizations.
Poverty reduction in Venezuela
Venezuela provides a useful contrast to the situation in Nigeria. 
Venezuela was formally under military rule with one of the highest 
poverty and inequality rates in Latin America. However, over the past 
thirteen years, especially under the radical democratic regime of Hugo 
Chávez from 1999, the country has witnessed remarkable improvement 
in all indices of development. Hugo Chávez came into office with three 
main promises: to facilitate completion of the democratic project and 
end corruption and poverty. To an extent he kept these promises. A 
poverty rate at a record high of 60 per cent in 1998 has been reduced to 
27.6 per cent. In the same period, extreme poverty has been reduced to 
7 from 25 per cent. This feat was achieved through a series of strategies 
encapsulated under ‘missions’, which promoted the organization of 
community councils and nationalization of companies, paving the 
way for employment opportunities. The government of Hugo Chávez 
also introduced various social programmes in education, healthcare, 
job training and food subsidies. Education is free from primary to 
postgraduate level, and access to healthcare was made universal. In 
order to sustain these and more social programmes, such as access to 
food in subsidized supermarkets (known as Mercal, PDVAL and the 
Bicentennial Markets), the government of Venezuela invests 60 per 
cent of its annual budget in social programmes.
In its assessment of the Chávez administration after ten years in 
office, the Center for Economic and Policy Research found that, 
over the entire decade, the percentage of households in poverty had 
been reduced by 39 per cent, and extreme poverty by more than half. 
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Inequality has also fallen substantially. The Gini coefficient fell to 41.0 
in 2008, from 48.1 in 2003 and 47.0 in 1999. The report also notes 
that from 1998 to 2006, infant mortality fell by more than one third, 
with a twelvefold increase in the number of care physicians in the public 
sector, with millions of Venezuelans having access to healthcare. A 
significant aspect of the social intervention programmes of the Chávez 
administration was the massive increase in the number of the citizens 
benefiting from social security. Although the country is oil dependent, 
the growth in GDP, estimated at about 13.5 per cent annually, was 
essentially in the non-oil sector. This contrasts sharply with Nigeria, 
where oil remains dominant in the political economy with the resultant 
systematic neglect of other sectors, especially agriculture.
The political leadership of the country has followed a leftist path, 
which diverges from the dominant neoliberal paradigm of many 
developing countries. According to Levingston (2014: 2), 
Venezuela’s political economic development under the leadership 
of Presidents Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro has been marked 
by progressive radicalisation of the government and its support 
base. The socialisation of private industry, [a] comprehensive 
ban on capital flight, expanded price controls and a move toward 
endogenous production and self-sufficiency in national food 
production (i.e. food sovereignty) have gathered pace over the past 
decade.
As expected, neoliberal forces have fought back by withholding 
investment through what Levingston calls reification and commodity 
fetishism. Global capital and its agencies, particularly the International 
Monetary Fund, have constantly expressed concern about the 
sustainability of the pro-people leftist reforms in Venezuela. The 
current oil crisis has negatively impacted on the growth trajectories 
of Venezuela. However, despite the resistance to this unorthodox 
approach that Venezuela’s political leadership has taken, there is a 
distinct possibility that this path accelerates development without 
follwing the neoliberal path of market democracy and uncontrollable 
capital.
Although Nigeria has some similarities with Venezuela in terms of 
being democratic and oil dependent, the political leadership of the two 
countries has behaved differently over the past decade of democratic 
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governance. While Venezuela has adopted a non-conventional approach 
to governance and economic management, such as nationalizing state-
owned enterprises, and thereby helping to create massive employment 
opportunities for the people, Nigeria has adopted liberal democracy 
and neoliberal economic policies (such as privatization, deregulation 
and a host of other market-oriented policies) which have worsened the 
poverty and inequality problems in the country. Although there are 
opposition parties in both countries, the Venezuelan government under 
Chávez remained focused on helping to improve the living conditions 
of the people.
Policy implications of politics for poverty reduction in MICs
Contrary to the prevailing orientation in the international community 
that getting the economics right will enhance poverty reduction, this 
chapter contends that politics is central to pro-poor growth strategies 
and income redistribution in MICs. In particular, the state must have 
the capacity to formulate policies that enhance the ability of the poor to 
have title to their land, stimulate job creation and enact social welfare 
programmes that build human capability and preserve dignity. Poverty-
reducing politics must not be anchored on ‘market democracy’, which 
cares only for the interests of the transnational capitalist class (TCC), 
the indigenous ruling classes and their cronies. Such politics must 
go beyond what I call ‘poverty reduction as tokenism’, in which, for 
example, the government purchases motor bicycles or tricycles for able-
bodied men (including university graduates) to carry passengers as a 
means of survival under the National Poverty Eradication Programme 
(NAPEP), as in the case of Nigeria. What is needed is a form of social 
democracy that appreciates the equality of all citizens, that seeks to 
establish institutions for accountable governance, redistributes income 
through taxation, improves spending on education, health and pensions, 
and formulates economic policies that favour job creation through 
industrialization, manufacturing and a service-oriented economy. 
In both the cases that have been examined in this chapter, the role 
of politics in either aggravating or reducing the poverty situation of 
the citizens has been spelt out. For instance, it has been shown that in 
Nigeria poverty reduction strategies have been largely ineffective owing 
to the politics of disempowerment that the politicians in the country 
are engrossed in. Apart from the fact that poverty reduction strategies 
in the country have been dictated by the logic of the market, the 
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various strategies that have been adopted are either not well thought 
out or rendered ineffective owing to the pervasiveness of corruption 
among the political elites. However, Venezuela has, through visionary 
political leadership, adopted various poverty reduction strategies that 
have helped in lifting millions of its citizens out of poverty. In essence, 
then, this is the justification of the central argument of this chapter 
that politics matters for development and especially for a reduction in 
poverty and inequality. 
The policy import of the analyses above will be considered from both 
domestic and international dimensions. At the domestic level, there is a 
need for a new approach to politics. As against the dominance of liberal 
democracy, which the international development agencies and devel-
oped countries have been promoting, there is a need for social democ-
racy. The need for this change is necessitated by the failure of liberal 
democracy to facilitate a reduction in poverty and inequality. As various 
scholars have argued, liberal democracy is by nature unsuitable for the 
task of fostering poverty reduction and inequality, especially in develop-
ing countries (Ake 2001). This is because it is based on ‘the neo-liberal 
principle of individual liberty, competition and the self-correcting nature 
of the market, and prioritizes the economic realm over and above the 
political sphere’ (Hobson 2012: 447). The promotion of democracy by 
the United States of America and the European Union in newly democ-
ratizing countries has not taken cognizance of the local peculiarities of 
those countries. Rather, the economic interests of these promoters of 
democracy in terms of liberalization of trade, finance and the invest-
ment regime, weak labour unions and a minimal state have been their 
overriding objectives (ibid.). The liberal democracy that these countries 
promote ‘has served to reinforce economic inequalities and social hierar-
chies [in MICs] as the underlying socio-economic order is placed beyond 
the scope of democratic decision-making’ (Robinson 1996).
Consequently, social democracy could be a way out of the twin 
problems of poverty and inequality in MICs. As scholars have argued, 
‘the consolidation of democracy in Europe was due to the protection 
of economic and social rights through the welfare state’ (Berman 2011: 
447). Although it may be expensive to maintain, the fact that many 
of the MICs such as Nigeria are rich in terms of resources makes the 
case for a social democracy more compelling. Although availability 
of natural resources has usually been a source of conflict in most 
countries, especially in Africa (Collier 2008), this should be managed 
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to ensure income redistribution. Social democracy focuses on income 
redistribution and building the capabilities of individuals and citizens. 
It is even more salient when one considers the positive correlation 
between the communitarian nature of social democracy and the culture 
of the people of the MICs.
Also, as social democracy subordinates economics to politics, it 
will be easier to allocate resources to redistributive activities, such as 
we have seen in the case of Venezuela, than under liberal democracy, 
where economics is the central focus. In a country like Nigeria, where 
the majority of citizens hardly feel the impact of the state in their daily 
living, they have more often than not resorted to seeking help from 
community associations and religious organizations. Consequently, it 
is our contention that social democracy will help in fostering poverty- 
and inequality-reducing politics, if adopted. Hobson (2012: 449) 
further argues, ‘a social democracy model places greater emphasis on 
the political sphere and community cohesion’. In view of the glaring 
failure of liberal democracy on these important scores, the adoption 
of social democracy should be an agenda for civil society organizations 
as well as national and international non-governmental organizations 
that are urging a reduction in poverty and inequality across the world. 
Although the change may not come easily, as the current status quo 
benefits the political elites and the transnational capitalist class, the 
pressure must be persistent in order to bring about what I call the third 
liberation, not of countries but of peoples. 
The international dimension to this issue concerns the manner of 
classification of countries into income groups and poverty level by 
international development agencies, as well as the strategies that such 
classifications evoke in addressing poverty and inequality. The World 
Bank uses various socio-economic indicators to categorize countries 
as low, middle or high -income. However, empirical research shows 
that the MICs are home to about 2.5 billion poor people, as against 
the previous classification, whereby the majority of the world’s poor 
lived in the Least Developed Countries. As Sumner (2011) argues, 
‘there is a “new bottom billion” of 960 million poor people or seventy-
two per cent of the world’s poor who live not in poor countries but 
in middle income countries’. Sumner’s study questions the continued 
relevance of the findings of John Collier’s popular study The Bottom 
Billion, in which he states that about one billion poor people live in 
Least Developed Countries, mostly in Africa (Collier 2008).
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The changes in the composition of the ‘geography of poverty’ from 
Least Developed Countries to MICs definitely warrant new strategies 
from the international community. These changes ‘raise questions 
not only about the definitions of country categories, the future of 
poverty reductions in heterogeneous contexts, the role of inequality 
and structural societal change and about aid and development policy’ 
(Sumner 2011: 2). They will also require that the international 
development community diversifies its portfolio of activities from 
just focusing on the Least Developed Countries to becoming more 
involved in MICs. Also, against the backdrop of the failure of foreign 
aid to lift as many people as expected out of poverty (Moyo 2009), 
and in particular owing to the fact that some MICs such as Nigeria 
have enough money to fight poverty but are constrained by lack of 
political will and corruption, the international community should 
redirect resources and assistance towards building state capacity and 
strengthening civil societies, such that the state will have the ability 
to redistribute income and pursue accountability and transparency in 
governance. 
Making politics serve the aims of development in Nigeria will 
necessitate cutting the number of political offices as well as having a 
unicameral and possibly part-time legislature. As national expenditures 
currently consume about 72 per cent of the national budget, the over-
bloated and inefficient bureaucracy should be streamlined. Conditional 
Cash Transfers (CCTs) tied to primary and secondary school enrolment 
as well as health services should be introduced in Nigeria and other 
countries. For the poor youth and adults that are illiterate, technical 
and vocational schools should be established to train them and make 
them employable. As the case of Venezuela has shown, scholarships and 
bursaries should be provided for bright but indigent students. Income 
redistribution will also involve making the rich pay more tax, especially 
on their numerous assets. It will also mean having a social security 
system that ensures a monthly payment of unemployment benefits to 
both the young and the old. Checks and balances should be put in 
place to ensure that pension funds are promptly paid to retirees.
Citizens’ action is imperative for poverty reduction because those who 
benefit from the current power structure may not have any incentive to 
change until they are made to see the need for such. As Green (2008) 
argues, ‘to break the cycle of poverty and inequality, and to give poor 
people power over their own destinies, a radical redistribution of 
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power, opportunities and assets is required. The two driving forces 
behind such a transformation is: active citizens and effective states.’ 
Citizens in MICs should strive to exercise their political and civil rights 
as well as keeping to their obligations, such as paying taxes and obeying 
the laws. As (Houtzager 2009) contends, payment of taxes by Brazilian 
citizens and subjecting the budgetary process to the participation of 
the citizens have helped them to hold the government accountable and 
responsive to their needs. Indeed, payment of taxes is an intrinsic part 
of the social contract. Governments that enhance human development 
create incentives for people to pay taxes willingly, while those that 
fail to perform in this regard create disincentives. Active citizenship 
will also ensure that it is only political parties that lift the standard of 
living for the people that secure votes in elections while any party in 
government that fails to do so loses votes.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the inextricable link between poverty 
reduction and politics in Nigeria with comparative notes from Venezuela. 
It argues that contrary to the prevailing orientation in the international 
community – that getting the economics right will enhance poverty 
reduction – politics is central to pro-poor growth strategies and income 
redistribution in MICs. In particular, it contends that the state must 
have the capacity to formulate policies that enhance the ability of the 
poor to have title to their land, stimulate job creation and enact social 
welfare programmes that build human capability and preserve dignity. 
Poverty-reducing politics must not be anchored on ‘market democracy’, 
which cares only for the interests of the TCC, the indigenous ruling 
classes and their cronies. Rather, social and participatory democracy 
that ensures equitable distribution of resources should be introduced 
in MICs. Building strong institutions that can facilitate accountability 
and punishment for deviations from established rules should follow 
this.
In view of the changes in the global geography of poverty, whereby 
two-thirds of the world’s poor population now live in the MICs, the 
chapter recommends a change in the strategies of the international 
community in tackling the scourge of poverty and inequality. An 
interesting dimension to the politics of poverty reduction in a federal 
state like Nigeria is that subunits of the federation that are controlled 
by opposition parties are recording a higher level of success in the 
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reduction of poverty and inequality. These subnational governance 
authorities seem to have incentives to contradict the urban coalition 
theory, as the impact of their intervention programmes is felt even in 
the rural areas, where the majority of the poor live. The motivation for 
their relative success could be an agenda for further research. 
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Introduction
The recent attention given to social inequalities as a driver of per-
sistent poverty in MICs has had little focus on the urban dimension, 
and the role of large cities in this process. This chapter argues that large 
cities can play a significant role in poverty reduction and social devel-
opment. Large cities have become dominant in national landscapes 
as engines of economic development, and spaces for struggle over 
social development and environmental change. Cities also constitute 
intermediate political spaces between the national government and the 
community level. City governments and their technical departments 
maintain close linkages with the social reality on the ground and with 
the unequal distribution of wealth, and they face the day-to-day respon-
sibility for dealing with these challenges. In developing countries, large 
cities often have greater resources and capacity than smaller cities and 
towns that enable them to employ different strategies to those adopted 
at national level in dealing with poverty and inequality. However, their 
response to these challenges is framed within, and often constrained 
by, national policy and legislation. This research offers an analysis of 
the politics and policies that address urban inequality in two MICs: 
Brazil and South Africa. The chapter examines how ‘housing for the 
poor’ has been addressed in three large, fast-growing cities in these two 
countries. The research presented here is based on recent fieldwork in 
Rio de Janeiro (Braathen et al. 2013), Cape Town (Jordhus-Lier and 
Aasen 2012) and Durban1 (Sutherland and Buthelezi 2012) as part of 
a comparative EU-funded research project (Chance2Sustain).2 
The chapter explores how urban poverty and inequality are being 
addressed through the lens of substandard settlement upgrading. 
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Four assumptions underlie our choice of approach. First, we argue 
that housing precariousness, or the lack of adequate housing, is a good 
proxy for understanding urban poverty and inequality.3 Secondly, 
housing precariousness is manifested in its most extreme form in 
urban substandard settlements. Housing policies and programmes, 
particularly those focused on substandard or informal settlements and 
their upgrading/relocation, therefore provide a useful way of exploring 
and analysing policies that purport to address urban poverty and 
inequality in cities in MICs in the global South.
Thirdly, informal settlements are not just containers of poverty. 
They are at the same time the material expression of poor people’s 
agency, and their rapid emergence often take places in locations in 
strategic proximity to job and transport opportunities (Huchzermeyer 
2011). This is linked to the fourth assumption – that urban informal 
settlements are primarily addressed at national government level 
through housing policies (i.e. a ‘politics of housing’) but at the local 
level they are transformed into a struggle over land and access to a 
bundle of urban resources between different actors in dense and 
dynamic urban landscapes (i.e. a ‘politics of location’). 
Defining substandard settlement upgrading in comparative urban 
research is challenging. In the case of Brazil, favelas have, to a certain 
extent, been formalized and legalized and hence do not reflect the 
same characteristics as the informal settlements in South Africa. 
Cape Town has experienced significant rural–urban migration since 
the 1980s, as a result of both the challenge to apartheid policies which 
excluded blacks from urban spaces and the opening up of cities post-
apartheid. Many newcomers construct homes in shack settlements on 
the Cape Flats. Informal settlements in Durban include both infor-
mal and peri-urban4 housing as a result of the strong spatial relation-
ship between the city of Durban (the urban core) and the homeland 
of KwaZulu (rural periphery) during the apartheid era (Sutherland 
et al. 2013). This has resulted in different approaches to upgrading 
based on differing social and environmental contexts. In comparison, 
the majority of informal settlements or favelas in Cape Town and 
Rio de Janeiro tend to be denser than in Durban, with more urban 
characteristics. In Rio de Janeiro favelas and wealthier neighbour-
hoods are often located side by side (socio-spatial micro-segrega-
tion). According to Misselhorn,5 the term ‘upgrading of sub-standard 
settlements’ is used broadly to describe a wide range of processes 
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that lead to the improvement of the quality of life of those living 
in informal or peri-urban settlements, and hence it is important to 
reflect on both the upgrading context and the approaches adopted. 
Huchzermeyer (2011) introduces a useful typology, whereby she 
distinguishes between different forms of upgrading, ranging from 
authoritative ‘eradication’ (clearance/eviction) campaigns, via inter-
mediate forms of ‘formalization’ and ‘regularization’, which may or 
may not offer housing opportunities to some of the previous dwellers 
on site, to genuine in situ upgrading projects which include informal 
settlement dwellers in decision-making, and where improved mate-
rial, infrastructural and social facilities are provided on site.
In this chapter we trace how housing policies initiated at the 
national level are interpreted and implemented at the local level. 
First, there is significant variation with regard to the level of coercion 
and participation that has characterized authorities’ efforts to upgrade 
and/or eradicate informal settlements, including the use of evictions 
and forced relocations or, on the other hand, the emergence of more 
collaborative methods. Secondly, the scope of policies varies, ranging 
from narrowly focused projects that construct houses, to more 
comprehensive approaches which are based on in situ rehabilitation 
with infrastructural and socio-environmental components. The role of 
upgrading policies within a macro-level planning framework for the 
city is the third dimension. This reflects the extent to which upgrading 
aims at ‘horizontal’ integration – improved access of informal settlers 
to the modern city (‘the right to the city’) – and reduced socio-spatial 
segregation. The alternative is ‘vertical integration’ – increased state 
control and improved access for external businesses to the informal 
settlements. While informal settlement upgrading must always be 
understood in relation to the wider urban space, infrastructural 
systems and natural environments, this chapter will deal less with the 
macro dimension and focus more specifically on issues of coercion/
participation and scope. 
The chapter first provides an overview of urban poverty and 
inequality in Brazil and South Africa, as well as in the three cities that 
form our focus: Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town and Durban. It then reviews 
the shifts in urban and housing policies in each country, with particular 
reference to the selected cities. Finally, it presents some comparative 
reflections on the policy shifts. 
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Urban poverty and inequality
During recent decades, a combination of democratic decentralization 
and neoliberal growth policies has resulted in the juxtaposition of the 
pro-poor and pro-growth agendas in Brazil and South Africa. Strategies 
and programmes for state interventionism against poverty have been 
tempered by a neoliberal efficiency discourse. Concomitantly, the 
perceived importance of urban economies has increased as a response 
to globalization. But flows of investment into these cities have also 
been accompanied by continued high levels of social inequality and 
residential segregation. 
Brazil The proportion of income-poor households in Brazil has 
been reduced from 23 per cent in 1995 to 12 per cent in 2009 (IBGE 
2010). This has been partly linked to the expansion of cash transfer 
programmes, such as Bolsa Familia, from the federal government to 
the poorest households. However, other dimensions of poverty such 
as housing precariousness tend to persist, particularly in metropolitan 
regions such as Rio de Janeiro.
TABLE 7.1 Proportion of households living in poverty, 2009
Income povertya Housing precariousnessb 
Brazil 12% 13%
Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region 10% 20%
Sources: a Calculated on the basis of data from IBGE (2010); b Ministry of the Cities/
Centro de Estudos de Metropole (CEBRAP 2010)
Being the second-largest metropolitan region in Brazil, Rio de 
Janeiro has followed the national trend and seen income poverty cut 
by half from 1995 to 2010.6 However, housing precariousness has 
not been reduced substantially in the same period, and 22 per cent of 
Rio de Janeiro’s population live in ‘substandard settlements’ or slum 
areas (favelas),7 totalling 1,393,314 inhabitants.8 Favelas are located 
across the entire metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro, although the 
largest favela clusters are concentrated in the northern and western 
parts of the city. 
In contrast to most other metropolises in Brazil and Latin America 
generally, Rio de Janeiro is marked by intense segregation at the micro 
level within the richer southern parts of the city (Marques 2013). 
Rich and poor neighbourhoods are often located in close proximity to 
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each other. Historically, slums (‘favelas’) originated on steep hillsides 
(‘morros’), a common aspect of Rio de Janeiro’s topography. The cost 
and difficulties of building formal infrastructure in these areas made 
them less appealing for the development of real estate projects. The 
vernacular distinction between ‘favela x asfalto’ (slum versus pavement) 
refers to the fact that most slums did not have paved streets. 
Following the consolidation of new middle-class neighbourhoods, 
favelas became providers of cheap and accessible labour. Many 
inhabitants are employed in different types of menial jobs in wealthier 
areas (from housemaids and cooks to doormen, waiters and many 
others), while conveniently living close to their employers.
South Africa In South Africa absolute and relative poverty have 
decreased since 2000, mostly as a result of the uptake of a range of 
social grants, with those living below the poverty line decreasing from 
38 per cent in 2000 to 22 per cent in 2008 (NPC 2011a). However, 
the severity of poverty among the very poor has not diminished and 
inequality has intensified, with South Africa having one of the highest 
levels of inequality in the world (Leibrandt et al. 2010). 
Post-1994 the urban poor have benefited from the extension of 
social grants, free and subsidized basic service delivery, including 
water, sanitation and electricity, and large-scale housing provision. In 
isolation, these interventions have increased the social wage. However, 
they have failed to restructure urban space and hence do not offer the 
wide range of urban resources required to address poverty and inequality 
in a systemic manner (Turok and Parnell 2009). New approaches to 
informal settlement upgrading have emerged as state policy has shifted, 
signalling more integrated approaches to the provision of urban services 
and facilities. However, owing to large housing backlogs and a lack of 
transparency at the local level, this has not translated into a socially 
acceptable housing process for the poor. 
CAPE TOWN Cape Town is South Africa’s third-largest city. It is the 
main economic centre of the Western Cape Province and home to 66 
per cent of the province’s population (CoCT 2007). Poverty has a clear 
spatial representation. The city is home to both the very wealthy and 
the very poor and reflects the extreme inequality of urban South African 
post-apartheid. It remains a racially segregated city, with informal 
settlements, which accommodate 144,000 households, located on the 
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periphery of the city on the Cape Flats. The informal settlement popu-
lation consists of migrants from the Eastern Cape and other poor rural 
areas of the country, as well as Cape Town residents hit by job loss 
and financial difficulties. Cape Town’s informal settlements are mainly 
located along the national N2 highway, which is a main development 
axis and spatial determinant of the city. 
DURBAN eThekwini Municipality9 plays a major role in the South 
African economy and it forms the economic centre of the country’s sec-
ond-most populated province, KwaZulu-Natal. The city is fast grow-
ing, with high levels of poverty and unemployment. Almost 42 per cent 
of the municipality’s population live under conditions of poverty and 
many experience the impacts of the city’s housing and services backlogs, 
with over 400,000 people living in informal settlements (eThekwini 
Municipality 2012). The informal settlements in the city are predom-
inantly located along the Urban Development Line (UDL) or urban 
edge, which divides the more dense urban and less dense rural zones of 
the municipality (Sutherland et al. 2013).
Substandard housing in eThekwini can be differentiated into 
very dense informal settlements and less dense peri-urban housing. 
Informal settlements are located on inner-city land or in marginal 
spaces within existing suburbs, consisting of shacks or imjondolos with 
very narrow access routes within the settlement. These settlements 
provide challenging conditions for in situ upgrading. Moderately dense 
settlements are located adjacent to existing townships and suburbs, 
usually found outside the UDL, and consist of shacks or more traditional 
dwellings. Owing to lower densities, these settlements provide more 
opportunities for upgrading (KZN Department of Human Settlements 
2011). 
National and local housing policies in Brazil
Rio de Janeiro has been a key player in national housing policy-
making in Brazil. Until 1960 it was the national capital that harboured 
Brazil’s main concentration of favelas. While the vast majority of the 
favelas of Rio de Janeiro were targets of public removal policies during 
the period of the military dictatorship, Rio redefined its approach 
in the 1980s towards a political recognition and urban upgrading of 
the favelas. This radical shift started with the democratic elections of 
state governors in 1983, when the left-oriented Lionel Brizola from 
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the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) became head of the state of Rio 
de Janeiro. Politicians and social movements from Rio managed to 
influence the legal and institutional levels, such as with the new 1988 
Constitution, the City Statute’s approval in 2001,10 and others. The 
notion of the ‘right to the city’, the recognition that all city residents 
are ‘rights holders’ in the city, which emerged from social movements’ 
struggle for a national urban reform, was included in the institutional 
framework (Santos Junior 2009). Although the national policies 
changed in the same direction, large-scale federal investments in urban 
housing and infrastructure did not take place until 2003 with a shift of 
national government. 
Federal initiatives from 2003 The left-oriented Luis Ignácio Lula da 
Silva from the Workers’ Party (PT) won the presidential elections in 
2002. The Lula administration (2003–10) created institutions such as 
the Ministry of Cities and federal and state councils of cities, which 
stimulated public participation in national, state and local housing and 
sanitation projects. The main housing programmes implemented by 
the federal government in Brazil have been the PAC – Programa de 
Aceleração do Crescimento (‘Programme to Accelerate Growth’) and 
Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House, My Life). While these initiatives 
have been coordinated by ministries at the federal level and funded 
by federal public banks, municipal and state governments have been 
responsible for implementing the projects (CEBRAP 2010).
Aiming at strengthening the economic infrastructure of the country 
and contributing to high economic growth, PAC integrated a number 
of development projects into a single programme in 2006. From 2007 
to 2010, the programme spent U$S15 billion annually on housing 
and US$22.9 billion on sanitation. According to the PAC programme 
document, 4 million families were to benefit from these investments. 
US$12.3 billion of the total investments in 2007–10 went to precarious 
settlements, supposedly benefiting 1.85 million residents. Among the 
funds invested, 67 per cent were allocated to housing developments for 
residents within their community, and only 6 per cent was allocated to 
the resettlement of households to other areas of the city. 
The programme Minha Casa Minha Vida added a significant volume 
of resources for the construction of new housing units. This ambitious 
programme was launched in 2008 with the aim of constructing 3.4 
million houses by 2014, of which 40 per cent were to be allocated 
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to families with monthly incomes of less than three minimum wages. 
In Rio de Janeiro, the programme is supposed to build 100,000 
housing units, the majority of which are intended for citizens who will 
be displaced by the preparations for mega sports events. The overall 
aim of ‘My House, My Life’ was to reinforce economic activity and 
support job creation during the financial crisis. The programme 
implementation was based on private sector contractors presenting 
projects to the federal government bank (Caixa Econômica Federal), 
with support from municipal or state governments or civil society, to 
obtain funding. The local governments are responsible for dealing with 
the land issue. This type of programme design was intended to ensure 
a rapid response in terms of proposals and implementation, which 
would be difficult if state and local governments were given a greater 
role. The programme proposed to eliminate 14 per cent of the national 
housing deficit (CEBRAP 2010). The housing programmes of PAC 
and Minha Casa Minha Vida continued at the same level and pace 
under President Dilma Rousseff (2011–14). 
Rio de Janeiro: recent housing and upgrading programmes Until 
the end of 2008 there were political tensions and little collaboration 
between federal and local governments regarding housing in Rio de 
Janeiro. However, in 2009 Eduardo Paes from the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party (PMDB) became mayor in Rio. He aligned with 
President Lula, whose Workers’ Party (PT) from then on took part in 
municipal, state and federal governments. 
In 2010, Rio’s municipality, represented by the Municipal Board 
of Housing, announced a new housing and upgrading programme 
called Morar Carioca. The programme had the goal of upgrading and 
formalizing all the favelas in Rio de Janeiro by 2020. This was part of 
creating a lasting ‘social legacy’ of the 2014 football World Cup and the 
2016 Olympic Games.11 Morar Carioca offered multi-sector territorial 
interventions, such as urban upgrading, conservation of public space, 
control of the growth of favelas, urban legislation and resettlement of 
residents who were living in hazardous areas. Until 2016, the year of 
the Olympic Games, 4.75 billion Brazilian reales (BRL) (around US$3 
billion) were to be spent; 156,000 families from 193 favelas were to 
benefit. From 2017 to 2020 a further 3.75 billion BRL (around US$2 
billion) was planned to benefit 109,000 poor families (Bittar 2011). 
One of the innovations of the Morar Carioca programme was to 
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promote a public tender in order to select architecture offices that 
would propose individual upgrading projects for each favela. In 
those proposals, the competitors were to present ways to include the 
participation of local residents in the elaboration and implementation 
of the projects. During the first round, forty architectural offices were 
selected to work with a special geographic area. However, only eleven 
were contracted, and they were not in action until the second half of 
2012. In early 2013 the municipality cut its contract with the NGO 
supposed to supervise the architectural offices and their participation 
in the communities (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014). At the end of the day the 
main function of Morar Carioca was to provide compensatory housing 
for people who had been removed because of public works, or because 
they resided in environmental ‘risk areas’. In order to construct these 
housing units, the city municipality drew on the federal housing 
programmes of Minha Casa Minha Vida and PAC.
Case studies from Morro da Providência and other favelas, however, 
show that the preliminary upgrading projects implemented under the 
Morar Carioca programme have repeated previous patterns of gov-
ernmental interventions in favelas (Braathen et al. 2013), including: 
1) lack of transparency of the formalization projects and the low par-
ticipation of local residents in their implementation; 2) mismatch 
between the large number of removals and the low number of new 
houses built to be offered to the former residents of the favelas; 3) new 
housing units being constructed in the peripheral suburbs and not near 
the favela where the removed people had resided.12 Thus, the policy 
resembled the old eviction and resettlement policies, although the offi-
cial policy since the 1980s has emphasized in situ rehabilitation, in order 
to enhance social inclusion and ‘integration’ of the favelas into the city. 
A comprehensive academic assessment of the Minha Casa Minha Vida 
programme concluded that it had increased the socio-spatial segrega-
tion of Rio de Janeiro and the other larger cities by building most of the 
houses for low-income groups in the suburban peripheries (Cardoso 
2013). From a ‘right to the city’ perspective these programmes ben-
efited mainly the private entrepreneurs, denied people’s rights to in situ 
rehabilitation and consequently contributed to the development of a 
‘city of exception’ (Vainer 2011). 
The government of the state of Rio de Janeiro has had an important 
role in the favela policies in the last decade, but its main focus has 
been on policing through the public security programme developed 
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around the new units for ‘community policing’, the UPPs (Unidades 
de Polícia Pacificadora). From December 2008 until the end of 2011 
the state government installed UPPs in twenty favelas around the city. 
The official goal was to bring the police presence closer to the residents 
of favelas and break the territorial control of ‘drug lords’. However, 
the programme has prioritized favelas in the central and southern 
zone – the traditional middle-class and business districts – and in 
favelas surrounding the main arena for the 2014 football World Cup, 
the famous Maracaná Stadion (Sørbøe 2013). By the end of 2014, 
thirty-eight UPP units had been installed, covering approximately two 
hundred of the nine hundred or so favelas in Rio de Janeiro.13
National and local housing policies in post-apartheid South Africa
Post-1994 the ANC government adopted a national housing 
programme whereby the state would deliver, on a large scale, state-built 
starter houses, known as RDP14 houses, using a site-and-service model 
(Huchzermeyer 2011). Charlton (2009) states that from a national 
perspective five related objectives are apparent in the post-1994 housing 
programme: to demonstrate delivery to an expectant post-democracy 
constituency; to contribute to the economy; to establish housing 
markets; to contribute to poverty alleviation; and to develop urban 
citizenship through the creation of a democratic and integrated society 
(ibid.). Under this housing programme the government claims to have 
built 2.3 million housing units since 1994. Although large numbers of 
houses have been transferred to the poor, these housing projects are 
often of substandard quality, and are located on the periphery of cities, 
reinforcing the spatial legacy of apartheid. They have not produced 
integrated and sustainable neighbourhoods which offer a range of 
social facilities and employment opportunities (ibid.; Pithouse 2009). 
By prioritizing the construction of formal housing, people’s need to 
be close to employment opportunities and social networks was also 
overlooked (Huchzermeyer 2006). 
Despite this large-scale housing delivery, informal settlements 
have continued to grow across South African cities. The eradication 
of ‘slums’ was, and still is, the dominant discourse of the ANC 
government, as in the ruling party’s view they represent the failure 
of the state to address poverty and inequality. By the early 2000s it 
became evident that the many informal settlements spread out across 
cities in South Africa were not simply representing a ‘housing backlog’. 
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Rather, they were expressions of a significant urbanization process 
based on rural–urban migration and population growth, whereby the 
urban poor located themselves in spaces in the city to obtain access to 
land and urban opportunities. As a result of the recognition by the state 
that the informal housing issue could not be contained or addressed 
through the large-scale delivery of formal RDP houses, the Breaking 
New Ground Policy (BNG) was launched in 2004. It resulted in 
the Upgrading Informal Settlements Programme (UISP), with the 
terminology of ‘eradicating’ informal settlements being replaced by the 
terminology of ‘upgrading’ informal settlements.
However, the initial implementation of the BNG policy was not 
successful, as a result of limited political will and little bureaucratic 
support for the new innovative policy. What was more worrying was 
that the policy was accompanied by a discourse of slum eradication 
(Charlton and Kihato 2006). In KwaZulu-Natal, the Department 
of Housing’s Strategic Plan for 2004–07 ignored almost all of the 
innovations in BNG, and listed the aspiration of ‘eradicating slums’ 
in the province by 2010 as the first of its strategic objectives (Pithouse 
2009). This resulted, in 2007, in the passing of KwaZulu-Natal’s 
Elimination & Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act. In 2007 the 
ANC resolved to extend the Act nationally despite opposition from 
shack dwellers’ movements and human rights organizations (ibid.). 
‘Shacks’, which essentially are the self-built housing solutions of the 
poor, appear in the discourse of ‘slum elimination’ as if they are a 
threat to society (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, a consolidation of the BNG approach emerged post-
2010 at both the national and local levels, supporting the development 
of sustainable human settlements as opposed to the previous approach 
of large-scale delivery of housing units (National Department of 
Human Settlements 2010). This programme, which is regarded 
as a national development priority, has a major focus on informal 
settlement upgrades, via the provision of basic services and secured 
tenure. This reflects the new national realization that the development 
of sustainable human settlements is ‘not just about building houses’, 
but is rather about moving towards integrated settlements, efficiency, 
inclusion and sustainability, and about ‘promoting improved access to 
work and social amenities’ (KZN Department of Human Settlements 
2011). Since 2010, a National Upgrading Support Programme 
(NUSP) has been put in place with World Bank and Cities Alliance 
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support, to strengthen capacities and learning for those involved in the 
UISP across the country. 
Cape Town In the Western Cape Province, the Integrated Services 
Land Project (ISLP) became the key vehicle for housing policies in 
the late 1990s. A representative involved in the management of ISLP 
claims that the project was important in developing new approaches to 
housing: community participation was built into the implementation 
process and available ‘greenfield’ land was used for housing purposes. 
Despite delivering an impressive number of housing opportunities, 
ISLP was unable to reduce the number of informal settlements. 
Informal settlement dwellers were offered formal housing, but other 
people were waiting to inhabit their shacks. The emergence of informal 
settlements is a result of a high in-migration from rural areas such as 
the Eastern Cape far outstripping housing construction under the RDP 
approach. 
In 2004, the City of Cape Town (CoCT) launched their Frame-
work for Upgrading Informal Settlements. The first phase was the 
Emergency Servicing of Informal Settlements (ESIS), launched in 
early 2004 (Graham 2006). ESIS focused on providing basic water, 
sanitation and waste removal services to all informal settlements at 
high speed, supported by the strong involvement of the ANC mayor at 
the time. While roll-out was achieved, capital investments were made 
at the expense of the maintenance of existing structures. The long-term 
sustainability of such an approach was also circumscribed by a lack 
of political support for upgrading (opposed to formal housing) and a 
general lack of community support and involvement which threatened 
roll-out. It therefore became clear that there was a need for politicians 
not to let a technical-bureaucratic approach remain dominant in the 
roll-out phase (ibid.). 
Metropolitan governments were given greater responsibilities for 
housing under the new housing code, and CoCT aligned its own 
policies with the Provincial Housing Department’s Sustainable Human 
Settlements Strategy (Isidima) (Smit 2008; Sutherland, Robbins et al. 
2010). Isidima put an emphasis on delivering housing opportunities 
through a mixture of tenure types for poor households – thereby creating 
socio-economically integrated communities with adequate access 
to social and economic opportunities in well-located and safe urban 
areas (Sutherland, Robbins et al. 2010). While national and provincial 
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government were drivers in the housing policy formulation process, 
the municipalities were ‘required to act as developers’, depending on 
capacity. 
Cape Town has yet to develop a coherent model of informal 
settlement upgrading. Rather, CoCT representatives describe their 
approach as a mixture of pilot projects, which will all provide lessons 
learned in order to mainstream a more comprehensive approach at a 
city level. Given the volatile, dynamic and vulnerable nature of informal 
settlements, it is a fundamental challenge for planners and the relevant 
municipal departments (which historically shaped the barriers against 
informal settlements) to adopt sufficiently flexible approaches to these 
settlements. The backbone of their approach, however, is the UISP, 
which facilitates the introduction and maintenance of basic services 
in informal settlements. In addition, there are more sophisticated, 
partnership-based and participatory approaches which are being 
tried out. 
One such initiative is driven by the South African SDI Alliance,15 
and in particular its local partner, the Community Organization 
Resource Centre (CORC). Since May 2009, CORC has initiated a set 
of local government partnerships whereby managers and technical staff 
from CoCT meet with community representatives and NGOs to plan 
upgrading in selected settlements. At present there are fifteen to twenty 
partnership projects across the city focusing on reblocking, new building 
materials, ablution blocks and other facilities. The community input in 
this model can be characterized as strong, with capacity-building and 
knowledge generation through local residents and their involvement 
in enumerations (household surveys) and exchanges (inter-settlement 
dialogues).16 The partnership meetings in this model are therefore 
encounters where different forms of knowledge are brought into 
contact with each other and where communication flows relatively 
freely. Still, some of the SDI partnerships have struggled to sustain a 
meaningful collaborative relationship with city officials as community 
resistance and limited tangible results have created mutual distrust. 
Additionally, these pilot projects and other similar initiatives have still 
not accomplished more than a small dent in the levels of deprivation 
for the more than 400,000 households located in informal settlements 
in Cape Town.
Many of the proposed upgrading projects in Cape Town in the last 
decade also testify to the contested nature of the land on which these 
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informal settlements are located. The establishment of these informal 
settlements is often the result of orchestrated, illegal land occupations 
on road reserves or other municipal land, resulting in long bureaucratic 
processes in order to upgrade land. In some cases, environmental 
hazards such as flooding and unstable or polluted soil represent 
obstacles to upgrading and create tension between bureaucrats and 
informal settlement dwellers. In other cases, private land has been 
occupied and poses both economic and legal barriers to interventions. 
When settlements are established on attractive land, there is a tension 
between the claims of informal settlement dwellers and the use value 
of land, which holds a relatively high value in an urban real estate 
market. Lastly, many of the informal settlements are visible from large 
highways, which is seen as detrimental to the attractiveness of Cape 
Town as a tourist destination. Such assessments were influential in 
motivating the national flagship project N2 Gateway, which included 
formal housing construction in an informal settlement close to the N2 
leading to the city centre in the run-up to the 2010 World Cup, by 
many accused of being a beautification project rather than a case of 
informal settlement upgrading.
Durban The eThekwini Municipality’s Housing Unit has adopted a 
flexible policy framework for the housing and settlement question so 
as to enable the city to be innovative in its response to a broad range of 
housing needs. The response to human settlements in the municipality 
is shaped by the legislation and policy of the National Department of 
Human Settlements and to a lesser extent the policy and strategies 
of the provincial department, the KwaZulu-Natal Department of 
Human Settlements. At a local level the municipality’s Housing Unit 
and Engineering Services Department have the strongest influence on 
housing policy and implementation. 
The municipality has a successful track record in the delivery of 
formal houses to the poor. However, the rate of delivery of RDP houses 
has declined over the past few years. Between 2005 and 2008 there was 
considerable public protest by informal settlers against the municipality 
in response to poor living conditions, a lack of access to basic services 
and unlawful evictions (COHRE 2008). In 2011 the Housing Unit’s 
five-year Sector Plan was approved by Council. However, the delivery 
targets of housing in the city have not been achieved (eThekwini 
Municipality 2012). Regulatory obstacles, most notably those triggered 
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by Environmental Impact Assessments that delay projects, and town 
planning requirements for township establishment which often require 
re-zoning, are cited as among the reasons why housing targets are not 
being met. The lack of availability of well-located land, due to high cost 
and competition from other uses, is another obstacle to the delivery of 
housing. Densification is considered to be critical to the future of the 
city, but this implies that construction costs of top structures will be 
higher, and also there are negative perceptions around a new form of 
housing that does not include a single house on a single plot (ibid.). 
As a result of the slow delivery of formal housing, the municipality’s 
response to informal housing has shifted since 2009, as there is now 
a much greater focus on upgrading informal settlements. According 
to a municipal official, ‘our focus (since 1997) has always been on 
upgrading of informal settlements which includes re-location to 
greenfields development where required […] [W]hat happened in 
2009 was an increased focus on servicing of informal settlements and 
provision of interim services.’ 
The municipality has a diverse and well-established informal 
settlements programme which has developed from the relatively 
progressive and tolerant approach the city has adopted towards informal 
settlements since 1997. Since 2009 the municipality has engaged with 
shack dweller organizations such as Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), with 
which it signed an agreement that three informal settlements would be 
upgraded in situ within the inner urban core and that a further fourteen 
settlements would obtain basic services in line with the principles of 
the BNG.
One of the innovations that has been developed in eThekwini 
Municipality is that upgrades are being undertaken prior to land acqui-
sition having been completed. This has been done to address the prob-
lems created by the length of time it takes to secure land for informal 
settlements (KZN Department of Human Settlements 2011). 
Many of the informal settlements in Durban have developed in close 
proximity to work opportunities in an attempt to reduce household 
costs by reducing transport costs. This issue becomes important when 
informal settlements are relocated to new sites that are distant from 
the original location of the settlement and often forms the basis of 
resistance to a proposed move. Thus, housing demand in the city is also 
addressed through greenfield development. Greenfield developments 
require affordable and well-located land which is in short supply in 
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the city. In upgrading projects, greenfield sites need to be chosen that 
are in close proximity to the informal settlement to be relocated. The 
municipality has plans to develop 120,000 sites on 6,000 hectares of 
land at twenty dwellings per hectare as part of the goals of the 2012/13 
IDP (eThekwini Municipality 2012).
One example of a large-scale greenfield housing investment, which is 
both a mixed-use ‘megaproject’ and a pro-poor response by the state to 
meeting the housing needs in eThekwini Municipality, is the Cornubia 
development in the north of the city. This project was identified as 
a lead project in the BNG’s new approach to housing the ‘poor’, 
whereby all new large-scale developments had to include 20 per cent 
of housing for the poor through a public–private partnership. However, 
this project has proved just how challenging it is to develop pro-poor 
housing in a large-scale development with a pro-growth agenda. Not 
only has the number of low-cost housing units decreased over time, 
but the pressure on this project to meet housing backlog demands from 
councillors in wards across the municipality raises the issue of who the 
beneficiaries of this housing project will be. 
Recent land invasions in Cato Crest, a low-cost housing and informal 
settlement area within the urban core, reveal the challenges associated 
with moving informal settlers into formal housing within an upgrading 
project. Allocating formal housing through ‘housing lists’ often results 
in state-provided housing being allocated to someone other than the 
person displaced by the formalization process, or in tenants laying claim 
to formal housing once owners have been relocated. In the recent social 
protests around housing delivery in Durban, intense pressure was placed 
on the Housing Department to be more transparent about how housing 
was being allocated in the municipality. The municipality had not been 
using the housing lists to allocate RDP housing in the city for a few 
years, and was rather allocating housing according to their settlement 
priority list. This revealed that the local state had not been transparent 
about its practice, and that, supported by its councillors, it was deter-
mining housing processes in the municipality, which went counter to the 
national government’s policy of allocating housing via housing lists. 
Comparative findings: shifting discourses, emerging policies in 
Rio de Janeiro, Durban and Cape Town
Cities are important in shifting national policy. The cities discussed 
in this chapter have paved the way for pro-poor housing policies. Our 
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research reveals housing policies, as they are formally stated, have 
shifted from repressive to pro-poor and participatory in Brazil and 
South Africa: from removals of informal settlements, via construction 
of low-cost housing units, to in situ rehabilitation and upgrading of 
resettlements. However, the patterns of policy changes have been 
complex, messy and mixed. 
An end to repressive approaches? In South Africa, the pro-poor agenda 
of 1994 quickly turned into a ‘more security-based and sometimes anti-
poor’ policy practice (COHRE 2008: vi). This repressive approach to 
informal settlements, through legislation, policies and programmes, 
has been characterized as ‘severe, violent and unlawful repression of 
shack dwellers’ organisations’ (ibid.: 1). 
Since the 2000s, urban authorities and national government have 
recognized that informal settlements require a more incremental, 
rights-based approach. Still, the challenge exists to secure ‘the right 
to the city’ for those migrating into both Durban and Cape Town and 
those that seek additional housing as families expand and age, as both 
cities have adopted a strong position in relation to the removal and 
control of any new land invasions or construction of shacks. As local 
authorities in both Durban and Cape Town have employed units to 
enforce their policies, and at the same time try to engage with informal 
settlement communities in order to facilitate upgrading, their authority 
is contested and not always seen as legitimate by informal residents. 
In Brazil, forced evictions and repressive practices ebbed in the 1980s. 
A rights-based approach to informal settlements was strengthened by 
constitutional and legislative changes, and by the democratic control 
over the police forces. However, in Rio de Janeiro and other larger 
cities the word remoção (‘removal’), which was broadly used during 
the military dictatorship, is again back on the agenda. This is due to 
a combination of a surge in urban land prices and public efforts to 
remove residents from so-called environmental risk areas, as well as a 
sharp increase in public works for the mega sports events – the FIFA 
World Cup 2014 and Olympics 2016 (Braathen et al. 2014). Besides, 
the upgrading efforts in many favelas have involved installations of 
funiculars and other means of public transport, obliging the removal of 
the houses in certain areas of the favelas. This development has in Rio 
been accompanied by the introduction of permanent policing, the UPP 
programme, in the favelas.
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Towards genuine in situ upgrading? In both countries ‘slum eradica-
tion’ through forced removals of informal settlements is no longer the 
stated policy. The emphasis is on in situ informal settlement upgrading 
in part through a more rule-based surveillance struggling to come to 
terms with the informal settlers. Brazil has offered in situ upgrading 
since the 1980s, but with a limited delivery rate. South Africa after 
1994 emphasized house construction for the poor, but without due 
national concern for in situ upgrading. Since around 2005 the two 
countries have embarked on a converging policy, attempting to com-
bine house construction with in situ upgrading at a larger scale. 
Brazil has been innovative in providing legal ‘regularization’ of 
the favelas, and public funds for social housing are more available 
for local governments than in South Africa. Rio de Janeiro has seen 
upgrading programmes being launched in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2010s, respectively. However, the recent example shows that what 
started out as an upgrading programme ends up as a traditional ‘urban 
development’ and house construction programme. 
The new progressive approach has been evident at the city level in 
both Durban and Cape Town since the early 1990s, but has recently 
gained new impetus. Durban, and to some extent Cape Town, has 
started the upgrading process through providing informal (interim) 
service programmes. Sanitation and electricity have been supplied to 
alleviate poverty and very poor living conditions. However, so far no 
clear and coherent city-wide models for informal settlement upgrading 
have taken shape. In Durban and Cape Town project-based piloting 
has dominated the scene. Furthermore, the upgrading of settlements 
is contested, and competition over land use is increasing as multiple 
actors within cities begin to compete for the limited land available 
for greenfield developments. A focus on securing a bundle of urban 
resources and not just on improved housing – i.e. a more integrated 
human settlements approach – is wanting in all three cities.
Increased community participation? In all cases we have observed, 
participation in upgrading programmes needs to be improved. Partici-
pation is not occurring at the scale and depth required to ensure that 
the development of human settlements can contribute significantly to 
poverty reduction. In general, there is limited community-level par-
ticipation and debate about the differentiated service provision model 
that has emerged in the cities of South Africa and a lack of bottom-up 
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definitions of appropriate qualities of services (Huchzermeyer 2011; 
Sutherland and Buthelezi 2012; Sutherland et al. 2013). 
At the city level, the technical departments of local government are 
in constant interaction with communities, through a variety of channels. 
However, the pressure on the state to respond to these settlements 
means that a top-down approach is often adopted to roll out solutions 
so as to avoid delays perceived to be caused by extensive participation. 
A difficult question is: does community knowledge matter? We find 
that communities’ ability to cooperate and use their own knowledge of 
their settlement to constructively contribute to an in situ development 
of their own neighbourhoods has been minimal (Jordhus-Lier 2013; 
Sutherland and Buthelezi 2012; Gewbu 2013). This can be attributed 
to the expediency and top-down implementation of the projects, 
among other factors. But it can also be attributed to the nature of in 
situ approaches. Their effective implementation is hampered by the 
lack of adequate negotiation with the complex local politics that exists 
within informal communities.
In eThekwini Municipality the relationship between informal settlers 
and the state is managed by politically elected ward councillors, who 
use local sub-ward committees as their vehicle for communicating with 
their constituency. Residents in informal settlements in the city believe 
that councillors are responsible for making decisions about housing 
and for delivering houses, as this is the message that is communicated 
to them by politicians. Nevertheless, many community members 
feel powerless as they do not believe that the councillors will act in 
the interests of informal settlement dwellers. Allegations of political 
patronage, party political interference, corruption and the failure of 
‘housing lists’ to allocate housing fairly are widespread (COHRE 2008; 
Sutherland and Buthelezi 2012). 
In Brazil, there are no ward-based councillors, but there is a 
network of neighbourhood associations that survived the introduction 
of multiparty democracy. However, in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro a 
big problem has been the instrumentalization of the neighbourhood 
associations by politicians and criminal networks (Braathen et al. 
2013). Still, in recent years several neighbourhood associations have 
been revitalized in struggles to have a say in local upgrading projects, 
or in struggles against removal of parts of the settlement. In addition 
they have invented many new spaces of participation and contestation, 
named social forums and residents’ committees. Brazil has a stronger 
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tradition of participatory local democracy than South Africa. Yet in 
Rio de Janeiro institutionalized participation is weaker than in many 
other Brazilian metropolises. For instance, its municipality has never 
practised participatory budgeting. The pronouncement that Morar 
Carioca would be made a really participatory upgrading project was not 
fulfilled (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014). Still, our cases show that participation 
– the right to participation, and the lack of participation – has been a 
key issue for social mobilization and contestation in Rio. Furthermore, 
a residents’ committee has the right to bargain with the municipality 
and, eventually, to present its case to the mediation committee of the 
municipal housing council, where civil society organizations appoint 
half of the representatives. There are also many examples of single 
dwellers backed by a resident committee who win their case in a state 
court, e.g. for a replacement flat near their favela house and not in the 
remote periphery.
Conclusion: towards less segregated cities?
The policy shifts thus far have not made the cities less segregated, 
integrating (former) substandard settlements with other urban spaces 
and ensuring ‘the right to the city’ for the poor.
In Cape Town and Rio the local government has intervened in 
informal settlements in preparation for mega events such as the FIFA 
World Cup. Such prestige projects have led to contestation between 
the city development strategy of the ruling coalition on the one hand, 
and the upgrading policy and rights of the informal settlement dwellers, 
on the other. In the opinion of some civil society leaders in Rio, the 
ruling coalition wants the integration of the favela territories, but not 
of the favela residents. In other words, our claim is that authorities 
in Rio de Janeiro promote the vertical integration of the favelas. Real 
estate speculation and gentrification have reached the centrally located 
favelas. Fast increases in land prices and house rents force the poorest 
residents to move out to more peripheral favelas.
In Durban civil society representatives argue that too much emphasis 
is placed on housing per se and that the informal settlement challenge 
is a far broader issue about addressing the ‘right to the city’. Informal 
settlement upgrading should ensure that the urban poor have access 
to a bundle of urban resources, which goes beyond the provision of a 
house with water and sanitation services. It should include access to 
livelihood opportunities, education and healthcare as well as public 
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transport. Similar concerns are raised in Cape Town, and there is also 
a growing impatience with the lack of delivery of in situ upgrading in 
both cities. 
Informal housing has many challenges, and provides some opportu-
nities for the poor in fast-growing cities. In the absence of large-scale 
social restructuring and transformation, informal settlements have 
become the expression of the poor’s creative and strategic responses 
to poverty and inequality in fast-growing urban areas. Informal set-
tlements offer arenas for the state to increase the social wage through 
the provision of basic services and by providing security of tenure, 
and more importantly for the way in which the state engages with its 
citizens. Greater participation and deliberation around future housing 
policies for the poor are the cornerstone to ensuring that the housing 
process becomes part of the state’s strategy to address poverty and ine-
quality. Through deepening democracy around the human settlements 
question, the governments can achieve far more than the delivery of 
housing units to the poor. They can develop integrated human settle-
ments that provide the poor with opportunities to improve the quality 
of life in cities. 
Notes
1 The City of Cape Town is the 
administrative name of the metropolitan 
municipality of Cape Town and 
the eThekwini Municipality is the 
administrative name of the metropolitan 
municipality of Durban. 
2 The research project Urban Chances 
– City Growth and the Sustainability 
Challenge (‘Chance2sustain’), funded by 
the EU Commission (FP7), 2010–14. This 
chapter is based on the work package 
‘Policies and politics to address urban 
inequality: poor people networks, CSO 
networks and campaigns on sub-standard 
settlements in metropolitan areas’. 
Project website: www.chance2sustain.
eu. Various stages of fieldwork and data 
collection were carried out from mid-2010 
to mid-2013. 
3 Getting and building a safe 
home is a cornerstone in the assets-
based approach to poverty reduction 
(Satterthwaite 2008). Homelessness and 
precarious housing are key expressions of 
extreme poverty and multiple deprivation 
in the cities (UN-Habitat 2008). In the 
urban space, there is unequal access to 
the physical, economic and legal assets 
which ensure a safe home (Moser 2008). 
Urban inequality is usually reflected in 
the spatial concentration of certain social 
groups in relatively homogeneous areas 
– socio-spatial segregation (Marques 
2013). 
4 Peri-urban housing has both rural 
and urban characteristics. 
5 Interview, 26 March 2013.
6 The significant reduction in urban 
poverty in Brazil since 1995 is evidenced 
by the biannual national household 
surveys (‘Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra 
de Domicílios’, PNAD) carried out by 
the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística (IBGE) since 1967. The national 
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censuses 1990, 2000 and 2010 support 
this observation (IBGE 2011).
7 However, not all the households 
in the favelas are poor, and there are 
many clusters of poor households located 
outside the favelas. 
8 IBGE, national censuses 2000 
and 2010, www.ibge.gov.br/english/
estatistica/populacao/censo2010/
calendario.shtm, accessed 20 March 
2013.
9 While the name of the city remains 
Durban, the name of the city municipality 
is eThekwini.
10 Law 10.257/2001; it regulates 
Articles 182 and 183 of the Federal 
Constitution, which refer to urban policies.
11 There are 900 favelas in Rio, and 
it is not realistic for the programme to 
reach all of them.
12 A study showed that so far 70 per 
cent of these apartments are located 
in the so-called West Zone, 40–50 
kilometres away from the city centre 
(Cardoso 2013).
13 www.upprj.com/, accessed 21 
October 2014.
14 These houses became known as 
RDP houses as a result of the housing 
programme being based on the national 
Reconstruction and Development 
Programme’s basic needs approach.
15 Slum Dwellers’ International (SDI) 
is a global NGO with its headquarters 
in Cape Town. Together with a national 
NGO, the Community Organization 
Resource Centre (CORC), they act as 
support organizations for two movements 
with their main base in informal 
settlements: ISN and the Federation of 
the Urban Poor (FEDUP, previously the 
Homeless People’s Federation).
16 See also SA SDI Alliance website 
for resources and information: www.
sasdialliance.org.za/map/, accessed 11 
May 2011.
References
Bittar, J. (2011) ‘Morar Carioca. Rio de 
Janeiro’, Paper delivered at Clube 
de Engenharia, Rio de Janeiro, 11 
November.
Braathen, E., with C. M. Sørbøe, T. Bartholl, 
A. C. Christovão and V. Pinheiro (2013) 
‘Rio de Janeiro: favela policies and 
recent social mobilizations’, NIBR 
Working Paper 2013:110. 
Braathen, E., G. Mascarenhas and C. M. 
Sørbøe (2014) ‘“Cities of exception” 
– the role of mega sports events in 
the BRICs countries, with particular 
focus on Brazil before the FIFA 2014 
World Cup’, Tensões Mundiais [World 
tensions], Special issue: ‘Critical 
perspectives on BRICS’, July.
Cardoso, A. C. (ed.) (2013) O Programa 
Minha Casa Minha Vida e seus Efeitos 
Territoriais, Rio de Janeiro: Letra 
Capital.
CEBRAP (2010) ‘Background report: 
Brazil’, Chance2Sustain Project, 
European Association of 
Development Institutes (EADI).
Charlton, S. (2009) ‘Housing for the 
nation, the city and the household: 
competing rationalities as a 
constraint to reform?’, Development 
Southern Africa, 26(2): 301–15.
Charlton, S. and S. Kihato (2006) 
‘Reaching the poor? An analysis of 
the influences on the evolution of 
South Africa’s housing programme’, 
in U. Pillay, R. Tomlinson and I. Du 
Toit (eds), Democracy and Delivery: 
Urban Policy in South Africa, Cape 
Town: HSRC Press.
CoCT (2007) Five-Year Plan for Cape 
Town. Integrated Development Plan 
2007–2012 (2010–2011 Review), City of 
Cape Town.
COHRE (2008) ‘Business as usual? 
Housing rights and “slum 
braathen et  al .  | 165
eradication” in Durban, South Africa’, 
Geneva: Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions.
Department of Housing (2004) ‘Breaking 
new ground: a comprehensive plan 
for the development of sustainable 
human settlements’, Pretoria: 
Department of Housing. 
eThekwini Municipality (2012) ‘Spatial 
Development Framework 2013/2014’, 
Durban: eThekwini Municipality.
Friedmann, S. (2006) ‘Participatory 
governance and citizen action in 
post-apartheid South Africa’, ILO 
Discussion Paper, Geneva: ILO.
Gewbu, B. (2013) Housing Preferences and 
Informal Settlement Upgrading, Lap 
Lambert Academic Publishing GmbH 
KG.
Jordhus-Lier, D. (2013) ‘WP3 settlement 
field report: Cape Town’, 
Chance2Sustain Project, European 
Association of Development 
Institutes (EADI).
Graham, N. (2006) ‘Informal settlement 
upgrading in Cape Town: challenges, 
constraints and contradictions 
within local government’, in M. 
Huchzermeyer and A. Karam (eds), 
Informal Settlements: A perpetual 
challenge, Cape Town: UCT Press, pp. 
231–49.
Huchzermeyer, M. (2006) ‘The new 
instrument for upgrading informal 
settlements in South Africa: 
contributions and constraints’, in M. 
Huchzermeyer and A. Karam (eds), 
Informal Settlements: A perpetual 
challenge, Cape Town: UCT Press, pp. 
41–61.
— (2011) Cities with ‘Slums’: From informal 
settlement eradication to a right to the 
city in Africa, Claremont: University 
of Cape Town Press.
IBGE (2010) ‘Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD) 2010’, 
Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE).
— (2011) Censo Demográfico 2010, Rio 
de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística. 
Jordhus-Lier, D. and B. Aasen (2012) 
‘Policies and practices of informal 
settlement upgrading, the case of 
Cape Town’, Paper presented at 
the NFU Conference, Oslo, 25/26 
November.
KZN Department of Human Settlements 
(2011) ‘Informal Settlement 
Upgrading Strategy for KwaZulu 
Natal’, Prepared by Project 
Preparation Trust for the KZN 
Department of Human Settlements, 
Pietermaritzburg.
Leibrandt, M. et al. (2010) ‘Trends in 
South African income distribution 
and poverty since the fall of 
apartheid’, OECD Social, Employment 
and MigrationWorking Papers no. 101, 
OECD Publishing.
Marques, E. C. L. (2013) Opportunities 
and Deprivation in the Urban South: 
Poverty, Segregation and Social 
Networks in São Paulo, Farnham: 
Ashgate.
Millstein, M. (2008) ‘Challenges to 
substantive democracy in post-
apartheid Cape Town: the politics of 
urban governance transformations 
and community organising in Delft’, 
PhD thesis, Department of Sociology 
and Human Geography, University 
of Oslo. 
Moser, C. (2008) ‘Assets and livelihoods. 
A framework for assets-based social 
policy’, in C. Moser and A. A. Dani 
(eds), Assets, Livelihood and Social 
Policy, Washington, DC: World Bank, 
pp. 43–82.
National Department of Human 
Settlements (2010) ‘National 
Delivery Agreement, Outcome 8’, 
Pretoria.
NPC (2011) National Development Plan. 
Visions for 2030, National Planning 
Commission, South Africa. 
166 | seven
Pithouse, R. (2009) ‘A progressive policy 
without progressive politics: lessons 
from the failure to implement 
Breaking New Ground’, Town and 
Regional Planning, 54: 1–14. 
Rondanger, L. and N. Nene (2013) ‘Shack 
dwellers invade in Durban. Hundreds 
take land and demand housing’, Daily 
News, 14 March.
Roshan, T. et al. (2013) Locating the Right 
to the City in the Global South, Oxon.: 
Routledge. 
Santos Junior, O. (2009) ‘O Fórum 
de Reforma Urbana: incidência e 
exigibilidade pelo direito á cidade’, 
Rio de Janeiro: FASE.
Satterthwaite, D. (2008) ‘Building homes: 
the role of federations of the urban 
poor’, in C. Moser and A. A. Dani 
(eds), Assets, Livelihood and Social 
Policy, Washington, DC: World Bank, 
pp. 171–95.
Smit, W. (2008) ‘Isidima: creating 
dignified communities’, State of the 
Province Report 2008, Provincial 
Government of the Western Cape, 
pp. 73–85.
Sørbøe, C. (2013) ‘Security and inclusive 
citizenship in the mega-city. The 
pacification of Rocinha, Rio de 
Janeiro’, Master’s thesis, University of 
Oslo, May. 
Steiker-Ginzberg, K. (2014) ‘Morar 
Carioca: the dismantling OF A 
dream favela upgrading program’, 
www.rioonwatch.org/?p=1768, 10 
September, accessed 2 October 2014.
Sutherland, C. and B. Buthelezi 
(2012) ‘Addressing sub-standard 
settlements: Durban, South Africa’, 
Chance2Sustain fieldwork report, 
November, Bonn: EADI. 
Sutherland, C., G. Robbins et al. (2010) 
‘South African city and country 
profile: Cape Town’, Unpublished 
Chance2Sustain working document, 
Durban: UKZN.
Sutherland, C., M. Hordijk, B. Lewis, 
C. Meyer and S. Buthelezi (2013) 
‘Water and sanitation discourses in 
eThekwini Municipality: a spatially 
differentiated approach’, Paper 
prepared for Chance2Sustain, Bonn: 
EADI.
Turok, I. and S. Parnell (2009) ‘Reshaping 
cities, rebuilding nations: the role 
of national urban policies’, Urban 
Forum, 20: 157–74. 
UN-Habitat (2008) The State of the 
African Cities Report, Nairobi.
Vainer, C. (2011) ‘Cidade de Exceção: 
reflexões a partir do Rio de Janeiro’, 
XIV Encontro Nacional da Anpur, Rio 
de Janeiro: Anpur.
8  |  A D U L T S  W H O  L I V E  O N  T H E 
S T R E E T S  O F  B U E N O S  A I R E S
Martín Boy
Introduction
Studies of the 1990s in Argentina must take into consideration 
the deepening of an economic model that was implemented from 
1976 and had as one of its main pillars the financial sector (Basualdo 
2006). Throughout the 1990s, the country experienced a profound 
deindustrialization process, an increase in unemployment to above 20 
per cent in 1995 and poverty and indigence reaching 61.3 per cent of 
the population of the partidos of Gran Buenos Aires (the metropolitan 
surroundings of the city of Buenos Aires) in 2003, after the social, 
economic and political crisis of 2001/02. The increase in poverty 
and indigence as well as unemployment and the impoverishment of 
the middle class were consequences of the implementation of a new 
economic model that divided the population into two big groups: those 
who were part of the system and those who were not (García Delgado 
2003). At that moment the urban landscape of the city of Buenos Aires 
began to change and new groups affected by poverty appeared, among 
them the Adults Living on the Street (ALS). The local authorities had 
to offer some answer to this social situation. Because of that, new social 
policies were created to address the ALS population.
This chapter will approach the issue of homelessness as an urban 
problem involving the state and the real estate market as main actors. 
This perspective diverges from those who emphasize certain personal 
attributes of the ALS population and accuse them of being responsible 
for their current situation. First, I will outline the recent urban 
transformations of the city of Buenos Aires responsible for changing 
the urban landscape, and the appearance of new groups like the ALS 
affected by poverty and social exclusion in central areas. Secondly, the 
political implications of these urban transformations will be presented 
in terms of the design and implementation of new social policies aimed 
at the ALS. Lastly, I will identify the main characteristics of the adults 
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living on the street and how they developed different strategies to utilize 
public spaces for survival.
Recent urban transformations of the city of Buenos Aires
Deindustrialization, a rise in unemployment and the impoverishment 
of the middle class led to strong urban transformations. From 1976, 
a new city project was driven by the policy-makers, and it was 
characterized by expelling the poor people from the central areas to 
the surrounding ones, without offering solutions to the housing deficit. 
This process was followed by a strong socio-spatial polarization of the 
city that showed more clearly the differences between the north and the 
south. Cravino (2006) says that during the 1990s the city experienced 
a process of social fragmentation and urbanization that was oriented 
exclusively to the market, which prioritized the development of the 
central area. Thus, the city was divided into two kinds of places: 
the bright zone (profitable) and the dark zone (unprofitable) (ibid.: 
24). In the bright zone, modern construction projects appeared. In 
the dark zone, we find overcrowded, precarious housing and other 
phenomena characteristic of urban poverty. These differences between 
the zones were accompanied by a residential segregation process that 
affected directly the relationships between persons who live in this 
society. Kaztman (2001) argues that when there is a strong segregation 
between different social groups, a higher tolerance of social inequalities 
appears:
The aversion to inequality lies in the ability that the more 
advantaged groups have to sympathize with those who have less. 
It also generates feelings of moral obligation towards them. These 
thoughts lose validity if they are not renewed frequently across 
informal contacts between persons of different socioeconomic 
levels. The feelings will be stronger if the interaction is more 
intense and frequent. (Ibid.: 185).1
In addition, Kaztman (ibid.) says that the residential segregation 
and the segmentation of access to public services prevent the rich and 
middle classes from feeling sympathy for people who live in poverty. 
This mutual loss of interest reinforces the breakdown of society that 
started with the neoliberal transformations, mainly in the 1990s. Those 
transformations changed two institutions that had cohesive impact on 
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Argentine society: the labour market and public education (Beccaria 
2001; Merklen 2000).
The names of the central area of the city are ‘microcentro’ and 
‘macrocentro’. In this area there are a large number of companies (many 
of them transnational), and five of the six lines of the city’s subway. 
Approximately one million people travel through or into this area on a 
daily basis for work. The microcentro area is near the macrocentro, and 
the rich and upper middle classes live there.
According to the fieldwork I carried out during 2006–11, the rubbish 
produced by companies located in the microcentro and the macrocentro, 
and the large number of people who transit through those places, were 
the two elements that attracted the ‘cartoneros’ (persons who collect 
and sell rubbish to survive) as well as the homeless, who built survival 
strategies based on the public space.
The emergence of mass poverty in central city areas The Government 
of the City of Buenos Aires (from here on referred to as GCBA) has 
updated the statistics relating to people who live on the street quite 
consistently since 1997. Ever since then the number of ALS has 
fluctuated, and there is no single explanation for these fluctuations. 
However, the number of ALS is not dependent on economic growth. 
This means that what happens at the structural level is not necessarily 
reflected in the street, in one of the crudest forms of poverty.
One of the characteristics of the majority of ALS is their lack 
of secondary education. Thus, they are not skilled enough to be 
incorporated by a labour market that constantly needs qualified 
workers. Recent GCBA studies have shown that 66.8 per cent of the 
adults who lived on the street in 2008 had not finished secondary 
school (Subsecretaría de Fortalecimiento Familiar y Comunitario 
2008). In 1999, GCBA discovered that 77.9 per cent of the ALS had 
not completed secondary studies (Calcagno 1999). Comparing these 
two reports, one significant observation can be made: people who are 
sleeping on the street have a higher education level than in the past. 
This situation could suggest that the labour market had become more 
selective. Later we present statistics showing that ALS are evicted 
from the housing market after losing their jobs, which allowed them to 
survive. So how many people live on the streets of Buenos Aires?
GCBA defined as Sin Techo – without shelter – those individuals 
who are older than eighteen and do not have a house or similar. This 
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definition excludes children as well as those adults who are sleeping in 
the paradores and hogares de tránsito, the two forms of shelters provided 
by GCBA and NGOs. Figure 8.1 shows that the number of people 
living on the street was stable at around one thousand people from 
1997 to 2007. Nevertheless, in 2009, the number of homeless people 
had grown strongly, reaching 1,950, 89 per cent more than the year 
before. After 2009, the number decreased again.
If GCBA had included in their estimates the children as well as the 
adults who sleep in the shelters, the number of ALS would be 100 
per cent higher. Furthermore, the city government does not count 
the individuals who live in informal settlements and people who are 
waiting to be evicted by the police and judiciary. Therefore we should 
consider homelessness as the last step in a long housing trajectory for 
people. Does a relationship exist between the number of homeless and 
the way the Argentinian economy works?
In the last twenty-five years, the Argentine economy has experienced 
booms and suffered crises. The last and most severe crisis occurred in 
2001/02. Owing to the recession, GDP declined between 1998 and 
2002. The turning point was the devaluation of 2002; a consequence, 
in part, of the social, political and economic crisis of December 2001. 
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8.1 Number of people living on the streets of Buenos Aires, 1997–2011 (source: 
National Institute of Training (Instituto Nacional de Capacitación, INCA), 
Government of the City of Buenos Aires
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together with Argentinian GDP between 1997 and 2011. It can be 
observed that in the most critical period (2000–02) the number of ALS 
increased. Nevertheless, when the economy recovered there were still 
significant increases, which means the crisis forced people to live on 
the street given that this group could not be part of the labour market 
when the economy improved. 
Simultaneously, one should not forget that the city government 
marginalized the poor population through massive evictions and lack 
of public policies which would guarantee access to housing for this 
group.
The new city project Since the early 1990s, the city of Buenos Aires 
has experienced a process of growing private real estate investment, 
mainly concentrated in the areas where the upper middle class live. 
This situation has extended to less favoured neighbourhoods in the 
last ten years. Consequently, certain urban areas saw a boom in their 
real estate value, fostering the expulsion of the working class that used 
to live there. Between 2008 and 2010, construction firms took action 
with the support of the local government and some judges. While the 
government promoted massive evictions, the judges accelerated them 
through new legal interpretations and rulings. In this way, ‘The State 
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8.2 Evolution of the number of ALS in Buenos Aires and Argentine GDP. Base 
1997 = 100 (source: Buenos Aires Presente (BAP) and the National Institute of 
Statistics and Censuses (INDEC)
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policies and new legal resolutions, thus determining who had the right 
to live in the city’ (Mutuberría Lazarini y Rodriguez 2009: 27).
There are no official statistics on how many people or families were 
affected by evictions, and there is not much information about what 
happened to those people. A group of politicians who work on the 
Comisión de la Vivienda (Housing Committee) of the Legislatura de 
la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (Assembly of the City of Buenos Aires) 
published a report in which they stated that most of the evictions 
were large-scale and violent, and that only a few individuals received 
governmental housing support afterwards.
According to the section for budget and financial coordination 
of the Secretariat of Social Development of the GCBA, the city 
government took part in approximately 392 evictions during 2008, 
which involved 2,958 families. Fifty-five per cent of them occurred 
in different neighbourhoods in central areas close to the south of the 
city: Barracas, San Telmo, Monserrat, La Boca, Constitución, Parque 
Patricios, San Nicolás, Boedo and San Cristóbal. This information 
reveals the existence of a city project that excludes poor people.
In addition, to promote the expulsion of the poor of the city, the 
local state carried out urban reforms that deepened the social divide 
between the north and the south of the city. This took place in a 
context of a neoliberal ideology that supported the increase in poverty 
and indigence. In this regard, different manifestations of poverty 
that appeared in the 1990s in the centre city have changed the urban 
landscape. This generated a new kind of social policy that needed to 
address extreme social exigencies. This point will be developed in the 
next section.
General characteristics of social policies
During the 1990s, a new kind of social policy introduced throughout 
Latin America was characterized by three elements: targeting the 
poor population, decentralization and a strong component of social 
assistance (Vinocur and Halperín 2004). This policy was designed to 
deal with a new social context characterized by vulnerability, instability 
and the displacement of institutions that for many years provided social 
cohesion to Argentine society. The key institutions were the formal 
labour market and public education. For many decades, the latter was 
a main factor behind social mobility. The changes affected mainly the 
poor population (Merklen 2000).
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In that context, poverty was incorporated into the public agenda and 
different social policies were designed to address the poorest groups in 
society. One of the terms used by policy-makers to refer to the groups 
was ‘beneficiaries’ (beneficiarios in Spanish). The beneficiaries did not 
take part in the design and implementation of the public policies; they 
were conceived by policy-makers as sujetos pasivos, passive subjects. The 
urgency of the social problems legitimized the targeting processes and 
caused the incorporation of new poor groups into the political agenda 
as beneficiaries and not as citizens with rights. 
Since 1997 five social policies have been created by the Secretariat 
of Social Development of the GCBA to cater to ALS. The first was the 
Programa Sin Techo (the ‘Without Shelter’ programme). It was followed 
by Buenos Aires Presente in 1999. More recently, in 2006, the secretariat 
created the Línea de Emergencia Social 108 (‘Social Emergency Line 
108’), the Coordinación de Paradores (‘Coordination of Shelters’) and, 
finally, Atención a Familias en Situación de Calle (‘Attention to Homeless 
Families’). Broadly, the city government has been offering shelters that 
provide temporary accommodation, housing subsidies for individuals 
and families that were evicted, and some multi-service vans going to 
places where the ALS need attention.
In 1997, the policy-makers who designed the Programa Sin Techo 
defined the target population according to their housing situation, lack 
of a home, amount of time living on the street, labour situation and age 
(the beneficiaries were only people older than eighteen). The policy-
makers’ diagnosis was influenced by evidence of a rise in severe urban 
poverty. Because of that, the social policies created to cater to the ALS 
characterized this group through material deficiencies. Policy-makers 
stressed the need for the government to engage with this social problem 
(sometimes to find a solution and sometimes to deal with the most 
urgent emergencies). The targeting focus implied that the beneficiaries 
were labelled and grouped with peers. 
This targeting approach contributed to relational impoverishment 
(Kaztman 2001), meaning the ALS were not connected with other 
groups that were better integrated into society. The social policies were 
thought to address a homogeneous group characterized by unsatisfied 
needs and the lack of social safety nets. In my opinion, this perspective 
fostered the loss of the possibility of generating social safety nets that 
could have contributed to a solution to the situation faced by the ALS. 
If the ALS had had the opportunity to socialize with other groups, there 
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would have been more chances for them to be integrated into society. 
The targeting approach of public policies conceives of homelessness as 
an isolated issue and does not consider the relationship between the 
homeless and the community.
Furthermore, the social policies created to cater to the ALS 
population had a decentralized character because all of them applied 
only to the city of Buenos Aires (2.8 million people live there, excluding 
9.9 million who live in the rest of the metropolitan area). Moreover, 
they are not coordinated with national or regional public organizations. 
Thus, the social policies are confined to the immediate locality, executed 
only with the budgets of the GCBA. They are not national policies that 
indicate to local governments what to do to prevent the increase in the 
number of people living on the street or what to do with them.
Finally, the component of social assistance is a common aspect in the 
policies which cater to the homeless. Social services created in 1997 had 
a social assistance perspective that emphasized ‘assistance, prevention 
and re-socialization’ (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 1997), and they 
tried to resolve urgent needs without sustainable solutions.
Social services provide temporary solutions for the needs that the 
ALS experience. Benefits of that social policy are transient. Structural 
problems are not addressed. One of the policy-makers at the Secretariat 
of Social Development who was interviewed argued that it was not its 
objective to solve the housing problem, but it was involved because the 
public Institute of Housing (Instituto de la Vivienda) was not working 
on the issue.
The Institute [of Housing] is not working at its full potential. The 
emergency is always transient. There is a structural problem that 
is not being addressed. It is not an emergency, it is a structural 
problem. The Secretariat should not attend the housing issue; 
it should work with the citizen income [ingreso ciudadano], for 
example. Now, the Secretariat [of Social Development] is working 
on housing policies because the deficit is there.2
The creation of shelters and social policies – as answers to 
unemployment, decreasing incomes and the broken social safety nets – 
did not change the structural problem that had been diagnosed. Social 
services, with the exception of the Atención a Familias en Situación de 
Calle policy, works with people who are already living on the street 
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and they are not preventing this situation. The population has to 
continue to endure the social vulnerability and instability engendered 
by the neoliberal model. Social policies which cater to the ALS act on 
previous political failures.
Resolving homelessness is one of the most difficult challenges to 
social policy and it requires a systematic approach with the participation 
of different institutions. In this regard, solutions should involve 
coordinated actions between the different public organizations that 
work on health, employment, housing and social and psychological 
issues. Otherwise, Grassi (2006) argues, policy-makers lose an integral 
vision of the issue and the state experiences a fragmentation process that 
treats the subjects in parts and not as a whole. The ALS should have 
the opportunity to be treated in a hospital, ask for a housing subsidy 
at the Secretariat of Social Development, job-search and go to shelters 
in the afternoon to get a bed. On the one hand, different ministries 
are not joined up to address homelessness in Buenos Aires. On the 
other, the fragmentation of functions that social policies displayed in 
the past has converted the Secretariat of Social Development into an 
archipelago of institutions that are not able to work together and do not 
relate to each other sufficiently.
But who are the homeless people? What are the main characteristics 
of this population, in the past and nowadays?
The changing profile of the homeless population
Big structural reforms characterized Argentina in the 1990s. Such 
transformations included the privatization of public services, the 
restructuring of the state, and the creation of new laws that militated 
against the rights of the workers. Those transformations were 
accompanied by higher unemployment and an increase in the number 
of families with unsatisfied basic necessities, as well as more people 
living in poverty and extreme poverty (Beccaria 2001). In that context, 
the profile of the homeless changed: who were they before and after 
the 1990s? 
The first reports about people who were sleeping on the street were 
written in the 1920s, when one can find the first contact between this 
group and public authorities. Juan Camilo Croto, a politician from the 
Province of Buenos Aires, proposed that this group should have free 
access to train travel. After that, people who live on the street were 
named crotos. But who were they?
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Back then, those living in public spaces were men who worked in 
rural areas and travelled around the country by train at harvesting 
times, staying in the cities temporarily. This situation started to 
change in the 1970s when technology innovations were incorporated 
into harvesting and fewer workers were needed. Because of that, the 
homeless population changed and became a group that lived in a 
nomadic way and started to alternate between living on the street and 
in precarious housing conditions in the urban areas. One of the policy-
makers interviewed affirmed that 
before the 1990s, the profile of the homeless population was 
characterized as being of golondrina workers [temporary and rural], 
who travelled between provinces to work. After the economic 
crisis, when these kinds of jobs reduced noticeably, given the new 
technology and that fewer workers were needed to carry out labour 
activities, this population started to live permanently in the city … 
and the number of homeless started to increase. Before the 1990s, 
men took some clothes with them and travelled far away.3
In the early 2000s, new groups converted the public space into a 
resource to meet their housing needs. They were the ones affected by 
social exclusion. Biaggio (2006) affirmed that the population that cur-
rently lives on the streets of Buenos Aires is really diverse: you find carton-
eros, unemployed, individuals who cannot afford the rent on their houses 
because they have lost their jobs, children who have escaped from their 
homes or institutions, individuals who were evicted, complete as well as 
incomplete families, mentally ill adults who were discharged but did not 
become integrated into society, etc. Many of them are addicted to alcohol 
and cheaper drugs. However, it is not easy to establish whether those 
addictions are the cause or the consequence of living on the street.
Different quantitative studies as well as my own qualitative fieldwork 
have shown that most of the homeless are Argentine migrants that 
went to Buenos Aires looking for new labour opportunities (Boy 
2012; Calcagno 1999; Subsecretaría de Fortalecimiento Familiar y 
Comunitario 2008). The great majority are men (86 per cent in 2007), 
as in other capitals and countries of Latin America: in Mexico City 81 
per cent of the homeless are men (Instituto de Asistencia e Integración 
Social 2009) and in Chile 85 per cent (Ministerio de Planificación, 
Gobierno de Chile 2005: 85). It is really hard to identify why this 
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trend occurs, but we can mention some elements that could explain it. 
Generally, Latin American states developed social policies especially 
targeted towards poor women with children. These kinds of policy act 
as protection for women, keeping them from living on the street. At the 
same time, gender studies argue that Western men are concerned with 
their pride. This keeps them from asking for help from their families 
or friends who, usually, do not know what their male relative is going 
through (Fuller 2001).
Government statistics showed that, in 2007, 52 per cent of the 
homeless in Buenos Aires were between 36 and 55 years old, 27 per 
cent were young (between 18 and 35 years old) and 21 per cent were 
56 years old or more. This means that most of the homeless are part of 
the economically active population. Once they used to have a house to 
live in, but they lost it. Why?
According to the study carried out by the city’s Subsecretaría de 
Fortalecimiento Familiar y Comunitario (Sub-secretariat of Community 
and Family Strengthening) (2008), 58 per cent of the homeless had a 
house in Buenos Aires city, 21 per cent in the partidos of Gran Buenos 
Aires (the surroundings of the city), 7.7 per cent in the rest of Buenos 
Aires province and just 7 per cent in other provinces. These figures 
show very clearly that 80 per cent of homeless had been excluded from 
the city they were living in, and it is more evidence of the particular 
neoliberal city project which is sustained by public policies. ‘The city’ 
is not for everybody and ‘it’ expels poor people to the countryside.
Many people believe that most of the homeless individuals are 
mentally ill and that this explains why they are sleeping in public spaces. 
In my opinion, we should question this belief and ask what options 
the city gives to the homeless. If we leave aside the psycho-medical 
paradigm we will be able to analyse this group as people who do not 
have rights to the city but, nevertheless, are able to build strategies to 
survive by using the urban infrastructure and social services as resources 
to reproduce the daily order.
Uses of the urban infrastructure of Buenos Aires
Where? One of my research questions is about how ALS use the 
infrastructure of the city. Where do they sleep? Since 1997, GCBA 
has undertaken a count of ALS almost every year to establish who they 
are (gender and age) as well as where they sleep. Official information 
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supports the argument that the ALS do not sleep everywhere in the 
city, that they prefer some areas. The city of Buenos Aires has forty-
seven neighbourhoods (see map in Figure 8.3). The GCBA evidence 
showed that the ALS are mainly found in seven of them. These seven 
neighbourhoods are localized in the central areas of the city, the so-
called ‘microcentro’ and ‘macrocentro’.
As can be seen in the map, the neighbourhoods chosen for sleep 
by the ALS are San Nicolás, Monserrat, Constitución, Balvanera, 
Recoleta, Retiro and San Telmo. As one moves away from the city 










































8.3 ALS by neighbourhood, 2007. 1. Nuñez 2. Saavedra 3. Coghlan 4. Belgrano 
5. Palermo 6. Colegiales 7. Villa Urquiza 8. Villa Pueyrredón 9. Villa Devoto 
10. Villa Del Parque 11. Agronomia 12. Villa Ortuzar 13. Paternal 14. Chacarita 
15. Villa Crespo 16. Recoleta 17. Retiro 18. Puerto Madero 19. San Nicolas 
20. Montserrat 21. San Telmo 22. Constitucion 23. San Cristobal 24. Balvanera 
25. Almagro 26. Boedo 27. Parque Chacabuco 28. Caballito 29. Flores 
30. Villa General Mitre 31. Villa Santa Rita 32. Floresta 33. Velez Sarsfield 
34. Montecastro 35. Villa Real 36. Versalles 37. Liniers 38. Villa Luro 
39. Mataderos 40. Parque Avellaneda 41. Villa Lugano 42. Villa Riachuelo 
43. Villa Soldati 44. Nueva Pompeya 45. Parque Patricios 46. Barracas 
47. La Boca (source: Author, with information from the Ministry of Social 
Development of the GCBA)
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Why? The next research question is: why do the ALS sleep in those 
specific areas? During the investigation, interviews were conducted in 
three different places: a square (Plaza del Congreso), a shelter of the 
GCBA (Parador Bepo Ghezzi) and a comedor popular.4 The fieldwork 
demonstrates that there are two really important aspects involved in the 
choice of sleeping place. First, the area should be rich in commercial 
activity (shops). Secondly, it should offer social services provided by 
the GCBA or by NGOs.
The map in Figure 8.4 shows in grey where the commercial 









































8.4 Location of government and NGO shelters and commercial use of the 
space, Buenos Aires, 2010. 1. Nuñez 2. Saavedra 3. Coghlan 4. Belgrano 
5. Palermo 6. Colegiales 7. Villa Urquiza 8. Villa Pueyrredón 9. Villa Devoto 
10. Villa Del Parque 11. Agronomia 12. Villa Ortuzar 13. Paternal 14. Chacarita 
15. Villa Crespo 16. Recoleta 17. Retiro 18. Puerto Madero 19. San Nicolas 
20. Montserrat 21. San Telmo 22. Constitucion 23. San Cristobal 24. Balvanera 
25. Almagro 26. Boedo 27. Parque Chacabuco 28. Caballito 29. Flores 
30. Villa General Mitre 31. Villa Santa Rita 32. Floresta 33. Velez Sarsfield 
34. Montecastro 35. Villa Real 36. Versalles 37. Liniers 38. Villa Luro 
39. Mataderos 40. Parque Avellaneda 41. Villa Lugano 42. Villa Riachuelo 
43. Villa Soldati 44. Nueva Pompeya 45. Parque Patricios 46. Barracas 
47. La Boca (source: Author, with information from the Ministry of Social 
Development of the GCBA and Urbeos Cities software)
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‘macrocentro’ are the most commercial zones. These comprise mainly 
the neighbourhoods of San Nicolás and parts of Retiro, Recoleta 
and Balvanera. The other important commercial areas are: Belgrano 
(north), Flores (west), Parque Patricios, Constitución and San Telmo 
(south).
The black dots on the map indicate where government and NGOs 
shelters are placed. Most of them are near the city’s ‘microcentro’ and 
‘macrocentro’ areas. The shelters are not inside the city’s commercial 
area but they are located at walking distance from it.
To sum up, the two maps show that the commercial area is the zone 
where ALS sleep at night and where the shelters are close by. This 
indicates the importance of the opportunities that can be generated for 
ALS individuals in a zone with a large number of shops and companies 
and the presence of many people (pedestrians and drivers). There, the 
ALS can earn some money by cleaning car windows, begging, selling 
things on the street, recycling rubbish (‘cirujear’), etc. This means 
that urban infrastructure determines the practices of those who live in 
public spaces. The urban infrastructure is used by the ALS as a vital 
resource for surviving.
Final comments
Throughout this chapter, different research questions were 
answered. First, I explained the rise in the number of adults who live 
on the streets of the city of Buenos Aires while Argentina’s economy 
grew between 8 and 9 per cent per year in the period 2003–11.
What can be observed is that when the economic crisis generated 
a rise in unemployment rates, more people came to live on the street. 
However, when the economy improved, the number of homeless did 
not necessarily decrease. So, what factors explain the changes in how 
many people are living on the street? This research question can be 
answered if we look at the recent history of Buenos Aires city and ask 
ourselves what city project the policy-makers were planning.
After 1976, different governments had the intention of expelling 
poor people from the city through diverse public policies such as, for 
example, the eradication of slums during the last military dictatorship 
(1976–83) and the acceleration of evictions during the current city 
government, in place since 2007. This means that different elements 
should be taken into account when considering an increase or decrease 
in the number of people living on the streets of Buenos Aires city. Crises 
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can disrupt urban poor people’s lives because of unemployment, but 
they are temporary and can be buffered through the implementation 
of public policies. However, in parallel to the various periods of crisis, 
the city project to expel poor people was the same during the period 
1976–2013. As mentioned earlier, the current local government, in 
alignment with part of the judiciary, decided to clear illegally occupied 
property before obtaining an eviction order. This means that there is 
an intention to accelerate the evictions to the detriment of occupants’ 
rights, without offering new housing solutions. The GCBA produced 
some statistical reports which showed that 6 per cent of the adults who 
live on the street were evicted from the last house they lived in. That 
means that the GCBA was generating new homeless.
Different social policies were formulated to cater to this group. 
But what characteristics do the policies have? As mentioned earlier, 
these kinds of social policy intensified social segmentation because 
they did not try to put different socio-economic groups in contact. 
The targeting focus implied that the beneficiaries were labelled and 
grouped with peers, with no idea of integrating the ALS people with 
other social groups. In my opinion, this perspective fostered the loss of 
the possibility to generate social safety nets that could have contributed 
to a solution to the situation faced by the ALS. As I mentioned earlier, 
the targeting approach contributed to relational impoverishment and it 
did not promote public spaces of socialization between different groups 
(Kaztman 2001). About forty years ago, the city of Buenos Aires was 
distinguished by having several spaces of this type: public health and 
education systems, as well as neighbourhoods in which people from 
middle and working classes lived together integrated with the rest of 
the city. The social safety nets that are created in the shelters do not 
encourage homeless people to leave the street. So one of the questions 
that arises is: what social policies could have dealt with homelessness 
in a more adequate way?
We should base policy on the understanding that the homeless 
are not guilty of causing the situation they are experiencing. Usually, 
people believe that those living on the street have mental problems, 
or that addictions make them lose their families or friends. In this 
chapter, I have proposed another approach to people who are living in 
the public space. During my fieldwork, I found that many of the life 
stories were influenced by Argentina’s social, historical and economic 
context. Usually, the homeless were not mentally ill or drug addicts; 
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they were individuals who could not pay their housing rents because 
they had lost their jobs. Moreover, they did not have access to the 
secondary education system and thus they were not qualified enough 
to get a job. Finally, men did not know how to ask for the help of 
their families, who might live in other provinces, far away from Buenos 
Aires. This means that the starting point should be not to pathologize 
people who are living on the street. Homelessness is not a problem only 
for those who experience it. It is a matter for the city, and for all people 




2 Interview conducted in Buenos 
Aires, May 2011.
3 This interviewee participated in 
the first social policy created to cater to 
homeless people, designed in 1997: the 
Sin Techo social policy.
4 A comedor popular is a place where 
poor people go to have dinner or lunch. 
Usually, the comedores populares are 
organized by NGOs.
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Introduction
In many parts of the world, rural social movement struggles are 
placing rural development on the national political agenda. The 
resurgence of rural social movement activity has been led by, among 
others, the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST), Mexico’s Zapatistas, 
the Indian Farmers’ Movement, and CONAIE of Ecuador (Desmarais 
2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005). In this chapter, I critically appraise 
the land and rural development mobilizations of the MST, which 
is widely acknowledged as one of the most organized, dynamic and 
influential rural movements in Latin America (Comparato 2003; 
Borras et al. 2008). 
In recent decades, the MST has utilized its strategy of occupy-
ing unproductive land to pressure successive Brazilian governments 
into redistributing 7 million hectares of agricultural land on which 
one and a half million members farm (Comparato 2003; Rossetto 
2005). Furthermore, studies have found that these mobilizations 
enhanced the livelihoods of land reform settlers, with many experi-
encing improvements in life expectancies, incomes and educational 
standards (Medeiros and Leite 2004; Carter and Carvalho 2010). 
How did the MST succeed in pressuring the government to deliver so 
much land? And what explains improvements in member livelihoods? 
Many analysts focus their research either on MST struggles for land 
or their struggles to build livelihoods on the land reform settlements. 
I argue that to better comprehend access to land and improvements 
in livelihoods, we need to analyse struggles for land and on the land 
as interconnected. I further posit that the MST’s grassroots poli-
tics encourages an organizational praxis (i.e. the merging of theory 
and practice) that sees the fight for land and livelihoods on land as 
interrelated. 
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Investigating the role played by politics and public policy in social 
development policies and their impact on well-being in MICs, on the 
one hand, and interrogating the role of public policies in promoting 
income and asset redistribution, on the other, are clearly burning issues 
in the field of contemporary development studies. In many countries, 
however, public policy already exists, but there has often been a lack of 
political will to implement these policies. As Green and Hulme (2005: 
876) aptly note, ‘[Inequality and] poverty reduction does not simply 
require “good” policy: it requires creating the capacity of poorer people 
to influence, and hold accountable, those who make policies.’ In other 
words, while state policies or ‘politics from above’ in Brazil can promote 
development in rural areas, social movement ‘politics from below’ can 
pressure the state to implement policies (e.g. redistribute land and 
reduce poverty and inequality) when it lacks the political will do to so. 
In this regard, the central task of social movements is to serve as spaces 
of political socialization and thereby help members, especially the 
poorest, to develop a critical consciousness of the environment in which 
they live, and thereby gain an understanding of the structural causes 
of their poverty and act collectively to challenge their marginalization 
(Freire 1993; Bebbington 2007; Karriem 2009). 
The MST has an expansive vision of politics; it views struggles for 
land as part of a larger project of social transformation, as MST leader 
João Paulo Stédile states: ‘Our strategic objective is to contribute 
to the reorganization of the Brazilian economy and society [so] that 
all Brazilians have work, education, housing, health, leisure, and 
cultural activities’ (cited by Pinassi 2000: 55). Whether the MST will 
achieve this broad transformation is an open question, but I argue 
that through its politics the MST promotes self-organization, political 
socialization and the forging of ‘global ambition’. In so doing, it has 
empowered members to exercise their political agency to challenge the 
power of rural elites, occupy land, and mobilize for agricultural credit 
and infrastructure support, thereby illustrating the efficacy of land 
occupations in facilitating the redistribution of assets, reducing poverty 
and improving social well-being in rural Brazil.
I commence the chapter by delineating the theoretical considerations 
underpinning it, specifically highlighting how politics can inform 
mobilizations geared towards improving the lives of the poor. In the 
following section, I provide a brief historical overview of the struggle 
for land in Brazil and, in doing so, I illustrate that contemporary 
186 | n ine
levels of land inequality and rural poverty are deeply imbricated in 
agricultural policies that have historically favoured agrarian elites. The 
next section analyses the origins of the MST and the strategies that 
drive the movement’s struggle for land. Drawing on the concept of 
territorialization, I show how the land occupation has transformed the 
MST from a small regional into a nationally based social movement, 
and illustrate the difficulties encountered under the Workers’ Party-
led Lula and Dilma administrations. In the penultimate section, I 
appraise movement mobilizations to build livelihoods on the land 
reform settlements and illustrate how this has contributed to improving 
rural livelihoods. I conclude by summarizing the key arguments of this 
chapter.
Politics, power and grassroots mobilization for development
Politics play an important role in determining development 
success and failure. Indeed, as Adrian Leftwich argues, ‘the study 
and explicit promotion of development … needs to be understood 
essentially and explicitly as a political process’ (cited by Hickey 2008: 
249). Notwithstanding the embeddedness of politics in development 
processes, contemporary neoliberal policy frameworks which seek 
to address poverty and inequality are increasingly framed within a 
technocratic discourse that ‘“cleanse[s]” development studies of 
considerations of power, class and politics’ (Padayachee 2006: 17). 
For example, the popularity of ‘social capital’, ‘participation’ and 
‘good governance’, which entered the lexicon of development during 
the 1990s, has served to underpin this technocratic turn in addressing 
poverty. 
Fukuyama (2002: 27) defines social capital as the ‘shared norms 
or values that promote social cooperation, instantiated in actual 
social relationships’, and argues that the presence of social capital is 
a prerequisite for successful development. In line with this reasoning, 
Narayan, in her study in Tanzania, concludes that ‘households living 
in villages with higher social capital have higher incomes’ (cited by 
Cleaver 2005: 893). However, Cleaver’s (ibid.) research on social 
capital in four villages in Tanzania’s Usangu district found that the 
enormous energy and time expended by the chronically poor in 
sustaining family and social networks and in engaging with institutions 
generated meagre benefits. These findings strongly caution against 
viewing social capital as a magic wand in addressing poverty. Building 
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social capital and enhancing the capacity of the poor to participate are 
clearly important, but in their technocratic form they gloss over the 
deep structural constraints and political marginalization that the poor 
face. This depoliticized approach to development – which Ferguson 
(1990) calls the ‘anti-politics machine’ – blunts a critical appraisal of 
the structural causes and dominant power relations that sustain poverty 
and inequality at local, regional, national and global scales. 
In contrast to technocratic approaches to development, social 
movements offer a more politicized approach that can empower the 
poor to challenge patron–client relationships, take their demands to 
state institutions, influence policy formulation and implementation, and 
hold political elites accountable (Hickey and Bracking 2005). In their 
mobilizations, social movements contest the policy and institutional 
arrangements that keep poor people in poverty, thereby challenging 
hegemonic ideas and the assumptions of the development project. 
Furthermore, in ‘politicizing discussions of development and society’ 
(Bebbington 2007: 813), movements bring to the debate terms such as 
redistributive land reform, equity and exploitation, thus allowing the 
poor to name the cause/s of their social marginalization and mobilize 
to change them. 
A political economy approach is useful in understanding how power 
is maintained and how grassroots movements can contest it. To this end, 
the realms of political education and consciousness-raising emerge as 
crucial sites of contestation to support alternative conceptions of power 
and development. However, the ability to act collectively presupposes 
a certain level of political consciousness and active participation to 
overcome structural positions of powerlessness. Consciousness-raising 
can thus play an important role in enabling members of a group to 
challenge hegemonic ideas of development and become protagonists 
of their own history, or, as Gramsci (1971: 377) put it, ideas can 
become the foundation from ‘which men [and women] move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle’. Marginalized groups do not 
immediately develop a consciousness of broad social change; rather, 
they usually start with a specific grievance or demand (e.g. for land) 
and only later incorporate broader demands. In this regard, Gaventa 
(1982: 25) writes that: 
[T]he development of consciousness of an issue re-enforces 
the likelihood of attempted action upon it, in turn re-enforcing 
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consciousness. A single victory helps to alter inaction owing to the 
anticipation of defeat, leading to more action, and so on. Once 
patterns of quiescence are broken upon one set of grievances, 
the accumulating resources of challenge – e.g. organization, 
momentum, consciousness – may become transferable to other 
issues and other targets.
Empowering members of a group to believe that they have the 
ability or power to act against social exclusion is especially important in 
contexts of highly unequal power relationships such as in rural Brazil. 
A political economy approach with its multifaceted understanding of 
power provides a useful framework through which to comprehend how 
social movements can challenge poverty and inequality. 
Historical background to the struggle for land in Brazil
Brazil has one of the world’s most unequal landholding structures, 
which can be traced to the Portuguese Crown’s policy of extending 
sesmarias or large land grants to officials who provided military or 
political service, and those who produced crops for export. The sesmaria 
laws stipulated that land which was not utilized within five years would 
revert to the Crown. In practice, however, the law was not enforced, 
resulting in large-scale concentration and underutilization of land (Hall 
1990). The promulgation of the Land Law in 1850 essentially reflected 
the labour needs of the agrarian elites in that ‘[t]he only way to obtain 
free labour under these circumstances would be to create obstacles to 
landownership, so that the free worker, unable to get land, would be 
forced to work for others’ (Da Costa 2000: 82). The 1850 law, in 
upholding the power of agrarian elites and denying land access to the 
landless, would be the source of increasing conflicts over access to land 
that have persisted to this day.
Brazil, unlike other countries in Latin America, has never successfully 
undertaken an agrarian reform programme. The first president who 
attempted a limited agrarian reform programme, João Goulart, was 
deposed in a military coup in 1964 that was strongly supported by 
rural oligarchs. To defuse rural discontent, the military regime enacted 
– theoretically at least – the most radical agrarian reform legislation, 
the Land Statute of 1964. Legally, the statute had far-reaching 
consequences in that it made provision for the expropriation of land 
in the ‘social interest’ (Hall 1990). In practice, however, limited 
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redistribution took place under the Land Statute. Colonization projects 
on the Amazon frontier, rather than agrarian reform, were to be the 
main instrument for redistributing land. In practice, the Land Statute 
was geared towards modernizing agriculture through mechanization 
and the use of ‘modern’ agricultural technologies. 
Brazil’s agricultural revolution had significant social costs. In a scene 
reminiscent of the great enclosure movement in nineteenth-century 
England, almost thirty million small farmers, tenants and sharecroppers 
were forced off the land between 1960 and 1980 as vast tracts of public 
land were brought under private control, further concentrating land 
in fewer hands (Perz 2000: 866). Many of the uprooted streamed 
into the cities, while others stayed as undercapitalized small farmers 
and landless workers. Still others migrated to recreate their life on 
government colonization projects in the Amazon. These migrants 
confronted numerous difficulties since Amazonian soils were unsuited 
to agriculture, institutional support was limited or lacking, and exposure 
to tropical diseases took a heavy social toll. Although the colonization 
projects were presented as promoting land reform, in reality they created 
a pool of cheap labour for mining, cattle ranching and logging projects 
on the Amazon frontier. Colonization was clearly a poor substitute for 
a thoroughgoing land and agrarian reform programme. 
These historical factors led to an increasingly concentrated 
landholding structure and growing landlessness. The Brazilian 
countryside has thus been a site of enormous wealth and asset 
accumulation, but also an arena of extreme land and income inequality, 
and oppressive rural social relations. One per cent of landowners with 
farms exceeding 1,000 hectares own 45 per cent of all farmland (Petras 
and Veltmeyer 2003; Carter and Carvalho 2010). Almost 50 per cent 
of Brazil’s poor reside in rural areas and the incidence of poverty 
among the rural population is more than double that of urban areas. 
Poverty is pervasive in the north-east and northern regions; however, 
even in the more prosperous south, poverty is concentrated in rural 
areas (World Bank 1999). While there has been a reduction in extreme 
poverty due to the Bolsa Familia cash transfer grants since the mid-
2000s, poverty and income inequality are still high according to the 
2010 Brazilian census (Leahy 2011). Land inequality, however, has 
remained stubbornly high. This brief historical sketch makes clear 
that Brazil’s contemporary levels of land and income inequality and 
poverty have been shaped by public policies that have generated what 
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David Harvey (2003) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’. These 
processes of dispossession and social exclusion may generate a political 
response because ‘[m]ovements might emerge in response to increasing 
levels of inequality, abuse and coercion that derive from shifts in the 
structure of social relationships and capital accumulation. In turn, the 
presence and action of movements might serve to rework these shifts’ 
(Bebbington 2007: 799). To build livelihoods in the countryside, the 
landless decided to organize themselves into a movement, as the next 
section will illustrate.
The origin of the MST and the territorialization of struggles for land
The MST’s genesis can be traced to the agricultural modernization 
policies that forced millions of peasants into the cities. Some of the 
peasants who resisted the move to the cities successfully occupied the 
Macali and Brilhante farms in the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande 
do Sul in the late 1970s. The success at Macali and Brilhante – the 
first under the military dictatorship – provided the impetus for further 
land occupations in the states of Parana, Santa Catarina, São Paulo 
and Mato Grosso do Sul (Marcon 1997; Morrisawa 2001; Branford 
and Rocha 2002). However, prominent members of the Pastoral 
Land Commission (CPT) of the Catholic Church were concerned 
at the isolated and fragmented nature of these localized struggles for 
land and feared that these incipient movements would be crushed by 
the dictatorship. In this regard, Harvey (1996: 324) has written that 
while localized ‘militant particularisms’ can acquire ‘global ambition’, 
they can also more easily be ‘dominated by the power of capital to 
coordinate accumulation across universal but fragmented space’. In 
the early 1980s, the CPT sponsored a series of meetings to unite these 
localized movements or militant particularisms. MST founder member 
João Stédile recalls CPT adviser Jose de Souza Martins’ advice that 
a ‘[social movement’s] struggle for land in Brazil will only have a 
future if it transforms itself into an important political agent to change 
society, if it manages to acquire a national character, and if it manages 
to organize [peasants in the north-east]’ (Stédile and Fernandes 2001: 
21, emphasis added). 
The CPT endeavour saw a number of localized movements merge 
to establish the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST) in January 1984. 
The MST consciously worked on building a movement with a national 
presence, maintained its autonomy from political parties, developed 
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its own leadership, and promoted political education (Morrisawa 
2001). With the consolidation of the MST in southern Brazil, the 
movement was faced with what Harvey (1996) calls the dilemma of 
either organizing in or dominating place at the local-regional scale or 
commanding space at the broader national scale. The MST decided to 
territorialize the struggle for land throughout Brazil. 
Territorializing the struggle for land nationally Fernandes (1996, 2001) 
uses the concept ‘territorialization’ to explain the growth of the MST 
into a national movement. Put simply, territorialization means that a 
successful land occupation leads to the establishment of a land reform 
settlement which provides the springboard for further land occupations 
and hence territorialization of the movement. Territorialization, 
however, not only results in the spatial conquest of territory, it also 
leads to the diffusion of global ambition, as illustrated by João Calixto: 
‘[W]e are the settled families from group I; you know that a great 
struggle [for land] began here in the region of Sumaré. Group I was 
one of the first to be settled, [then] came group II, [then] came group 
III … then we began to form group IV’ (cited by Fernandes 1996: 135, 
emphasis added). Calixto describes the organizational strategy that 
drives the territorialization of the movement: upon conquering land 
reform settlement Sumaré I, Calixto and his comrades recruited other 
landless families to undertake another occupation, which led to the 
conquest of Sumaré II. This territorialization process was repeated and 
eventually led to the establishment of settlements Sumaré III and IV, a 
strategy that has been territorialized across Brazil (ibid.). 
Territorialization does not automatically lead to the establishment 
of a land reform settlement; instead, after occupying an unproductive 
farm, MST members are usually violently evicted by the police through 
a court order obtained by the landlord. At this stage the government’s 
land reform agency, INCRA, intervenes to resolve the conflict: 
sometimes INCRA expropriates the occupied property or settles the 
occupiers on land acquired in another part of the municipality or state 
(Meszaros 2000); however, in most cases INCRA simply mediates the 
land conflict without settling the families. Instead of dispersing, the 
landless set up a land encampment and engage in mass mobilizations 
until they are settled.
The successful occupations at Sumaré demonstrate how the organi-
zational praxis drives the territorialization of the MST. However, 
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territorialization does not operate in a linear fashion; rather, as MST 
member Miguel notes, the quest for land is a deeply contested process:
[T]he development and … rooting of capitalism in the countryside 
continuously creates more difficulties for the poor … [So] we are 
in this constant political dispute, fighting to redistribute land, to 
de-concentrate land and, on the other hand, the mechanisms of 
the [capitalist] model concentrating land. (Interview 23, 7 June 
2004)
The land occupation, in tackling the structural causes of landlessness 
(e.g. land inequality), thus brings to light the class contradictions in the 
struggle for land and rural development under capitalism. 
The MST draws legitimacy for its occupations from Article 184 of 
the Brazilian Constitution, which states that ‘[i]t is incumbent upon 
the Republic to expropriate land for the social interest, for purposes 
of agrarian reform, rural property, which is not performing its social 
function’. While the Constitution sanctions the expropriation of 
unproductive land, successive governments have applied the clause 
only after grassroots pressure. The land occupation not only forces the 
legal system into action, it also stimulates a debate between the state 
and society on Brazil’s extreme land inequality and the necessity for 
expropriating land that does not meet its social function. 
Politics or political conscientization is the central medium through 
which the MST has sought to challenge the marginalization and social 
exclusion of the landless. The MST does not see the landless as victims 
who need charity, but as actors who could, through organization and 
struggle, become protagonists of their own liberation. To ensure 
the political socialization of its members, the MST employed Paulo 
Freire’s (1993) Pedagogy of the Oppressed to create the conditions for its 
members to study, debate and actively reflect on their social reality and 
organize to change their state of social marginalization and landlessness. 
Freire (ibid.) argued that in a context of unequal power relationships, 
the poor often get trapped in a ‘culture of silence’ which prevents the 
development of a critical consciousness that is needed to challenge 
a state of powerlessness (Gaventa 1982; Gramsci 1971). The MST 
promotes a consciousness of global ambition which enables members 
to see the fight for land not in particularistic terms, but as part of a 
larger political project of social change, as João points out:
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I entered into the MST out of necessity [for land] [but] the 
movement taught us to have a larger vision, to have a vision that 
it is not enough to struggle for … a piece of land for yourself. … 
I have to have a vision that behind me there are another twenty, 
thirty, forty, fifty that also need land. … The movement gives you 
conditions to understand the whole of society, the way in which 
it is structured, and who it is that orders in the country today. 
(Interview 58, 24 October 2004)
João and his comrades had participated in various occupations 
in Rio Grande do Sul before being settled in 1989. From this base 
they recruited other landless families and embarked on more land 
occupations, and, in a process of territorialization that was successfully 
repeated, they had pressured the government to establish fifty-six land 
reform settlements by 2004. João captures how the MST’s organizational 
praxis promotes political socialization, values of solidarity, territorial 
expansion, and active participation in the movement. Prior to the land 
occupation, João and his colleagues underwent a lengthy period of 
political education to orient them on the politics of land reform and 
the principles of the MST, and forge organizational cohesion, all key 
ingredients in ensuring group solidarity and cooperation during and 
after the occupation.
Like Calixto and João, other members were similarly empowered 
to exercise their agency and claim land. For example, in the early 
1990s, MST members entered the Pontal de Paranapanema region in 
the state of São Paulo, where they discovered that wealthy landowners 
had illegally occupied a million hectares of government land. The 
MST launched numerous occupations to pressure the government to 
expropriate and redistribute this land, but the occupations generated 
a violent backlash by landowners. In this volatile situation, the state 
and federal government – under pressure to act by the Church 
and human rights groups – were forced to intervene, leading to the 
settlement of 6,000 families by the end of 1994 (Branford and Rocha 
2002: 59; Fernandes 1996). These successes simply served to swell the 
ranks of the MST and a year later 22,000 families occupied a further 
fifty-nine farms in the Pontal region (Hammond 1999: 477). As the 
movement territorialized in the mid-1990s, land occupations increased 
substantially, forcing the Cardoso administration to settle 400,000 
families throughout Brazil between 1995 and 1998 (Comparato 
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2003). From its modest origins in the south, the MST opened new 
fronts of struggle in the north-east, the north and centre-west regions, 
and gradually gained a presence in all five geographic regions of Brazil 
(Karriem 2009). 
Agrarian reform under the Lula and Dilma administrations While 
the MST made importance advances under President Cardoso’s 
administration it expected more support for its agrarian reform agenda 
from the Workers’ Party candidate, Lula, who assumed the presidency 
in 2003. Lula was elected into office on a strong platform of popular 
support to undo a decade of neoliberal rule. Upon coming to power, 
however, Lula’s government continued and deepened Cardoso’s 
neoliberal agenda by voluntarily increasing the primary budget surplus 
target of 3.75 per cent of GDP initially agreed with the IMF to 4.25 per 
cent to appease the markets.2 To meet the self-imposed target of 4.25 
per cent, the Finance Ministry drastically curbed public spending, and 
actively promoted the expansion of agribusiness to generate foreign 
exchange. Lula took to heart former president Cardoso’s advice that 
Brazil had to ‘export or die’ and, in so doing, gave continuity to an 
exclusionary agro-export model. 
Instead of promoting popular mobilizations in support of a 
transformative agenda, Lula and the Workers’ Party (PT) called on 
popular movements to be patient, arguing that the Brazilian state could 
not be transformed overnight and that the conservative economic policy 
was temporary. The PT and the Lula government in effect demobilized 
popular forces while simultaneously reinforcing the ‘liberal ideology of 
private property and the business class as the principal protagonists 
of society’ (Almeida 2005). The speed with which the PT – the 
hegemonic force on the Brazilian left for almost two decades – moved 
to the political centre caught most movements by surprise. After a 
period of perplexity, the MST was among the first movements to assert 
its autonomy and challenge the Lula administration’s conservative 
turn and support for agribusiness. In late 2003, the MST and other 
movements marched on Brasilia to demand the launch of the National 
Plan for Agrarian Reform (PNRA). The government eventually agreed 
to settle 400,000 families (instead of the PNRA target of 1 million) 
by the end of 2006 (Stédile 2007). In 2004, when the agrarian 
reform budget was cut, the MST embarked on a month-long national 
campaign of occupying government buildings and 127 unproductive 
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farms throughout Brazil (the highest number ever for a single month), 
and carrying out roadblocks. 
In May 2005, the MST initiated a campaign to challenge 
the government’s neoliberal policies, which undermined social 
investments. To this end, the MST mobilized a broad rural–urban 
coalition comprising 12,000 activists and carried out a seventeen-day, 
230-kilometre march from the city of Goiania to the federal capital, 
Brasilia. The national march document – ‘Proposals of the MST, the 
Via Campesina, and the social movements to the Lula government’ 
– strongly critiqued the government’s economic policy and demanded 
that the primary budget surplus be invested in education, healthcare, 
agrarian reform, housing and sanitation to meet the needs of the 
Brazilian people, rather than paying bankers.3 While the march was 
important in uniting popular movements and politically disputing the 
neoliberal shift, the Lula government continued to privilege agribusiness 
and the neoliberal model. 
The Lula government did not meet the PNRA target of settling 
400,000 families by 2006; instead, 401,827 families were settled over 
his two terms of office (2003–10) compared to the Cardoso govern-
ment’s 460,269 families between 1994 and 2002 (Lima 2013). The 
MST and other rural movements argue that the Lula government’s set-
tlement figures are inflated as they include land squatter families who 
have been living on the land for years. The MST was even more disap-
pointed when the Workers’ Party’s Dilma Rousseff, who succeeded 
Lula as president in 2011, took an even more overtly pro-agribusiness 
stance. The MST made few gains under her presidency: between 
2011 and 2012, the Dilma administration settled only 44,000 families 
(Farrah 2013; Scarso 2012). The MST clearly faces an extremely dif-
ficult political conjuncture as Dilma’s policies have strengthened agri-
business which, in turn, has made her more dependent in Congress on 
the votes of the agribusiness bloc, or bancada ruralista, which resolutely 
opposes the MST’s agrarian reform objectives. MST leader João Paulo 
Rodrigues acknowledges that the movement faces a politically adverse 
conjuncture, stating that while the Lula and Dilma governments (com-
pared to previous administrations) have not criminalized the move-
ment, they are not committed to promoting agrarian reform:
Agrarian reform depends on two things: the organization of the 
people, and a progressive government willing to work with us. In 
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25 years of hard work, we have made much progress in organizing, 
but we have not encountered a people’s government truly 
committed to agrarian reform. (Cited by Tilly et al. 2009)
What this suggests is that while the MST and its members can make 
their history, they do not always make it as they please. While the MST 
has made few gains in terms of land redistribution, it has pressured 
the Lula and Dilma administrations to implement public policies 
supporting family agriculture, as will be pointed out in the next section, 
where I will also appraise MST efforts to unite struggles for land with 
those on the land reform settlements.
From struggles for land to building livelihoods on the land
Conquering land is but the first step in building livelihoods. Land 
reform beneficiaries are usually settled on land that has little to no 
infrastructure, and government provision of start-up support takes 
months to materialize, as land reform settler Francisco dos Santos 
from the state of Pernambuco notes: ‘When I arrived here there was 
nothing. I had to clear the land by myself, and at the beginning we were 
starving’ (Glass 2013).4 Indeed, a national study conducted between 
1995 and 2001 found that living conditions on land reform settlements 
were precarious: more than 50 per cent of settlements lacked access to 
potable water, 55 per cent lacked electricity, roads on the settlements 
were in a poor state, and there were significant delays in receiving credit, 
adversely affecting the building of livelihoods on the land (Carter and 
Carvalho 2010: 295–6). 
MST settlers realized that resources take a long time to materialize, so 
they drew on their land occupation experience to pressure government 
to provide the resources to make a living on the land. One of my 
interviewees, Ivanildo, explains how the MST empowers members to 
see struggles for and on the land as interconnected:
Look, we actually had several mobilizations … [to] fight for the 
right, you know, that everyone has … [S]o summarizing what is 
written in the Constitution, ‘everyone has the right to land’ … 
but it is not only for land that we carry out the struggle. We also 
need credit, housing, infrastructure in order to work, agricultural 
credit to plant. If you do not fight for this, you will not succeed. 
(Interview 22, 6 August 2004)
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Ivanildo exemplifies how the movement empowers members to 
mobilize for land and ensure social reproduction on the land. While 
the first year of settlement is the most difficult, families who have been 
settled for years also confront significant challenges. For example, in the 
state of Paraná members of the Jardim Alegre land reform settlement 
met with municipal officials for assistance in storing their maize stocks. 
When negotiations produced no results, 1,000 Jardim Alegre members 
occupied the municipal building to demand repairs to impassable 
roads which lead to grain silos to store their maize. After two days 
of occupation, the mayor agreed to repair the roads and approached 
the Ministry of Agrarian Development for emergency assistance in 
storing the harvested maize. Similarly, in the state of Bahia, 700 MST 
members occupied the Mucuri municipal building and demanded the 
construction of a health clinic, the contracting of teachers for schools, 
and the expropriation of land (Folha de São Paulo, 28 February 2007). 
MST members do not always succeed in realizing their demands, but 
they are convinced that without mobilizing, state institutions will not 
meet or will take a long time to meet what they consider to be legitimate 
demands. José Gregorio, former Secretary of State for Human Rights, 
acknowledged the efficacy of the MST’s grassroots pressure:
On a scale of one to ten, without the MST, the government would 
work for agrarian reform at a level of 3.5. But with the MST, the 
government is working at a level of eight. The intensification of 
government actions and efforts are, without a doubt, a response to 
pressure from the MST. (Interviewed by Cadji 2000: 32)
MST mobilizations have improved livelihood opportunities for tens 
of thousands of rural families. A Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) study on land reform settlements in the early 1990s found 
improvements in residents’ educational standards, life expectancies and 
incomes (Romeiro et al. 1994). A recent study covering all five regions of 
Brazil corroborated the FAO findings and found that, despite enormous 
difficulties in accessing agricultural credit and other public resources, 
there had been improvements in the living conditions of land reform 
settlers (Leite 2004; Heredia et al. 2006). While incomes increased, 
they varied greatly by region: in the state of Ceara in the north-east, 
for example, the average monthly income was R$117 (US$60),5 while 
in Santa Catarina, in the south, it was R$439 (US$220). 
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These incomes are low, but if social well-being is measured solely 
by income, then André, one of my interviewees, would be classified 
as a ‘failed’ farmer in mainstream development terms. However, 
once we gain deeper insights into the before-and-after life histories 
of land reform beneficiaries, we find new or contested meanings of 
development. Before joining the MST, André worked as a sharecropper 
and had to give over 50 per cent of his production to the landlord, 
which left little for his wife and seven children, who often had very 
little to eat. By exercising his political agency he now has a brick house, 
chickens and cows which provide milk for his children. He produces 
most of his food, his children attend the local school, and he continues 
to participate in MST activities. André still faces many problems, such 
as getting access to agricultural credit, but the life of his family has 
improved immeasurably since his days as a sharecropper (Interview 
13, 30 May 2004). Social well-being clearly means more than simply 
income. 
In spite of the low incomes, 82 per cent of interviewees in the north-
east (the poorest region in Brazil) said that their diet had improved in 
both quantity and quality relative to their prior landless status or as 
labourers on the sugar cane and cotton plantations. They now pro-
duced staple foods such as beans, maize and cassava, reared chick-
ens and cattle, and sold excess produce in local markets. Moreover, 
their purchase of agricultural inputs and consumer goods stimulated 
economic activity in many rural economies, especially where there 
was an agglomeration of settlements (Carter and Carvalho 2010). 
Access to land has therefore had a positive role in promoting local 
economic development and improving the livelihoods of extremely 
poor families. 
While land inequality is still stubbornly high in Brazil, there have 
been significant reductions in inequality in some regions, where there 
have been concerted land occupations of the type highlighted by Calixto 
and João above. Bergamasco and Norder (2010: 340), drawing on 
agricultural census data, found that in the Mirante do Paranapanema, 
Sumaré and Promissão municipalities in São Paulo state there had 
been a decline in land inequality (see Table 9.1). For example, owing 
to the redistribution of land in the municipality of Promissão between 
1985 and 1995, the number of agricultural holdings doubled and the 
median size of the plots decreased significantly, leading to a reduction 
in the Gini coefficient for land from 0.769 to 0.685. 
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While MST land occupations have had some success in reducing 
land inequality, they have also set in motion a change in rural power 
relations since the landowner is forced to negotiate with the landless. 
In the settlement phase, movement leaders in turn negotiate with the 
federal and local governments, thus bypassing local agrarian elites, 
which have traditionally politically represented and mediated the rural 
poor’s interaction with state institutions. In this regard, the MST’s 
political actions destabilize traditional client–patron relationships, 
thereby contributing to the democratization of rural social relations 
and the emergence of new grassroots development actors (Meszaros 
2000; Leite 2004).
The MST has mobilized for the implementation of public policies, 
but it has also joined other movements in demanding that the Brazilian 
government formulate and implement new legislation to address some 
of the problems their members face. The storage and marketing of 
agricultural produce are among the major problems confronted by 
small-scale farmers. The MST and other rural social movements have 
mobilized for years to pressure the government to address this problem 
via state procurement, storage and commercialization policies. This 
grassroots pressure finally bore fruit in 2003 when the Lula government 
established the Food Acquisition Programme (PAA), a component of 
Brazil’s Zero Hunger programme. Moreover, persistent mobilization 
led to a new law in 2009 that stipulated that the National School Meal 
Programme (PNAE), which serves 45 million students, purchase 30 
per cent of all food supplies from small farmers. In the past, PNAE 
purchased most produce from medium and large-scale farmers (Sa 
2012). 
TABLE 9.1 Land distribution and land inequality in selected municipalities, 1975–95












0.813 79.74 0.801 111.36 0.755 65.94
Promissão 0.813 130.40 0.769 93.17 0.685 56.39
Sumaré 0.640 37.92 0.687 34.50 0.527 31.61
Source: Adapted from Bergamasco and Norder (2010: 340)
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The government’s National Supply Company (CONAB) purchases 
agricultural products from small farmers at guaranteed prices, stores 
and then distributes the produce to entities (e.g. churches) that provide 
it to food insecure communities. The PAA and PNAE thus exercise 
an important role in generating a secure source of income for small 
farmers, as well as addressing the hunger, food and nutrition insecurity 
of a significant portion of Brazil’s population. Chmielewska et al. 
(2010: 20) found that the PAA allowed farmers to increase the land 
devoted to production, plant new varieties of fruits and vegetables, 
and start rearing pigs, cows and chickens, thus leading to greater 
product diversification. There was also increased utilization of tractors 
and investment in irrigation systems, and some beneficiaries who had 
previously sold their labour to other farmers or in local towns now 
worked full-time on their own farms. In the words of one beneficiary, 
‘Before we just passed the day doing little, but today we work on 
our plots to produce for CONAB’ (ibid.: 21). A sub-modality of the 
PAA, the Incentive for the Production and Consumption of Milk or 
PAA-Milk, incentivizes the production and consumption of milk by 
families facing food and nutrition insecurity in Brazil’s north-east 
region (where 46 per cent of households confront some degree of 
food insecurity), with farmers producing between 30 and 100 litres 
of milk per day prioritized. In 2009, almost 24,000 farmers in nine 
states produced 174 million litres of milk, which were distributed to 
662,000 families or 3.3 million people living in conditions of food 
and nutritional insecurity (Peraci and Bittencourt 2010). The PAA 
and PNAE have been well received by social movements and policy 
analysts, especially for their role in bridging the realms of production 
(by poor small farmers) and consumption (by food insecure families). 
However, there have been calls for these programmes to receive greater 
budgetary and institutional support if they are to meet their promise 
of building more secure livelihoods for poor small-scale farmers and 
tackling the challenges faced by the 65 million food and nutritionally 
insecure residents of Brazil (IBGE 2010). 
The MST’s struggle for land and rural development programmes has 
made important strides in gaining assets and building the livelihoods of 
its members; however, poverty as well as land and income inequality are 
still high in Brazil. While all its objectives have not been realized, MST 
mobilizations for and on the land give strength to further struggles for 
a more egalitarian future.
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Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I analysed the MST’s struggles for land and rural 
development and showed how, through a process of territorialization, 
the movement grew from a regional into a national movement. 
Territorialization, however, not only leads to the territorial expansion 
of the movement, it also leads to the spatialization of an organizational 
praxis that encourages self-organization, political socialization and 
global ambition. Furthermore, I point out that the force of the MST 
lies in merging struggles for land with struggles for livelihoods on the 
land. In so doing, the movement brings together into one organization 
landless families fighting for land and land reform settlers demanding 
public policies to remain on the land. Landless families join the settled 
families in pressuring the government to provide agricultural credit and 
infrastructure support. The settlers, in turn, provide material (food, 
tents, etc.) and practical support by recruiting and embarking on land 
occupations with the landless families, as the activism of João and Calixto 
exemplifies. This active solidarity between the landless and settled 
families is an important factor in the MST’s organizational cohesion, 
its national growth and improvement in member livelihoods. 
I have also tried to argue that the MST’s ‘politics from below’ has 
played a vital role in pushing the state to implement existing policies 
(e.g. redistribute land) and has been a driver for the promulgation and 
implementation of new policies such as the PAA and PNAE. While 
the MST broadly paints the state and its institutions as representing 
landowner and elite interests, in practice its mobilizations are both 
against and with the state; but it is via adversarial actions that the state 
is pushed into working with and meeting some of the demands of MST 
members. In other words, the state is a ‘space of struggle through 
which and against which [to] articulate [movement] aims’ (Marston 
2003: 231).
Politics have been an important medium through which the MST 
has empowered members to exercise their political agency, occupy land 
and provide agricultural credit, thereby improving social well-being in 
rural Brazil. The MST’s grassroots actions show the efficacy of land 
reform in putting unutilized land to productive use, improving rural 
livelihoods and promoting regional development. While the MST’s 
mobilizations under the Lula and especially the Dilma administrations 
have not yielded as many benefits for its members, these mobilizations 
have revealed that poverty and inequality are intrinsically political 
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problems and, as such, ‘politics and political change remain the key 
means by which such poverty [and inequality] can be challenged’ 
(Hickey and Bracking 2005: 851). 
Notes
1 I would like to thank Rashied 
Ahmed, Mark Hoskins and the editors for 
their valuable comments, which made the 
chapter much stronger.
2 The IMF-imposed primary budget 
surpluses are generated to service 
interest payments on Brazil’s debt. During 
Lula’s first term of office (2003–06), the 
government paid $600 billion reis (R) 
(almost US$300 billion) just to service 
debt (Sicsú 2007).
3 For a detailed account of the 2005 
march, see Karriem (2005). 
4 Today, Francisco dos Santos 
is a fairly successful fruit farmer 
and generates a monthly income of 
R$3,000.00 (US$1,500.00) and employs 
five workers (Glass 2013).
5 The amounts mentioned are 
equivalent to US$60 and US$220, 
respectively.
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Sony Pellissery
Introduction
India is a hierarchical society. At a religio-philosophical level, graded 
inequality is legitimized in India. Long spells of Arab invasion and 
colonialism have not created historical discontinuities strong enough to 
dislodge the religio-cultural traditions. Thus, despite a Constitution that 
guarantees equality for all citizens, a feudal mode of production thrived. 
The impact has not been the same for all citizens. Socially disadvantaged 
groups at the bottom of the hierarchy – lower castes and indigenous 
people – which constitute about 25 per cent of the population, continue 
to experience durable poverty in a country where double-digit economic 
growth has occurred in the last two decades. Similarly, while a significant 
proportion of economic growth stories emerge from a handful of 
metropolitan cities, over 70 per cent of the population resides in rural areas, 
with 53 per cent of the population deriving their livelihoods from non-
mechanized rain-fed agriculture. This chapter argues that this paradoxical 
drama of economic growth with appalling inequality can be understood 
only through the lens of the complex story of asset alienation: land. 
India has 304 million hectares of land and approximately 256 
million households (Census of India 2011). What processes have led to 
an unequal distribution of this vast resource? If unequal distribution of 
land is at the core of the story of poverty, why has a rebellion for equal 
distribution not occurred? These questions require deeper examination 
of the nature of society and economy. This chapter will examine the 
ideational foundations of inequality in the first part. In the second part, 
evidence for unequal distribution of land will be presented to argue 
why land is the key defining feature of social inequality. 
Ideational foundations of inequality in India
Indian civilization is much more dynamic than the brief history of the 
Indian state. This has the implication that the effectiveness of the Indian 
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state in addressing inequality is deeply embedded with the question of 
how inequality was cumulatively generated in the civilizational process 
(Pellissery 2005). Some authors (Khilnani 2010 among others) argue 
that the state is a contested concept in India since diversity (of language, 
religion, historical continuity of regions and geo-climatic basis) has 
prevented Indian society from developing a social contract, which is 
essential to combat inequality. These arguments point to the importance 
of the ideational foundations of inequality in the Indian context. 
To investigate the societal and cultural dimensions of the origins 
of poverty and inequality in the Indian context one has to revisit its 
history 2,000 years ago. This is because the roots of rationalist challenge 
to authority systems (religion) (comparable to the Enlightenment 
in Europe) took place when Buddha rejected God as well as the 
Hindu social order. Without a brief examination of this legacy,2 the 
story of inequality and attempts at social reform in India would be 
incomplete.
The feudalistic nature of production (which was resistant both to 
the British colonial rule and the new Constitution of the Republic 
of India) is closely associated with Hindu social order and its caste 
system.3 India has a unique social division, the (endogamous) caste 
system. ‘Caste is class at primitive level of production, a religious method 
of forming social consciousness in such a manner that the primary producer 
is deprived of his surplus with the minimum coercion’ (Kosambi 1954: 14, 
emphasis in original). Until 800 BC, caste is not seen as an institution 
of discrimination (or a ‘social problem’ in the sense we understand 
today) since inter-dining and intermarriage were possible. During the 
late Bronze Age and early Iron Age pastoral-nomadic communities 
developed into four castes. Kosambi (1955: 42) explains this develop-
ment as follows:
The reason for caste stratification is the new productive basis, 
which had led to relations of production between groups, higher 
than in the tribal stage but with still primitive tools. Thus, we 
have a tenant of Brahminism for state policy that each caste and 
subcaste (jati), tribal district, guild, and even large family group 
had to be judged by its own particular laws, obviously because 
it was then a unit of production. Therefore, the state could not 
uniformize the juridical structure within groups, but only regulate 
transactions between groups.4
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Religion as a source of power was used to valorize some and 
devalorize other functions. In other words, the actions of the highest 
caste (Brahmins) in offering sacrifices was most noble, compared to the 
activities of the labouring caste (Shudras). ‘Brahminism had constructed 
the acts of tilling the land, removing a carcass from the village, skinning 
a carcass, and transforming hide into leather as filthy. In other words, 
the whole process of human intercourse with nature, land, plants and 
animals in productive and creative modes was constructed as unclean’ 
(Iliah 2007: 303). This rigid caste structure that prevented mobility 
warranted a revolt.
Buddhism was a revolution in Aryan society in circa 400 BC. It 
began as a religious revolution and evolved as a social and political 
revolution (Ambedkar 1987 [1956]). As a revolution, it challenged the 
caste system and accepted members from lower castes in the position 
of priest (a role reserved for Brahmins – the highest caste) and gave an 
equal position to women. These were explicit challenges to the power 
structure of society, which was legitimized by the Upanishadic and 
Puranic scriptures. At the core of Buddhist revolution was the principle 
of social equality. This was possible because of the reasoned rejection 
of God. King Ashoka (304–234 BC) accepted these Buddhist ideals 
and put them into practice, and religious revolution as social revolution 
received the patronage of the state. 
As a counter-revolution to this, Brahminical forces solidified the 
caste system through much stricter laws through Manusmriti (ibid.), 
and the regime that succeeded King Ashoka persecuted Buddhism by 
accepting Manusmriti’s code of law (compiled during 200 BC–AD 200). 
The greatest assault on rationality itself was when reason was rejected 
in favour of religious precepts.5 ‘Hindu observed untouchability and 
caste not because they are inhuman or wrong headed. They observed 
caste because they are deeply religious’ (Ambedkar 1936: 68). Thus, 
the very social philosophy of the Hindu religion is focused neither on 
the individual nor on society but on ‘Brahminic supermen’ (Haragopal 
and Sukumar 2007).
The caste system created two kinds of long-term impacts. First, it 
legitimized a graded inequality through legal measures that awarded 
different types of penalties for the same crime (lower punishment for 
high-caste and higher punishment for lower-caste). Society, deeply 
divided into numerous grades, found it hard to unite on the basis of class, 
since the fight was with the grade above.6 Secondly, discrimination in 
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the realm of education (since learning was reserved for the Brahminical 
caste) led to loss of human capital and inclusion in the jobs other than 
agriculture and unskilled work. 
Impossibility of Hindu reformation in modern India
Democracy’s track record in achieving drastic power shifts is limited. 
Rather, historical discontinuities such as colonization, revolutions 
(intellectual or political) or even rule by a benevolent dictator have been 
proved to change the power equations after which democracy stabilizes. 
In this sense, the Indian subcontinent had a good opportunity in the 
form of the freedom struggle against British colonial rule in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. However, by this time the political class, 
because of its identification with richer segments in society, had failed to 
raise the ‘social’ question in a comprehensive manner. A section within 
the Congress Party, which spearheaded the freedom struggle, argued 
that social reform (in its limited sense) must precede political reform. 
However, this view of the Social Reform Party was silenced7 by those 
who held that political reform and capture of power from the British were 
more important. Thus, the elitist nature of the freedom struggle and 
the making of the Constitution by English-speaking Western-educated 
Indians were precedents to concealing important social questions. 
If the ‘social’ question in independent India was to be appropriately 
framed, it should have been as a Hindu reformation, i.e. challenging 
the internal contradictions of Hindu social philosophy in the light 
of the modernist values of the mid-twentieth century. This was not 
to be the case. The Constitution of independent India was a vision 
statement of ideals for a ‘new’ country. The biggest problem was how 
the Enlightenment ideals of ‘equality, liberty and fraternity’ were to 
be realized in a context where the majority was illiterate and had lived 
for centuries with the Hindu social philosophy of graded inequality. 
The chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent 
Assembly, Ambedkar (who was from a lower caste), strongly argued 
this: ‘Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to 
be cultivated. We must realize that our people have yet to learn it. 
Democracy in India is only a top dressing, on an Indian soil, which is 
essentially undemocratic.’ He further cautioned that if the inequalities 
were not removed, the poorest sections would undo the Constitution 
and democracy itself. The Constitution specifically recognized two 
social groups as hugely disadvantaged. These groups were placed in 
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the schedule of the Constitution, and they were: Scheduled Castes or 
Dalits (literally meaning ‘broken’ people; outcastes from the Hindu 
caste system and, therefore, untouchables)8 and Scheduled Tribes or 
Adivasis (people who lived in forests or indigenous people). Presently, 
Dalits constitute 16.6 per cent of the Indian population while Adivasis 
constitute 8.5 per cent. Both these groups, owing to historical injustices, 
have experienced disadvantage in all spheres of human development.9
Independent India’s development plans were not in the direction 
of inequality reduction.10 A handful of industrialists in Bombay had 
prepared the ‘Bombay Plan’, which was to become the blueprint for 
national development for the next few decades under the Nehruvian 
vision (Chibber 2003). Though the Bombay Plan did not have a 
socialist vision, Nehru visualized that industrialization could be possible 
without the suffering that Europe underwent, in contrast to Gandhi, 
who believed industrialization was a problem in itself. Sanyal (2007: 
155) compares the Gandhi/Nehru debate on industrialization to that 
of Lenin/Narodniks in Russia,11 and points to the paradox of the initial 
victory by Nehru/Narodniks and contemporary disenchantment with 
such capital-intensive models. 
After initial balancing of investment in small-scale and large-scale 
industries, Indian planning processes hugely favoured capital-intensive 
large industries. Yet this state-led industrialization was hugely different 
from European industrialization, where the capital came from 
private/market sources. Nor was the strategy to extract surplus from 
agriculture for the development of industry. As Chakraborty (1987: 
21) states, ‘it was necessary for agriculture to contribute to the building 
up of a modern industrial sector by providing cheap labour and also 
cheap food’. Thus, the capital-good hypothesis and the wage-good 
hypothesis worked simultaneously in India. Sanyal (2007: 167) has 
argued that though there was no surplus extraction, the very process 
of separation of the means of labour from labour itself was sufficient 
to establish the process of primitive accumulation in early independent 
India’s development path. 
The capitalist push led to the coexistence of industrial success and 
high levels of poverty. Thus, by the early 1970s, there were specific 
programmes designed to eradicate poverty. The Congress Party, 
facing elections in the early 1970s, used the slogan garibihatao (remove 
poverty), which won votes from the masses. Subsequently, anti-poverty 
programmes were unleashed across different Indian states. These 
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attempts did not yield much of a result since the fundamental question 
of inequality, namely that of property, was not addressed. 
Property at the root of deprivation
As pointed out above, Hindu social philosophy, which legitimized 
graded inequality, created disadvantaged sections through the processes of 
discrimination and historical injustice. These groups received special rights 
in the Constitution and policy spaces. Though the histories of both Dalits 
(through discrimination within the caste system) and Adivasis (through 
isolation due to their prolonged periods in forests) are different, policy 
responses to ensure welfare for them are the same. Positive discrimination 
in jobs (through a quota system), prevention of atrocities against Dalits 
and Adivasis and budgetary spending in proportion to their population are 
three important interventions designed for these groups. Yet none of these 
measures addresses the crux of the problem, i.e. land alienation. 
Land in India was in few hands at the time of independence, since 
the British colonial administration had created a property registration 
system, primarily as an attempt to collect taxes.12 In an agrarian economy 
such as India’s, land as property was central to bringing well-being to 
the people. As Dreze (2004: 1729) points out: ‘The economic and 
social rights complement and reinforce each other. Taken in isolation, 
each of them has its limitations, and may not even be realizable within 
the present structure of property rights.’
The Republic of India made a feeble attempt at land distribution 
in the 1950s.13 However, the political class, which was also the 
landowning class, successfully foiled this attempt in connivance with 
the bureaucracy. With the exceptions of the states of Kerala and West 
Bengal (where Communist parties were in power) no state was able to 
make any progress in this direction. This has resulted in 40 per cent of 
rural households living as landless labourers. At the same time, there is 
an abundance of land owned by large landholders. Table 10.1 provides 
evidence on the inequality of landholdings. The Gini coefficient for 
land inequality in India is 0.76 (Rawal 2008).
It is important to note that even if land reforms had been successful, 
the situation of Dalits and Adivasis would not have improved (see 
Table 10.2 for the relative deprivation of the two groups compared to 
other social groups). This is because the disadvantaged groups of Dalits 
and Adivasis have always had completely different types of relationship 
with land. 
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Dalits were a labouring class, and not a landowning class. They 
worked on the farms of landlords, often under oppressive conditions 
(e.g. Breman 1989). Traditionally, they were also not cultivators. 
When land reform was being attempted (in the 1960s and 1970s), 



















31.12 29.82 18.97 10.68 4.22 3.06 1.6 0.52
Proportion of 
area owned (%)
0 5.11 16.89 20.47 13.94 16.59 15.21 11.77
Source: Modified based on Rawal (2008)













Proportion of population 
(total, %)
26a 49.2a 16.6 8.2 100
Mean household per capita 
consumption (rupees)
1,037 748 657 511 776
Proportion of households 
owning or cultivating land (%)
74 65 44 62 60
Average area owned (high 
caste = 100)b 
100 78 25 75 64
Notes: a The percentages of upper caste and OBCs are approximate, since the census 
does not collect data on caste systematically. However, a process called ‘Caste Census’ 
is presently under way in India. Other religions, such as Muslims and Christians, are also 
divided into different castes. b Since this is an estimate, other groups’ landownership is 
estimated in proportion to the high caste.
Source: Compiled from Census of India (2011) and analysis (by Barooah et al. 2014) 
of household survey data collected during 2004/05 by the University of Maryland 
in collaboration with the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) 
from 41,554 households in 1,504 villages and 971 urban areas across thirty-three states 
of India. The table presents data relevant to rural areas to show the relationship 
between landlessness and poverty with reference to social groups. Data from urban 
households shows poverty measured as per capita consumption in exactly the same 
fashion, i.e. highest in upper-caste households and lowest among Scheduled Tribes.
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one group that was able to assert its claim was tenants, who were 
cultivators. Cultivators were from the middle caste, referred to as ‘Other 
Backward Classes’ (OBCs) in India, compared to landowners, who 
belonged to the upper caste. In the social hierarchy of India, the OBCs 
assumed a higher position over Dalits and Adivasis. As OBCs gained 
landownership, their social and political position improved significantly. 
Eventually, in north India, OBCs were able to consolidate as a political 
group (very often known as ‘social justice parties’) and defeat upper 
castes in the elections. Thus, the composition of the Indian parliament 
(as well as the bureaucracy) changed from high-caste-dominated to 
OBC-dominated. This has not been a pleasant scenario for Dalits. As 
OBCs occupied a socially higher position in the hierarchy and assumed 
economic and political power, their tension with Dalits increased (Pai 
2012). Thus, land has become the axis of conflict between Dalits and 
OBCs in most of rural India.
Compared to the situation of Dalits, Adivasis had a different 
relationship with the land question. They basically depended on forest 
for their livelihood. They relied on hunting, gathering and subsistence 
farming. Their value orientation to land was that of identity. About 60 
per cent of Indian forest lies in 187 Adivasi districts. Land was alienated 
from Adivasis through two processes. First, money borrowed from non-
Adivasis at usurious interest rates led to land being surrendered to the 
moneylender (Mander 2002). Non-Adivasis exploited the illiteracy of 
Adivasis by forging documents and forcing them to pledge land deeds 
for small sums of money. Secondly, the state displaced the Adivasis, 
which is discussed later in this chapter. There is a law preventing land 
alienation of Adivasis, i.e. a non-Adivasi could not buy land from an 
Adivasi. Yet the state could acquire the land from Adivasis and give it 
to private companies under the eminent domain principle.14
A common thread that unites both these disadvantaged groups 
on the land issue is their dependence on land for livelihood and as a 
security, rather than as a capitalist mode of production,15 for which there 
is statistical evidence (World Bank 2007: 51). This livelihood approach 
to land is in direct opposition to the current developmental model of 
the Indian state. These conflicts require deeper examination.
Developmental processes that deepen land alienation
As pointed out earlier, in independent India progress was equated 
with building infrastructure necessary for capitalist development. It is 
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estimated that approximately sixty million people have been displaced 
owing to ‘development projects’ since independence in 1947, i.e. 
approximately one million persons a year (Walter 2004; Michael 1999). 
Forty per cent of the displaced are Adivasis and 25 per cent are Dalits 
(Pinto 1998). A good majority of India’s urban slum (the informal 
economy of property relations where land titles are disputed) population 
is comprised of development-displaced persons. The projects which lead 
to ‘development-induced’ displacement are closely associated with the 
planning exercise. These planned developments include constructions 
of dams, mines and highways and industrial development. 
Earlier development projects focused on dams, primarily meant for 
irrigation. Resistance to such projects received national attention when 
a dam was planned with World Bank funding across the Narmada river 
in central India, displacing about twenty million Adivasis. This grew 
to a national movement against land acquisitions in the 1980s. Since 
then, there has been organized agitation in all locations where Adivasis 
have suffered attempts to displace them. The major argument of the 
displaced communities has been that when a livelihood approach is 
taken towards land, compensation in terms of either money or land 
is insufficient to replace what is lost. Livelihood is connected with the 
environment, such as social networks of members, commons16 in the 
area, and sacredness of land where ancestral gods reside. 
In more recent times, displacement has been due to the allocation 
of mining rights. Natural resources in India are found on land which 
Adivasis inhabit. Ninety per cent of coal, 100 per cent of mica and 
about 60 per cent of other minerals are found in the districts where 
Adivasis have been living for centuries (Pinto 1998). State governments, 
in the urge to gain foreign direct investment from international mining 
companies, have sold these huge tracts of natural resources. This 
could be termed ‘development versus development’. On one hand, the 
state wants extractive development, unmindful of the rapid depletion 
of natural resources that could sustain many generations, dependent 
on the capital-intensive mode. On the other, people want a durable 
relationship with land as a livelihood opportunity. 
The nature and form of resistance have changed from the 1980s 
to today. In richer states, where compensation packages are high (e.g. 
Gujarat, Haryana), people are ready to part with lands. But in poorer 
states (e.g. Jharkhand, Orissa) armed violence is taking place over the 
question of land.17 However, today there is no concerted demand for 
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land reforms. In a country where 53 per cent of the labour force is in 
agriculture, and the contribution of agriculture to GDP is a dismal 14 
per cent, it is obviously clear that, given the choice, farmers would like 
to leave the land. Since 1990, there has been a huge agrarian crisis and 
on average 14,000 farmers have committed suicide every year. This 
evidence has to be interpreted in the light of larger development paths 
that the country has taken, rather than as evidence to deny land rights 
to the poorer sections. 
Similar to the displacement of Adivasis for the primitive accumulation 
of profits from natural resources is the case of urban displacement in 
the form of slum clearances. The majority of occupants in the slums of 
metropolitan areas are Dalits. They have come to the city looking for 
a livelihood and to escape the oppression and discrimination of feudal 
landlords. ‘Land’ rights for this population do not imply use of the soil, 
but include access to other natural resources such as water (Kothari 
2001: para. 62).18 Despite the human rights bodies and civil society 
organizations appealing for the right to shelter for these people, courts 
have stated that ‘allowing people who build their homes over generations 
on public land – encroachers – to remain on land is akin to giving money 
to a pick-pocketer’ (Almitra H. Patel v. Union of India, 2000, 8 SCC 
19, cited in Suresh and Narrain 2014). Elsewhere (Davy and Pellissery 
2013; Pellissery 2013) I have elaborated how radical citizenship has 
claimed property rights in informal settlements such as slums. 
The contradiction between the republican state and the 
feudal mode of production
The Industrial Revolution in Europe saw the forces of feudalism 
being systematically succeeded by the forces of capitalism. The modes 
of production also completed the dramatic shift from agricultural to 
industrial. The Indian experience, on the other hand, is a disjointed story 
of different modes of production. The debate on the predominant mode 
of production in India has long continued with few definitive answers. 
Coexistence of dual modes is widely accepted. So while capitalism has 
come to be a mode of production, it bases itself on semi-feudal, pre-
capitalist modes of production (Thorner 1982). These feudal relations 
of production are based on the zamindari system of landlordism. 
There is a widespread consensus that the feudal mode of ownership 
and production needs to be tackled, since it is detrimental to both 
capitalist expansion and livelihood options. Yet social policy models 
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that have transformed feudal structures are virtually unknown, both 
theoretically and among practitioners. It is in this sense that land rights 
as social rights become the guiding problem for distributive justice in 
India.
Ownership of land for the two most socially disadvantaged 
communities (Dalits and Adivasis) can substantially improve the 
welfare of these groups. However, addressing this deprivation requires 
challenging the feudal mode of production. India has 14.2 million 
slaves, and approximately 60 million child labourers.19 These disturbing 
numbers are related to the expansive feudal mode of production. 
Property rights could give true freedom to this population.20 Justice K. 
K. Mathew, in his treatise on Democracy, Equality and Freedom (1978), 
categorically expressed the view
In a Society with a mixed economy, who can be sure that freedom 
in relation to property might not be regarded as an aspect of 
individual freedom? People without property have a tendency to 
become slaves. They become the property of others as they have 
no property themselves. They will come to say: ‘Make us slaves, 
but feed us’. Liberty, independence, self-respect, have their roots 
in property. To denigrate the institution of property is to shut 
one’s eyes to the stark reality evidenced by the innate instinct 
and the steady object of pursuit of the vast majority of people. 
Protection of property interest may quite fairly be deemed in 
appropriate circumstances an aspect of freedom. (p. 71)
The disadvantaged groups of Dalits and Adivasis are demanding 
dignity and equality by demanding property. However, Ambedkar, 
champion of the cause of Dalits, had argued that equality and liberty 
could not be achieved through purely materialist social policies: 
Religion, social status and property are all sources of power and 
authority, which one man has, to control the liberty of another. 
One is predominant at one stage, the other is predominant at 
another stage. That is the only difference. If liberty is the ideal, 
if liberty means the destruction of the dominion which one man 
holds over another then obviously it cannot be insisted upon 
that economic reform must be the one kind of reform worthy of 
pursuit. If the source of power and dominion is at any given time 
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or in any given society social and religious then social reform and 
religious reform must be accepted as the necessary sort of reform. 
(Ambedkar 1936: 33)
Later Ambedkar argues that even if property redistribution is given 
paramount importance, in a hierarchical society, support for such 
redistribution is dependent on whether non-discrimination could be 
expected after distribution.21 Thus, Ambedkar (referring to graded 
inequality) insisted that equality and liberty could not be separated 
from fraternity.
This analysis indicates that access to land is not merely a demand 
for livelihood, but a demand for equality and full membership in a 
society. It is in this sense that land alienation becomes a means of 
grading citizens and placing the alienated members at the bottom of 
society. 
Conclusion
The mode of production in a society determines the nature of 
relations among the citizens. In the context of huge land inequality 
and a feudal mode of production, equality and liberty are far from 
realized for the sections of population that are deprived of the means 
of production. Yet a majoritarian democracy (rather than a system of 
proportional representation) fails to generate a system of fraternity 
among citizens to give space for charting a course towards equality and 
liberty.
The socially disadvantaged groups of Dalits and Adivasis, which 
have been pushed to poverty through historical injustice, are caught in 
the vicious cycle of asset deprivation, socio-economic marginalization 
through discrimination and limited political resources. This chapter 
has argued that the reason for the persistence of their marginalization 
is their land alienation. This root cause has been legitimized by the 
Hindu social philosophy of religious justification for graded inequality. 
In modern times, the extraction-intensive development path has denied 
the place of land as a livelihood resource. It seems apparent that in a 
hierarchical society, when state-led development is aiding those at the 
top of hierarchy, the demand for livelihood through land (by those on 
the lower rungs of the hierarchy) will be perceived as less legitimate, 
and attempts to assert such voices may often lead to violence and social 
disturbances.
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Notes
1 This chapter was first presented 
as a paper during the conference on 
‘Understanding Southern welfare’ at the 
Centre for Interdisciplinary Research 
(ZiF), University of Bielefeld, Germany, 
24–26 November 2014. In preparing this 
chapter, I have hugely benefited from an 
exchange of ideas with Benjamin Davy, 
Lutz Leisering and Ulrike Davy. 
2 There have been similar challenges 
to Hindu social order from time to time, 
such as Jainism, which was a revolt 
against the caste system, or Sikhism. 
During the medieval period, Bhakti saints 
(such as Kabir and Nanak) preached 
about social equality and castelessness. 
In the nineteenth century there was an 
intellectual renaissance during which 
many reformers (some influenced by 
Western thought) appealed for liberation 
and the abandoning of class and caste. 
For details see Thapar (1966).
3 Prominent academic works on caste 
have not taken the political economy 
approach seriously. The works of Max 
Weber or Dumont have emphasized the 
cultural dimensions of caste. In recent 
times, there has been renewed interest in 
examining the caste issue from this missing 
dimension. Singh (2014) argues that the 
underlying issues of caste relations are 
those of property and land rights.
4 Note that Kosambi uses the term 
‘caste-class’. Ambedkar and subsequent 
writers (for instance, Omvedt 2007) have 
emphasized that caste’s origin is not in 
‘functional differentiation’ as occurred 
in the capitalist stage of European 
development. Caste originated in the pre-
capitalist mode of production. Ambedkar 
repeatedly maintained that caste is 
not ‘division of labour, but division of 
labourers’.
5 Ambedkar argues that the reason 
for the disappearance of Buddhism from 
India is the Brahminical persecution 
rather than Islamic invasion. 
6 Interestingly, Indian Marxists 
subsume the caste question into class, 
and thus fail to raise the issue of caste 
inequality. This inability by Marxist 
groups to consolidate the disadvantaged 
groups has partly contributed to the 
consolidation of groups on a caste basis 
in electoral politics, which has led to the 
casteization of politics in recent times. 
7 Ambedkar (1936) analyses the 
reasons for this. He points out that the 
Socialist Reform Party was concerned 
with reform of the Hindu family, and 
not wider concerns of reconstruction of 
Hindu society. ‘The Social Conference 
was a body which mainly concerned itself 
with the reform of the high caste Hindu 
family. It consisted mostly of enlightened 
high caste Hindus who did not feel the 
necessity for agitating for the abolition 
of caste or had not the courage to agitate 
for it. They felt quite naturally a great 
urge to remove such evils as enforced 
widowhood, child marriages etc, evils 
which prevailed among them and which 
were personally felt by them. They did 
not stand up for the reform of the Hindu 
society. The battle that was fought 
centred round the question of the reform 
of the family. It did not relate to the social 
reform in the sense of the break-up of the 
caste system. It was never put in issue by 
the reformers. That is the reason why the 
Social Reform party lost’ (p. 28).
8 Note that the Indian Constitution 
does not abolish the caste system, but it 
abolishes discrimination based on caste, 
creed and language. 
9 Various reports and studies (by 
both government agencies and civil 
society organizations) provide evidence 
for the deprivation of lower castes and 
Adivasis in the domains of education, 
health, poverty levels and access to public 
services (for a synthesis of these reports, 
refer to World Bank 2011), which need not 
be repeated here.
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10 Poverty alleviation as a separate 
target of development planning gets 
acceptance only during the fifth plan (late 
1970s).
11 The argument concerning mass 
production versus production by the 
masses for local consumption needs.
12 The East India Company gained 
revenue collection rights (Diwani) from 
Mughal emperors (in 1765) though 
their primary interest was in trading. 
Eventually, they realized that revenue 
derived from huge agrarian tracts was 
more profitable than income from trade. 
Subsequently, systems of property 
rights were created to suit this revenue 
collection system. Different systems 
were developed in different parts 
(Zamindari – permanent settlement 
through an intermediary for 100 years; 
Ryotwari – direct revenue collection 
from cultivators, which necessitated 
identification of property and its 
registration). The question of property 
rights in independent India is entangled 
with these path-dependent legacies. I 
have examined this issue of how modern 
India’s property regimes have path 
dependency on colonial times elsewhere 
(Pellissery and Sattwick 2012).
13 See Pellissery (2014) on the 
historical evolution of the jurisprudence 
of land rights as social rights in India.
14 The power of the state to acquire 
land from private parties forcefully (but 
often with compensation) in the wider 
public interest.
15 There has been intense debate 
in India as to whether agriculture is a 
capitalist mode. See Patnaik (1991) for a 
summary of these debates.
16 The National Sample Survey (1999) 
pointed out that 45 per cent of rural 
households in India depend on commons 
for firewood collection, another 13 per 
cent for fodder collection, 20 per cent 
for grazing land, 30 per cent for water 
for livestock, and 23 per cent for water 
for irrigation. The same report pointed 
out that these vital common property 
resources were shrinking at the rate of 1.9 
per cent every five years.
17 In 2013, a New Land Acquisition 
Act was passed in parliament. This 
Act replaced the old 1894 legislation 
which was extensively misused by 
corporations and the state to take 
land for a pittance. Absurd cases are 
exemplified by Revenue Divisional Officer-
cum-LAO v. Shaik Azam Sahem, where 
the Supreme Court increased the rate 
of compensation from 16,000 rupees 
(Rs) to Rs141,666.66 per acre, or Kanta 
Devi & Ors v. State of Haryana & others, 
where the rate of compensation was 
increased from Rs40,000 per acre to 
Rs384,000 per acre. For more on the 
issue of compensation see Singh (2012). 
The new Land Acquisition Act is still not 
operational. Industry has demanded that 
compensation rates be lowered and that 
the ‘social impact assessment’ clause be 
modified. The new government, keen 
to attract business, is considering these 
demands by the business communities.
18 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal 
Corporation (1985) had been a landmark 
case in which the Supreme Court 
respected the plea of pavement dwellers 
for shelter under the right to life. For 
many years the Supreme Court followed 
this logic in deciding cases of slum 
dwellers’ eviction. Yet, in recent times, 
there has been a deviation from this logic. 
19 The Census of India estimates that 
15 million children in the age group of five 
to fourteen are in child labour. However, 
civil society groups (Bachpan Bachao 
Andolan) estimate this number to be 60 
million.
20 The sense of freedom attached to 
landownership in India can be identified 
with Hegel’s exposition on property. 
He characterizes property as having 
the ability to give completeness to an 
individual’s innate idea of freedom. This 
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attachment of the subjective to the 
objective ‘thing’, i.e. ‘land’, is justified as it 
allows a human being to exercise his free 
will and thus his sense of freedom on an 
external thing.
21 ‘Now it is obvious that the 
economic reform contemplated by the 
Socialists cannot come about unless there 
is a revolution resulting in the seizure of 
power – that seizure of power must be 
by a proletariat. The first question I ask 
is: Will the proletariat of India combine 
to bring about this revolution? What will 
move men to such an action? It seems 
to me that other things being equal the 
only thing that will move one man to take 
such an action is the feeling of equality 
and fraternity and above all of justice. 
Men will not join in a revolution for the 
equalization of property unless they know 
that after the revolution is achieved they 
will be treated equally and that there will 
be no discrimination of caste and creed’ 
(Ambedkar 1936: 34).
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1 1  |  T H E  P O L I T I C S  O F  H U N G E R  D E A T H S 
I N  O D I S H A  ( I N D I A )
Rajakishor Mahana
In 2000, three tribals were shot dead in a police shooting in Maikanch 
village while protesting against the establishment of a mining project 
by Utkal Alumina International Ltd (UAIL) in the Kashipur block 
of Rayagada district in southern Odisha. Even after many years, the 
people’s movement in Kashipur was still in force. As a PhD student 
interested in the anthropology of development, I had been conducting 
my fieldwork in Kashipur since 2004, attempting to understand the 
dynamics of conflict over development. A similar incident of police 
shooting happened on 2 January 2006 in Kalinganagar, Jajpur 
district, in eastern Odisha, where people had been fighting against 
the establishment of Tata Steel Industries on their agricultural land, 
which resulted in the death of fourteen tribals (Das 2006a, 2006b, 
2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f; JOHAR and JMACC 2006: 22; The 
Hindu 2006a, 2006b). In both places, the reason for the conflict over 
development was obvious. The state takes pride in transforming the 
countryside into an ‘industrial hub’ and had invited a number of 
multinational companies (MNCs) to start a new era of ‘development’ 
in Odisha. But Bulka Miniaka, an old tribal leader of the Kashipur 
movement, challenges the very concept of ‘development’: 
What is development? Whose development? Does development 
imply cars and vehicles for everyone? The Chief Minister and others 
may need cars but why does everybody need it? Is it possible to give 
cars and vehicles to everyone? We don’t need cars and motors. We 
are the people of the soil and our lives revolve around the soil. We 
cannot live without our land. We will die to save our land.
This illustrates the resistance of the tribals to the authoritative and 
bureaucratic forces of power and development. This confrontation, 
a counter-hegemonic discourse, found not just in words, actions, 
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struggles, dharanas (sit-ins), lie-downs, bandhas, gheraos 1 and boycotts, 
but in the fragmentary play of aspirations, dreams and desires, in 
betrayed and ruined hopes, in habits of being and ways of life, is neither 
antagonistic to change nor against development; rather, I argue, the 
tribals are the subjects of an ongoing development endeavour who aspire 
not only to more material and economic prosperity but also to freedom 
– freedom from domination and deprivation. Against this background, 
this chapter (as an introductory section to my PhD thesis) makes a 
critical examination of how ‘development’ works in a relatively small 
community in the Kashipur block in Odisha, and how the failure of a 
development intervention justifies another development intervention. 
Kashipur as an example has been chosen for the following reasons. 
Kashipur, which is part of the undivided KBK (Koraput, Bolangir 
and Kalahandi) districts, known as the hunger hot spots of India, has 
received considerable state funding along with a number of national 
and international development interventions. Secondly, though very 
rich in natural resources, Kashipur has the dubious distinction of being 
known for its poverty, hunger and backwardness, thus presenting a 
paradoxical picture of resource prosperity and economic poverty. 
During 1985/86, the death through starvation of 400 people in 
Kashipur captured the attention of the national media for the first time. 
Again in 2001, the media highlighted the incidences of chronic food 
shortage and hunger deaths in Kashipur, drawing nationwide attention 
–anger, concern and sympathy (Bhagat 2001; S. Das, 2001; Khan 2001; 
Kumar 2001; Satapathy 2001). Kashipur was flooded with delegations, 
initially from the local media to the prime minister of India – all trying 
to show their concern, determine the severity of the incident and assess 
‘what needs to be done’. In 2004, I followed the trail of the incident to 
the local community of Kashipur, which was still struggling with poverty 
and hunger long after the crisis of the hunger deaths began and ended 
for the outsiders who came to ‘assess the situation’. Although there 
has been no dearth of agency-sponsored development interventions – 
national and international – starvation deaths continue to be prevalent 
in Kashipur. For example, during the rainy season in 2007, there were 
around four hundred unnatural deaths, again attributed to ‘cholera’, 
‘diarrhoea’, ‘malnutrition’ and ‘hunger’ (Samantra and Das 2010). ‘In 
Kashipur alone, more than fifteen Adivasis died this year also due to 
diarrhoea,’ Bhagaban Majhi, a tribal leader from Kucheipadar village 
in Kashipur, told me over phone in September 2010, although the 
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government of Odisha acknowledged the deaths of only nine tribals in 
Kashipur during August and September 2010. 
Critical thinking on the root causes of the hunger deaths brings forth 
two questions. Why do ‘development’ interventions fail to produce 
the intended consequences? Why are development interventions 
continued despite the fact that they tend to fail to produce the 
intended consequences? The conventional analysis of development 
failures, however, leads to two important conceptual problems. First, 
substantive empirical evidence shows that development interventions, 
though ‘failing’ in their own terms, succeed in producing something 
– for example, altered social relations, redistributed power or realigned 
state–society relations (Ferguson 1990: 18–21, 254–6). Secondly, 
focusing on ‘what went wrong’ limits analysis to implementation-
related tags like ‘social capital’, ‘public action’, ‘political will’ or ‘vested 
interest’ (cf. Currie 1998, 2000). This conventional analysis overlooks 
a potentially more useful analysis of whether the development 
interventions themselves are based on false assumptions about their 
bases of operation. Building on the insights of Ferguson’s ‘anti-politics 
machine’, this chapter identifies the roots of the false assumptions that 
lead development interventions to produce unintended consequences. 
Further, Joel Migdal’s ‘state-in-society’ model of political power helps 
in understanding the power brokers in a society that guides social 
control and political power (1988, 2001). Based on these theories, 
the chapter provides an adequate understanding of how development 
works by exploring the politics of hunger deaths in Kashipur, Odisha. 
It shows that development interventions failed to address the issue 
of hunger deaths in Kashipur not because there was drought in the 
area, a lack of development interventions or a failure of institutional 
support mechanisms, but because of the power play of the local elites 
who controlled the food, as well as the apathy of the state in addressing 
the root causes of hunger deaths. Through the attribution of hunger 
deaths to ‘drought’, ‘food poisoning’ or ‘cholera’, attention has been 
diverted from the fact that severe food shortage is a chronic problem in 
Kashipur. The development interventions, mostly in the form of ‘relief 
measures’, have ensured the disempowerment and vulnerability of the 
tribals and reinstated the myth that land in Kashipur is too infertile to 
produce enough for the tribals to sustain themselves. Thus, the politics 
of hunger deaths has produced land as ‘the problem’, which, in turn, 
has invited another development intervention. Therefore, the chapter 
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argues that development interventions justify their continuance by 
producing ‘underdevelopment’ of various kinds.
Revisiting the anti-politics machine: James Ferguson and beyond
Over the years, although conventional development wisdom has given 
birth to different theoretical constructions, essentially conventional 
development thinking has not strayed far from its roots in the ‘positivist 
orthodoxy’ of the 1950s, which held that the underdeveloped 
communities could develop through the implementation of technical 
plans with the assistance of a benevolent state. Such simplistic 
assumptions are problematic. Ferguson’s study on Lesotho (1990), 
for example, explicitly reveals that unintended consequences are 
produced by development interventions as a result of what he calls the 
‘anti-politics machine’ – development interventions are rooted in false 
assumptions that simplify the political process and depoliticize how 
power and politics are exercised in a local context. Though there is 
widespread consensus that almost all major development interventions 
in Lesotho failed to produce the intended outcomes, he argues that the 
development agencies continue to justify more interventions with the 
same erroneous assumptions that led previous plans to fail. A serious 
limitation of this conceptual apparatus is that it predetermines how to 
overcome the shortcomings in development interventions. 
Ferguson deals with the two most common assumptions that 
depoliticize development planning: the principle of ‘governmentality’ 
and its corollary – the linear (i.e. technical) planning method. While 
the former assumes ‘the main features of economy and society must 
be within the control of a neutral, unitary, and effective national 
government, and thus responsive to planners’ blueprints’ (ibid.: 72), 
the latter provides a ‘blueprint approach’ that believes public policy is a 
series of linear inputs for the production of certain quantifiable outputs. 
Ferguson suggests, however, that these apolitical assumptions are the 
cause of poor development planning, not the result of development 
planning itself.
Ferguson’s semantic engagement with Foucault’s ‘power of 
discourse’ (cf. Escobar 1988) limits his study to looking into the 
attendant issues that merit equal, if not more, attention, i.e.: How 
are false assumptions produced? What are the elements within the 
development discourse that justify development interventions relying 
on such false assumptions? How does the beneficiary community 
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think and act in response to the ‘anti-politics machine’? By attending 
to the above questions, one can construct a more progressive critique 
of development discourse that aspires to an improved development 
discourse and practice (intervention). 
Although development discourse led to the evolution of different 
approaches to rationalize state power, the state has occupied a central 
and dominant place in the discourse of development theory and 
practice, determining the development of a society through linear 
public policy models that consider policy planning as a series of linear 
inputs resulting in an intended output (see Figure 11.1). 
The linear public policy prescription is evident throughout the 
literature, from the World Bank reports to scholarly academic writings 
indicating that there is a resistance to engaging in a deeper political 
analysis to understand the reasons why the linear and the scientific 
policies have failed to produce the intended results. 
The limitation of the model is that it reduces policy planning to 
a technical exercise in problem-solving. Moreover, the model is also 
susceptible to what James Scott calls ‘high-modernist ideology’ – that 
is, an overconfident emphasis on scientific and technical progress 
Recognizing and defining the problem to be addressed
Identifying possible policy solutions
Assessing the potential advantages and disadvantages of the
alternative policy choices
Choosing the policy option that best fits the desired solution
Implementing the policy
Possibly evaluating the outcome
11.1 The linear policy formation model (source: Tordella (2003: 9))
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to satisfy growing human needs, expand production, tame nature 
(including human nature) and resolve all the problems of society (Scott 
1998: 4, 89–90). The application of this model depoliticizes the social 
and political issues, implicitly demanding a technical solution. On 
the other hand, the state has been recast as a technical instrument for 
mechanically implementing development plans as it visualizes them. 
The divorce of policy from the realm of politics is most problematic 
with this ideal-linear model, which depoliticizes the nature of political 
power and the environment in which development plans operate. 
The state does not operate as an idealized monopoly of power within 
societies. Scott, for instance, makes a strong case that the subalterns 
actively challenge state control (cf. Huntington 1968: 177–91; Tripp 
1997; Coplan 2001) through ‘hidden’ non-compliance with the state 
authorities, which he powerfully termed ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 
1985). In recognition of this, Migdal’s ‘state-in-society’ model of 
political power avoids the limitations of depoliticized development 
planning and focuses on the study of the exercise of political power 
in real, not idealized, societies (1988, 2001). Depicting society as ‘a 
mélange of social organizations’ rather than dichotomous structures 
(e.g. centre–periphery, modern–traditional, etc.), Migdal presents his 
state-in-society model, which has two important components relevant 
to development theory (1988: 28): 
1. Social control and political power derive from the ability to augment 
social welfare; and 
2. As this augmentation of social welfare is not monopolized by any 
single source, social control and political power exist fragmented 
among ‘a mélange’ of competing and cooperating power-holders. 
The first component is similar to Scott’s argument that the primary 
concern of the peasants is to sustain their livelihoods, and therefore 
power lies in the hands of those patrons who are able to augment the 
welfare of the community (1976: 180–85). Thus, despite the state’s 
resistance to other organizations achieving predominance, the state 
emerges as the dominant authority once other organizations, such as 
ethnic groups, families, clans, multinational corporations, domestic 
enterprises, tribes and villages, offer individuals the resources for 
survival. Here the individual makes a choice, though difficult, among 
the competing components of survival strategies. Non-compliance 
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with the state authority here is not just personal deviance or criminality 
or corruption; rather it is an important struggle over authority to make 
rules that determine the individual’s social behaviour. 
The second component indicates that the state exists within ‘a 
mélange’ of power brokers that compete for social control and, in 
turn, complicates the process of how social control is exercised. Here 
accommodation of power among different power brokers, such as local 
politicians, state bureaucrats and implementers and non-state local 
‘strongmen’, ensures the restriction of the monopolization of dominant 
power by any single formal or non-formal power broker (Migdal 2001: 
84–94). 
This does not mean that leaders do not have an interest in making 
the state the vehicle for progressive social change. Ultimately, it is 
the implementers who must make policy work at the ground level, 
sandwiched between the policy-makers and the society. Here they 
confront different kinds of pressures, from formal supervisors, the 
intended beneficiaries of the implemented programme, regional 
state actors (e.g. peer politicians and bureaucrats) and the non-state 
strongmen (e.g. moneylenders, landlords and local businessmen). 
Along with these pressures, the personal character and professional 
obligations of the implementers influence the intended outcome of the 
interventions. The policies and plans that ignore such dynamics are 
naturally susceptible to unintended consequences. 
The preceding section argued that development interventions tend to 
produce unintended consequences for local communities owing to the 
incorporation of false assumptions regarding how politics is exercised in 
the local contexts. Building on the insights of Ferguson, I have argued 
that incorporation of false assumptions depoliticizes the real context 
of social control and development planning in the local communities. 
Finally, Migdal’s state-in-society approach that recognizes the state 
as ‘a mélange’ of power brokers helps us to understand how informal 
and non-state channels of power lead development interventions to 
produce unintended consequences. Building on these theories, I will 
examine how development interventions produce ‘underdevelopment’ 
by analysing the politics of hunger deaths in Kashipur as an example. 
Kashipur caught in the webs of development
The old termite-eaten district gazetteer may have been accurate in 
declaring that ‘the entire Kashipur tahsil … is a wild country, a tangle of 
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hills and valleys with a few patches of cultivable land’. An administrative 
unit since 1573, nearly four hundred years later Kashipur still had 
no town, only clusters of small villages overwhelmingly inhabited by 
Scheduled Tribes – the most marginalized group on India’s social totem 
pole (Senapati and Sahu 1966: 8, 442, 446). In partial contrast, today 
in the Kashipur block of Rayagada district there are two or three small 
towns and 416 villages with an increasing proportion of general caste 
and Scheduled Caste inhabitants, local governance units, a few local 
NGOs and a considerably improved communication infrastructure. 
The total population of the block is 121,086, of which 62 per cent 
belong to Scheduled Tribes, 20 per cent to Scheduled Castes and 
the remaining 18 per cent are General Caste (GOO 2007: 11–12). 
As stated above, though very rich in natural resources, Kashipur has 
the dubious distinction of being known for its poverty, hunger and 
backwardness, thus presenting a paradoxical picture of resource 
prosperity and economic poverty. 
As a result, development interventions of various local, national and 
international agencies were brought together for the development of 
Kashipur and its people. But a British scholar who visited Kashipur 
in early 2002 to study how development and relief work in rural India 
writes:
Vulnerability to crisis remains a long-term dilemma for this 
community despite that ‘development’ has been the Government 
of Orissa’s official raison d’être and that the state enjoys the 
full-time assistance of five UN development agencies, several 
national and international NGOs, the World Bank, DFID, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Kashipur Block also has been embroiled 
in development work including over 40 years of government 
watershed projects, 21 years of service from a local NGO, plus 
multi-million dollar development projects administered by IFAD 
and UNICEF. (Tordella 2003: 1)
Here my goal is to understand the intricacy of the production of 
underdevelopment, unravelling how this development ‘assistance’ has 
failed to contribute measurably to the welfare and progress of the tribals. 
I will present here, as an example, an analysis of one of the multimillion-
rupee development projects implemented in Kashipur, administered by 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 
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As described at the beginning of the chapter, during 1985/86 Kashipur 
faced a severe drought. Starvation deaths were reported in both the 
local and national media. The death toll reached 400. So Kashipur 
block was deemed an underdeveloped area and targeted for immediate 
development intervention. A mega development project administered 
by IFAD was launched in Kashipur in May 1988, intended ‘to achieve 
a sustainable economic uplift of the tribal population with a spread of 
benefits that would reach the weaker and most disadvantaged section 
of the community’ (IFAD 1998: 2). 
The programme was implemented by the Orissa Tribal Development 
Programme (OTDP). In an interview, Akhila Saunta, who was in 
power as a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) during IFAD’s 
intervention in Kashipur, told me, ‘the people were not considered 
worthy enough to be consulted at any stage and the project was 
implemented according to the convenience of the project authorities, not 
according to the priorities of the beneficiaries’. Therefore, Agragamee, 
a local NGO, initially involved in the OTDP for human resource 
development (HRD) activities, withdrew from the project because it 
believed that the people’s voices were not given due emphasis in the 
prioritization of the project’s activities and implementation. The IFAD 
evaluation report also acknowledges that
The target group did not feel ‘included’ and sufficiently integrated 
in the project […] The degree of participation at all stages in the 
project was limited – for instance, tribal people were minimally 
involved in project design and were seldom involved in developing 
the annual work programme and the budget. The project lacked 
consultation with the targeted population, thus creating an 
atmosphere of mistrust and discontent. (IFAD 1999: 2, 6)
With targeted beneficiaries of 12,500 tribal families and 4,000 non-
tribal families, OTDP made ‘good achievements’ in infrastructure 
development. With the objective of bringing the tribals into the 
national mainstream, the development of infrastructure was accorded 
considerable importance. A road from Tikiri, a small town in Kashipur 
block, to Kashipur block headquarters and a railway line from 
Rayagada to Koraput were constructed, connecting Kashipur to the 
outer world through a rail route. The project was ‘relatively successful’ 
in land surveying and settlement activities. Playing an instrumental 
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role in land surveying, the project issued rights to dongar (hill) land 
to 6,837 families in 236 villages, covering a total area of 17,175 acres 
of land (IFAD 1998: 2). The scheme was not implemented in half of 
the villages in the block, and ‘those villages whose land was likely to 
be acquired for mining and refinery purposes were specifically kept 
out of the ambit of the programme’ (V. Das 2001: 2613). Through 
the agriculture and natural resources development component, a few 
water harvesting structures were constructed and varieties of high-
yielding hybrid seeds and new crops were introduced. For example, 
the tribals were taught to grow coffee and mulberry (for sericulture) in 
their dongars, where they used to grow traditional crops such as ragi, 
small millets, legumes and niger. The OTDP succeeded in irrigating 
only half of the land targeted and performed below expectations on 
human resources development. Within a decade (1987–97), IFAD had 
spent Rs600 milllion2 and a further Rs400 million was spent by the 
Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) for the development 
of Kashipur block alone (Sarangi 2002: 3241). 
The project ended with many shortcomings. Money was spent 
hastily without even meeting the official targets and there were large-
scale misappropriation and irregularities. OTDP had twelve project 
managers in an implementation period of nine years, which obviously 
prevented a minimum degree of continuity. Highlighting all these, 
one local daily reports, for example, on the closing day of OTDP, 31 
December 1997, ‘On this day bills worth Rs.5 crore had been passed 
for payment to contractors and other suppliers. The report expresses 
surprise, that in one day, how so much money could have been transacted 
and accounted for’ (The Dharitri 2001, cited in Das 2003: 81). The 
sustainability of the development intervention became questionable, 
not to mention that the water harvesting structures, irrigation systems 
and roads constructed under infrastructure development – the most 
successful component of the project – were found to be deteriorating 
at the time of the evaluation (IFAD 1999: 6). Another problem is that 
the OTDP created a community of wage labourers out of an almost 
self-sufficient community (cf. Nanda 1994). According to the IFAD 
evaluation report (1998: 2), 
The tribals were provided both with food-for-work and a token 
salary in return for their labour in developing project-related 
infrastructure. However, once infrastructure activities were 
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completed, employment opportunities were absent, thus leaving 
the tribals without the cash-in-hand they had received through 
OTDP. Having got used to cash-in-hand, the tribals have been 
forced to revert again to moneylenders, which has only aggravated 
their indebtedness problem.
The people of Kashipur realized the motive behind the IFAD project 
in the 1990s when the area was selected for corporate development 
intervention. As early as 1992, Kashipur was identified as a bauxite 
resource for the establishment of a mining project by Utkal Alumina 
International Ltd (UAIL). 
The story of hunger deaths in Kashipur
Despite so much ‘effective’ public intervention, the irony is that the 
number of Below Poverty Line (BPL) families in the block, according 
to government estimates, increased from 15,471 in 1992 to 24,582 in 
1997 (Sarangi 2002: 3241). Even today, out of a total of 32,245 families 
in Kashipur, 19,158 (59.41 per cent) are BPL families. Moreover, 
what is surprising is that hunger deaths continue to be a regular yearly 
phenomenon in the area. For example, in Kashipur, 400 people died 
of hunger in 1986, 60 in 1999, 40 in 2000, 44 in 2001 (ibid.: 3240, 
3239), about 400 in 2007 and 15 in 2010 (author’s fieldwork), though 
the official causes and reasons provided are diverse and ambiguous. 
The tug-of-war between the ruling and the opposition party continues 
with regard to hunger deaths. The state defines starvation death as ‘death 
completely without food’. Thus, the ruling government has denied that 
hunger was the cause of the deaths, saying that the medical reports show 
that the victims had consumed ‘poisonous food’ such as ‘mango kernels, 
tamarind seed powder, mushrooms and pumpkin leaves’ (Sarangi 
2002: 3239). The real causes of the deaths are completely ignored. 
As usual, the ruling government continues distributing food grains to 
the poor families at a subsidized rate through the Public Distribution 
System (PDS), issuing compensation to the victims’ families and 
establishing emergency packages such as Food for Work, the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), etc. The best thing 
they have done is to appoint a committee to investigate ‘hunger deaths’, 
which has suggested some remedial measures. 
The bone of contention here is not whether these were ‘starvation 
deaths’ or deaths due to ‘food poisoning’. My investigation here is on the 
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current state of destitution in Kashipur and the life-threatening condi-
tions that compel the tribals to consume mango kernel, tamarind seeds, 
ghurdi sag (a kind of wild green leaf) and/or poisonous mushrooms. In 
general, the staple food of the people in this area is mandia pej – gruel 
prepared out of ragi (finger millet), locally known as mandia. Flavoured 
with a pinch of salt and a handful of rice or maize corn thrown in, this 
rather bland gruel is taken for breakfast, lunch and, in the absence of 
rice, for dinner too, without variation. It is a staple food for babies too. 
Rice and suan (little millet) come next in the list of food items. Rice 
is a luxury for them. In addition, they produce varieties of pulses, oil 
seeds and vegetables mostly for their consumption. They also cultivate 
a few cash crops like alsi (niger). To a large extent, food consumption 
depends upon the seasonal agricultural yields and forest produce.
The identifiable sources of livelihood for the tribals of Kashipur are 
agriculture, occasional wage labour and collection of minor forest produce. 
(Now the hills of Kashipur are barren and the forest is almost desolate 
owing to dongar (shifting) cultivation, corporate interest and jungle mafia. 
The J. K. Paper Mill at Rayagada is responsible for the depletion of the 
forest in Kashipur to a large extent.) The hilly terrain of Kashipur does 
not leave much space for plain land cultivation and nearly 90 per cent of 
the plain lands are not irrigated. So the tribals practise shifting cultivation. 
The presence of laterite soil brings low yields. Per capita landholding in 
the district is 1.5 hectares and per capita grain output is 124 kilograms per 
annum (Jena 2008: 20). In Kashipur, out of the total cultivable area of 
37,124 hectares of land, paddy is grown only in 7,585 hectares and other 
crops, including varieties of small millets, pulses, oil seeds, vegetable and 
cash crops, are cultivated on the remaining 29,539 hectares of land. Of 
the total cultivable area, only 4,980 hectares (13 per cent) are irrigated 
and the rest are rain fed. In the block, there are 3,705 sukhbasi (landless) 
families and 3,293 families without homestead land. All the agricultural 
produce, taken together, lasts at best for six months. The chronic food 
shortage starts as soon as the rainy season arrives and it continues until 
the beginning of the next harvest. 
Even though the area is known for food shortages during the rainy 
season and non-availability of wage earning, the tribals of Kashipur 
(namely the Kondh, Paraja, Penga and Jhodia) prefer not to migrate 
in search of alternative livelihoods. So, during this period, they mostly 
depend on wage earning, which is not readily available. During lean 
periods, the other available means of survival is the PDS rice supplied 
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by the government. Many families are not in a position to buy the PDS 
rice owing to lack of money. The poor families mortgage their ration 
cards to the local moneylenders for a sum of a mere Rs.50 or even 
less. Despite possessing the cards, many of these families hardly ever 
purchase the prescribed amount of 25 kilograms of rice as they find it 
difficult to meet the cost. The moneylenders who buy the rice generally 
grant a pittance (mostly 5 kilograms) to the card holder and make a 
profit by selling the remaining 20 kilograms on the open market at a 
higher price (EPW 2002: 3477). The District Collector, Bishnupada 
Sethi, admits, ‘The people are so poor, they often don’t have money 
even to buy rice at BPL rates’ (Satapathy 2001). Half of the poor 
families having BPL cards admit that they are unable to buy PDS rice 
at times when it is most needed.
Besides all these problems, the public supply is irregular, unpredict-
able, insufficient and corrupt. As soon as the PDS rice reaches the local 
ration shops or Panchayat offices, people rush there, even walking for 
the whole day in the hill terrains. Very often, I have seen a crowd of 
men and women sitting in front of the Panchayat offices waiting for 
their monthly quota of ration. As, in most cases, the PDS rice is dis-
tributed on a first-come-first-served basis, sometimes laggards end up 
getting nothing. Sometimes, sitting and starving for the whole day and 
getting no ration, they return home in the evening in the hope that they 
will get rice the next day. 
Anticipating the non-availability of food and wage earning from 
July to September every year, the tribals of Kashipur collect and store 
dried mango kernels and tamarind seeds to consume during times 
of food crisis. Eating mango kernel once or twice a year on specific 
ceremonial occasions is fine. However, consuming mango kernel or 
tamarind pulp as a staple food is inadequate. But when there is no food 
grain left and hunger haunts the belly, the tribals will eat anything they 
can lay their hands on, from mango kernel, tamarind seeds, ghurdi sag, 
bamboo shoots and dried beef to poisonous mushrooms. Tankupej, 
the mango kernel gruel, is a heavy food, hard to digest. Thus, when 
taken continuously without any variation, it leads to indigestion and 
dysentery. Deaths due to this are considered (by the government) ‘food 
poison deaths’ rather than ‘hunger deaths’ as the tribals have not died 
empty bellied but have consumed mango kernel gruel! 
Another problem associated with food scarcity is the exploitation 
of tribals by the moneylenders, traders, contractors and bureaucrats. 
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Mostly during the monsoon, finding no opportunity for wage 
earning and not being able to mobilize money to buy PDS rice, the 
tribals approach moneylenders, who are ever ready to provide loans 
both in cash and kind. As soon as the tribals harvest their crops, 
the moneylender ensures payment with exorbitant rates of interest 
(sometimes ranging between 200 and 400 per cent, depending on the 
calculations of the moneylender). As an old man from Bilamala village 
in Kashipur says, ‘Adivasi kamani, Sahukar bharani – the tribals harvest 
to pay the moneylenders’. Thus, a major portion of the harvest goes to 
the moneylenders, pushing the tribals into a vicious circle of usury. 
Realizing the gravity of the situation, Agragamee, after a series of 
discussions and consultations with the local people, developed an 
alternative saving strategy to provide the tribals with a self-sustaining 
food security system throughout the year, especially during monsoon. 
After suggestions from Agragamee, community grain banks called 
kutumb panthi started in a few selected villages, with each family 
contributing to the collective saving of grains just after the harvest. As 
a result of this, in 1993, UNICEF supported Agragamee’s pioneering 
effort in carrying forward the programme of food security in Kashipur 
block. Thus, to encourage development of the scheme, Agragamee 
provided a matching contribution of grain to each of the newly built 
kutumb panthis. In Kashipur alone, Agragamee helped to set up 535 
kutumb panthis in 412 villages (Das and Das 2001: 131). In times of 
need, the villagers borrowed from it, initially by paying a high rate of 
interest equalling the amounts charged by the moneylenders. This 
helped the kutumb panthis to grow fast. As surplus grain built up, the 
rate of interest was lowered. All the decisions regarding the grain bank 
– time of grain collections and distribution, interest rate, monitoring of 
defaulters and use of surplus grain – were taken collectively, ensuring 
transparency and continuity of the system. Half of the members of the 
kutumb panthis were women. It is observed that kutumb panthis with 
strong women leadership succeeded better and lasted longer than those 
managed by men. However, these kutumb panthis were very helpful 
in providing food security during the worst periods of food shortage 
and also in providing an alternative strategy for the poor tribals to free 
themselves from the clutches of moneylenders. 
After six years, UNICEF’s support of Agragamee’s endeavour in 
food security came to an end. With no support, Agragamee had to cut 
its monitoring of kutumb panthis. Nevertheless, a few kutumb panthis 
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were sustained by the communities themselves. But in many villages 
the kutumb panthis came to an end owing to a strong counter-campaign 
by the moneylenders, who saw that a major source of their income was 
slipping away. Poor storage facilities resulting in loss of food grains, the 
apathy of the people towards the kutumb panthis, defaults in repayment 
and lack of monitoring were some of the other reasons for the failure 
of the kutumb panthis. It was found, however, that the kutumb panthis 
had stopped functioning three or four years earlier in the villages where 
hunger deaths were reported in 2001 (Agragamee 2007: 3). Today the 
kutumb panthi no longer exists in any tribal village in Kashipur. 
In August 2006, I visited Panasguda and Bilamal villages in Kashipur. 
In July 2001, seven people were reported dead owing to consumption of 
poisonous mushrooms in Panasguda. Although Bilamal is the adopted 
model village of the UAIL, four family members also died of hunger 
in this village on 8 August 2001. By 25 August 2001, nineteen persons 
were reported dead in the same block owing to consumption of mango 
kernel, tamarind seeds, wild mushrooms and leaves. The story is the 
same in many other villages in Kashipur. 
In August 2007, I was in Kashipur conducting fieldwork. All the 
villages were affected by ‘diarrhoea’ and ‘cholera’. According to the 
government health authorities of Rayagada District, 6,000 patients 
from Kashipur block suffering from ‘cholera’ were treated in August 
2007 (Jena 2008). The death toll increased rapidly. Medical teams, 
media persons, activists, researchers and politicians visited the area 
to assess whether the deaths were due to ‘dysentery’, ‘cholera’, ‘food 
poisoning’ or ‘starvation’. Controversy continues. As usual, the 
government issued compensation for the deceased and provided relief 
and job opportunities (through NREGS) from its emergency fund. The 
irony is that, in this situation, the people have not been provided with 
their wages even after two months of the completion of the NREGS 
works. 
The stark reality, however, is that backbreaking poverty and chronic 
food shortage continue in Kashipur. During my stay in Kucheipadar 
village in September 2007, I was invited one day by Suni (name 
changed) to dinner. I followed her that dark night to her house, which 
was located at the other end of the village. Reaching home, she was 
happy to inform her family members that I was going to dine with 
them. Suni, with the help of her brother and sisters, hurriedly cleaned 
and lit the old broken lantern (the tribals generally do not light lamps 
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at night as they manage with the fire from the oven). The small room 
was illuminated and I could see everything – nearly emptied grain bins, 
a few bunches of dried maize hanging from the ceiling beam, a few 
clothes on the dola (rafter) and a few earthen and aluminum pots on the 
raised earthen platform (kitchen). Suni was quick to serve me food in 
aluminum plates. I asked her to give food to her father and brother, and 
she did so. She also got her own food. We sat together to eat. Initially 
I took the curry to be dal (curry prepared out of pulses). But I could 
feel the difference while eating. To my query as to what kind of dal it 
was, she told me sheepishly that it was ambdijhola – a curry prepared 
out of rice gruel supplemented with tamarind. Her father interrupted 
her and said that, during rainy days, it was not only vegetables but also 
staple food commodities that become scarce. He was worried that their 
food bin was getting emptied and they had to wait for another three 
months for the crops to ripen (at the earliest, maize ripens by the end 
of October). During lean periods, they had to depend on the PDS 
rice, which they buy with their wage earnings. Even the monthly quota 
of PDS rice (25 kilograms/month) was not sufficient for their eight-
member family. If they earned more in wages, they bought rice from the 
market. Otherwise, they survived by consuming jahnapej (maize gruel, 
if dried maize is available), tankupej (mango kernel gruel), tamarind 
seeds, ghurdisag (a variety of wild greens) and mushrooms. ‘Do you like 
eating tankupej?’ I asked. Almost everybody in the family grimaced and 
Suni’s father said, ‘Nobody likes to take the bitter-tasting tankupej but 
when there is nothing at home and rats run in your belly, then you have 
to eat whatever you find.’
The story is the same for almost every family, except a very few elites 
in the village. Food shortage is a persistent problem in Kashipur. In the 
name of eradicating poverty and hunger deaths, the colonial legacy of 
development interventions continues without any attention being paid 
to immanent development. In other words, development interventions 
of different kinds continue ‘by creating abnormalities’ (Escobar 1992: 
25) in more concrete terms like ‘the poor’, ‘the malnourished’, ‘the 
illiterate’ and ‘the landless’. In Kashipur, in the quest to eradicate all 
problems, the development interventions have continued indefinitely. 
Bhagaban Majhi complains that nobody has paid any attention to the 
most desired development interventions in the area, namely irrigating 
arable lands, giving land titles to landless families, planting fruit-
bearing trees in dongars and creating employment opportunities during 
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lean periods. Rather the government has constructed water reservoirs 
to provide water to the company, handed over arable land to the 
company, and planted coffee, mulberry (for sericulture) and eucalypts 
(for supplying timber to paper mills). While the tribals of Kashipur 
demand better education and healthcare facilities, the government has 
been establishing police outposts and barracks. 
The point, however, is that while lack of capacity-building 
and state imperialism have succeeded in keeping the area and its 
people ‘underdeveloped’, it is the premeditated political will of the 
government to prove that the land in the area is unproductive and, 
hence, corporate intervention is necessary. Thus, after the 2001 
hunger deaths, the local MLA of the then ruling BJD government 
claimed, ‘Had people allowed mining/industry, this [deaths] would 
not have happened’ (Sarangi 2002: 3241). It is imperative to mention 
at this juncture that, in 2001, four people died of hunger in Bilamal, 
the company’s (UAIL) adopted model village. Nonetheless, today all 
political parties, along with some of the local elites, are proclaiming 
‘industry is the solution’. They do not discuss, however, how to put an 
end to hunger deaths, unemployment and other perennial problems 
that the tribals face. Sankar Muduli, an educated tribal boy from 
Bagrijhola, a village adjacent to the boundary wall of UAIL, argues, 
‘The officers and the leaders were exploiting us earlier. Now those 
people are politicizing starvation deaths. By means of this, it will be 
easy for them to bring the company in here.’ 
The production of underdevelopment
The previous section illustrated how false assumptions regarding 
the exercise of power and linear policy models have produced 
unintended consequences for the tribals of Kashipur. The development 
interventions and relief measures in Kashipur have resulted in two long-
term unintended consequences. First, the discourse of ‘emergency’ 
and ‘relief’ in this context seems to have diverted attention away from 
the essential problem of hunger (which is wrongly assumed to have 
been ‘relieved’) and its fundamental causes in Kashipur (it is assumed 
simply to be due to a year of drought). By attributing the hunger deaths 
to ‘drought’, ‘food poisoning’ or ‘cholera’, for example, attention 
has been diverted from the fact that severe food shortage is a serious 
problem in Kashipur. Another important fact is that nearly 90 per cent 
of lands in Kashipur remain unirrigated, although almost all the tribals 
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depend on agriculture for their subsistence. Secondly, the politics 
of relief in Odisha ensure that by the time relief is undertaken, the 
community have become disempowered and reached the final stage 
of vulnerability to hunger (i.e. visible destitution or starvation deaths). 
As the tribals are not bystanders to hunger, waiting for the government 
relief to reach them, they try to employ their own coping mechanisms 
(Figure 11.2) and, in the end, they become more vulnerable owing to 
loss of assets and the breaking down of all social safety nets. Finally, the 
relief measures in the form of the provision of PDS rice, the food for 
work programme, the creation of emergency employment opportunities 
through programmes like the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) 
and NREGS feed the tribals temporarily and they become even more 
vulnerable once these relief measures are over. 
The inadvertent outcomes are the results of the incorporation of 
false assumptions in development planning. First, everybody – the 
media, the public, bureaucrats and politicians – assumes that the state 
is the sole authority in terms of relieving the hunger crisis. The ‘victims’ 
are in fact not bystanders to hunger deaths, and they employ their own 
survival strategies long before the food crisis reaches the point where 
the media and the government appreciate the need for relief. Thus, 
augmentation of the tribals’ own coping strategies long before the 
food crisis reaches its terminal stages is a more useful form of relief 
than feeding them temporarily while they are dying. Secondly, another 
false assumption that underlies the hunger crisis and relief model 
in Kashipur is the belief in linear policy planning, as illustrated in 
Figure 11.3.
This model accepts the hunger crisis as a situation that needs particular 
state relief. The food insecurity, in fact, is the result of the accumulation 
of the multiple vagaries the tribals face. Thus, state relief measures 
Food shortage Wage earning Borrowing Mortgage of valuables
Selling of assets including immovable property Eating whatever they find Unnatural deaths
11.2 The hunger deaths cycle
Drought Crop loss Hunger crisis Relief No hunger crisis
11.3 Linear hunger crisis and relief model (source: Tordella (2003: 32))
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in the form of temporary feeding never cover all the vulnerabilities, 
which extend beyond loss of entitlements and availability of food. 
Furthermore, the policies do not operate in a vacuum but 
are influenced in the long run by multiple power brokers. Thus, 
understanding the role of individuals and ‘vested interests’ is central 
to understanding why the relief measures have failed to achieve the 
intended outcome. Tordella (2003: 34) writes,
The seeds for Kashipur’s hunger-related deaths were planted by 
a decade of local and district administrators who did not irrigate 
un-cultivatable tribal farmland, by the moneylender and local 
contractors who sought to deconstruct community grain banks, 
and by local NGO leaders who had adopted policies leading to the 
organization’s 18-month suspension from conducting development 
work in Kashipur.
The bureaucrats and politicians, along with the local strongmen, 
have come to a consensus that the problems of poverty and hunger 
dominate the lands of Kashipur. The root of the hunger crisis, they 
claim, is the non-fertile land of Kashipur, which does not produce 
enough for the tribals to sustain themselves, although, in fact, no 
attention has been paid to enhancement of the productivity of the land 
(e.g. irrigation, introduction of new technology and planting of fruit-
bearing trees in the dongars). Thus, the politics of hunger deaths has 
produced land as ‘the problem’. The government and elites, therefore, 
argue that the land should be exploited to its fullest possible extent 
to augment the welfare of the community. This argument invites and 
justifies another development intervention to solve the problem of 
hunger deaths in Kashipur, which leads to Kashipur’s arable lands 
being handed over to corporate concerns like UAIL, which promise a 
better future for the tribals of Kashipur. Thus, ‘development’ becomes 
significant for ‘everyday forms of state formation’ (Joseph and Nugent 
1994), continuously allowing the state to underpin and restate its raison 
d’être and become instantiated in the life-world of the marginalized. 
It seems, then, that the goal of all development interventions is not 
alleviating the suffering, hunger and poverty of the tribals, as all 
programmes avowedly claim, but eliminating them as a cultural, 
social and agricultural community. Escobar therefore writes, ‘what is 
at stake is not really the eradication of hunger (even if the planners 
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wholeheartedly desired so) but its multiplication and dispersion into an 
ever finer web, a play of mobile visibility which is hard to hold in one’s 
insight’ (1995: 117). The tribals, nonetheless, continue to struggle to 
sustain their identity and survival strategies, even with the development 
of capitalism.
Notes
1 Bandha, meaning ‘to close’, is a 
form of protest in which activists declare 
a general strike, with offices, businesses, 
schools, etc., remaining closed. Gherao, 
meaning ‘encirclement’, is a form of 
protest in which activists prevent 
employers leaving a place of work until 
their demands are met.
2 Rs = Indian rupees (INR). On 16 
December 2014, the exchange rate was 
INR1.00 = US$0.0156.
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This collection offers a timely reassessment of viable ways of addressing poverty across the globe 
today. The profile of global poverty has changed dramatically over the past decade, and around 
three-quarters of the poor now live in middle income countries, making inequality a major issue. 
This requires us to fundamentally rethink anti-poverty strategies and policies, as many aspects of 
the established framework for poverty reduction are no longer effective. Featuring contributions 
from Latin America, Africa and Asia, this much-needed collection answers some of the key 
questions arising as development policy confronts the challenges of poverty and inequality on the 
global, national and local scale in both urban and rural contexts.
Providing poverty researchers and practitioners with valuable new tools to address new forms of 
poverty in the right way, Poverty and Inequality in Middle Income Countries shows how a 
radical switch from aid to redistribution-based social policies is needed to combat new forms of 
global poverty.
‘This timely and important collection of essays breathes fresh air into the debate about what it means to 
be poor in today’s world, and what can be done to end poverty.’
Tony Addison, chief economist, United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics 
Research
‘The excellent papers in this volume throw much needed light upon the politics of poverty reduction in 
middle income countries. They deserve a wide readership.’
Armando Barrientos, University of Manchester
‘A welcome addition to the literature on poverty. In focusing on domestic actors and politics, the essays 
in this volume help to shed light on the social drivers of poverty and available instruments for effective 
poverty reduction.’
Jimi Adesina, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
‘This volume is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the causes of, and solutions to, poverty and 
inequality in the global South. Comparative and interdisciplinary in approach, it provides a comprehensive 
and critical analysis and is a timely addition to the literature on these issues.’
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